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Abstract 
The conflict between the Turkish State and the Kurdish populations of Turkey can be 
summarized into four general time periods: from the 1920’s – 60’s, where the Turkish 
nation was being formed, during the 1960’s-80’s where its foundations began to be 
contested, the 1980’s – to the end of the 90’s, where a civil war ensued, and up until the 
first decade of the 2000’s, where democratization efforts ensued. Following the second 
millennia, and the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
attempts at a political peace process to solve the Kurdish conflict (already commenced, 
in the 90´s) increased. Firstly, with the secret “Oslo Talks” between 2008 – 2011, and 
then followed by the on-going peace process, which commenced between the Turkish 
State and the PKK in 2012.  
 
The aim of this research is to examine participation mechanisms of civil society, and 
other societal sectors, individuals and organizations, in the ongoing Kurdish Peace 
Process between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish State, with the 
help of the “Broadening Participation” framework.  This thesis seeks to evaluate the 
analytical strength of this framework in the context of the Kurdish Peace Process, and 
through this, provide an overview of participation mechanisms in this case study, in 
order to identify and describe additional instances, also beyond the framework´s reach. 
This research will take a broader view on participation, examining inclusion in the 
wider peace process, not limiting its view to only the ongoing peace negotiations. Thus 
it will examine inclusion models working to influence track I, but also, a wider array of 
activities of different sectors and tracks, in attempting to influence a resolution and 
transformation of conflict at all societal levels. 
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Özet  
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti ve Türkiye'deki Kürt nüfus arasındaki çatışma dört genel 
zaman diliminde özetlenebilir: 1920'lerden – '60'lara, Türk milletinin şekillenme 
dönemi; 1960'lar – 1980'ler, bu temellerinin tartışmaya açılması; 1980'lerden – '90ların 
sonlarına, iç savaşın ortaya çıkışı; ve 2000'lerin ilk on yılına kadar, demokratikleşme 
teşebbüsleri. İkibinlerden itibaren Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin (AKP) iktidara 
gelmesiyle siyasal barış sürecinde Kürt Sorunu'nun çözümüne yönelik ('90'larda 
başlayan fakat sonuç vermeyen) teşebbüsler artmıştır. Bunların ilki 2008 – 2011 yılları 
arasında gerçekleşen gizli “Oslo Görüşmeleri” ve onu takiben Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Devleti ve PKK arasında 2012 yılından beri devam etmekte olan barış sürecidir. Bütün 
barış girişimlerine rağmen anlaşmaya varabilmek adına uzlaşmalarda kat edilen yol çok 
fazla değildir. 
 
Bu araştırmanın amacı Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti ve PKK arasında devam eden Kürt 
Barış Süreci'ne “Katılımın Genişletilmesi” kavramsal çerçevesinin de yardımıyla  sivil 
toplumun ve diğer toplumsal sektörlerin, bireylerin ve kuruluşların katılım 
mekanizmalarını incelemektir. Tez, bu çerçevenin Kürt Barış Süreci bağlamında bu 
kavramsal çerçevenin analitik yeterliliğini değerlendirmeyi amaçlarken, aynı zamanda 
çerçevenin odağında ve ötesinde yer alan diğer örneklerin belirlenmesi ve tanımlanması 
amacıyla katılım mekanizmalarına genel bir bakış da sunmaktadır. Bu araştırma barış 
sürecinde tarafların dahil edilmesi pratiklerini incelerken devam eden barış 
müzakerelerine bağlı kalmadan katılımı geniş bir ölçekten ele alacaktır. Bu yüzde resmi 
görüşmeleri etkileyecek dahil etme modellerinin yanısıra bütün toplumsal seviyelerde 
çatışmanın çözümü ve dönüştürülmesi için farklı sektörlerin faaliyetlerini de 
inceleyecektir. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this research is to examine participation mechanisms of civil society, and 
other societal sectors, individuals and organizations, in the ongoing Kurdish Peace 
Process between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish State, with the 
help of the “Broadening Participation” framework.a This thesis seeks to evaluate the 
analytical strength of this framework in the context of the Kurdish Peace Process, and 
through this, provide an overview of participation mechanisms in this case study, in 
order to identify and describe additional instances, also beyond the framework´s reach. 
This research will take a broader view on participation, examining inclusion in the 
wider peace process, not limiting its view to only the ongoing peace negotiations. Thus 
it will examine inclusion models working to influence Track I, but also, a wider array of 
activities of different sectors and Tracks (1.5, II and III), in attempting to build peace. 
 
The political rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, who came to 
power in 2002, will be examined. There is a prevalent view that their political tenure 
has brought the most progress to the process of ending the violent conflict between the 
Turkish State and the Kurds of Turkey. The period of the AKP’s rule has undoubtedly 
brought on the largest attempts to solve the Kurdish conflict, during which Track I 
initiatives such as the secret “Oslo Talks”, which commenced in 2008 and 
unsuccessfully concluded in September 2011,1 took place. Recent talks re-commenced, 
and have been ongoing directly between the PKK leadership and its leader, Abdullah 
Öcalan, and the Turkish state, since October 2012. Hence, the time scope of this 
research will be the beginning of the Oslo Talks in 2008, up until the local elections 
taking place in March 2014, where the AKP once again won a sweeping majority. 
 
This research aims to ultimately give an overview of the types of participation of 
citizens, organizations and other societal actors in the Kurdish peace processes, at 
various tracks and different channels, in the selected time period (2008 – 20014).b 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  “Turkey: The PKK and a Kurdish Settlement”, (Istanbul/Brussels: International Crisis 
Group (ICG), 2012) 	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According to Spurk, 2010,2 civil society is increasingly being seen as one of the basic 
pillars of democracy. In the “Broadening Participation in Track One Peace 
Negotiations” project, participation takes into account “…all relevant societal and 
political groups in a context besides the main parties to the conflict.” This extensive 
(ongoing) study takes into account participation not only into peace negotiations, and 
their implementation, but also political transitions. The theoretical framework of the 
“Broadening Participation” project is a multi-case academic study, which (as can be 
inferred from the projects title) seeks to move beyond the debate of including or 
excluding civil society, but also to investigate the mechanisms for participation of a 
wider range of actors in society as well. Hence, it is seen that the study of civil society, 
and other sectors beyond this, are becoming of central importance to study in both the 
realms of conflict resolution, transformation, and also in the policy world, not least in 
response to real-time challenges and conflict dynamics internationally, which are 
increasingly undermining past, state-centric approaches. 
 
This thesis will include an overview and summary of the research, in the current 
chapter, followed by a conceptual discussion on political participation and review of the 
relevant literature, in Chapter 2. This chapter will then be followed by an outline of the 
methodology employed to conduct this research in Chapter 3, including the presentation 
of the nine selected case studies of societal actors (selected from the chronology of 
participation detailed in Appendix A and its general description in Appendix B). 
Furthermore, a historical background of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, and description 
of the chronology of peace processes will be presented in Chapter 4. The presentation of 
the data obtained and an empirical description of the history of the instances of 
participation and inclusion, in parallel to these peace processes, will be outlined in detail 
in Chapter 5. This chapter will also present the data obtained from these selected cases, 
and the analysis of these, through the coding of the models and mechanisms of 
inclusion that took place. Lastly, a conclusion will be outlined, in Chapter 6, where the 
theoretical, practical and policy-oriented findings of this research will be discussed. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Christoph Spurk, “Understanding Civil Society” In Civil society and peacebuilding: A 
critical assessment, Ed., Thania Paffenholz, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010), p. 3.	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This research was completed by research conducted in Istanbul, Turkey, mainly in the 
timespan June 2013 – June 2014. Through semi-structured personal interviews and 
media monitoring in this time period, a review of a wide range of societal and political 
actors in different sectors of society; such as civil society, the private sector, women’s 
organizations, members of cultural life, academia, political parties, public figures and 
leaders, as well as policy makers and governmental representatives, in order to identify 
actors activities and inclusion in the ongoing, and previous, Kurdish peace processes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  The “Broadening Participation in Track One Peace Negotiations” Project, is a research 
project under to coordination of Dr. Thania Paffenholz from the Centre on Conflict 
Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP), at the Graduate Institute Geneva, in 
cooperation with Bilkent University (Dr. Esra Çuhadar), and TUFTS University. The 
project is supported by the Governments of Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Finland and 
Germany (Zivik/ifa). Please see the project website for more detailed information: 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/centresandprogrammes/ccdp/ccdp-
research/projects/current-projects/broadening-participation-in-trac.html	  
 b	  This research concludes it´s investigation with the March 2014 local elections. 
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Chapter 2 – Inclusion in Peace Processes: A Literature Review 
 
This research aims to evaluate the analytical strength of the “Broadening Participation”1 
Framework, in order to provide an overview of the activities and types of inclusion 
mechanisms taking place in the Kurdish peace processes in Turkey. The Broadening 
Participation study seeks to follow up on the theoretical discussions gaining importance 
in the field of conflict resolution and transformation, and the study of peace processes, 
negotiations and political transitions, stressing the importance of participation/inclusion. 
This thesis aims to use this framework, but also to move beyond it, in terms of taking a 
broader view on participation, not limiting itself solely to the framework´s models, but 
to a broader range of additional peacebuilding Track I, 1.5, and III activities as well, 
which form part of the wider peace process efforts, beyond the scope of negotiations. 
 
The increased focus of international organizations,a and in the policy realm in general, 
on the importance of civil society involvement and other excluded sectors involvement 
in political negotiations during peace and political transition processes is clear. 
Moreover, the complimenting societal dialogue needed for transforming conflict 
peacefully, is now acknowledged beyond the narrow scope of the peacebuilding and 
conflict transformation literature. The United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (DESA) for instance, is focusing on the importance of civil society in 
strengthening a democratic, just and integrated society, in processes of development and 
transition, and peace processes. They outline some mechanisms of participatory 
dialogue to reach these ends, and the clear benefit seen to be gained through this 
process, including: awareness-raising; building positive and social relations; the quality 
of outcomes; and credibility.2 The evidence of the increasing importance of the concept 
of inclusion in the policy and practice field can also be witnessed in the presence of an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  “Broadening Participation in Track One Peace Negotiations” Project, Paffenholz 
CCDP, Graduate Institute Geneva, with Çuhadar, Bilkent University.  
 
2  Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations (DESA), 
Participatory Dialogue: Towards a Stable, Safe and Just Society for All, (New York: 
United Nations Publications, 2007). 	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expert on “gender and social inclusion” on the United Nations Mediation Expert Team 
for 2013, to name one example of many.3  
 
Increased understanding and research to inform both theory and the practice world is 
therefore needed, as mediators and practitioners have tended to favor the exclusion of 
civil society and other sectors from negotiations; although several theorists have 
generally advocated for their inclusion.b This has sparked a marked dissonance between 
the theory and practice worlds.c This evidences a current deficit and marked need for 
further research and guidelines as to the ways in which civil society and other sectors 
participate, and may be included, in negotiated settlements and beyond, but also as to 
what the outcome of such inclusive practices are, and how best to manage them. Civil 
society and other sectors participation are favorably viewed in order to ensure 
sustainability and effectiveness of negotiations; ownership, sustainability and 
implementation; and outreach, in a given political transition or peace process.4 
 
In the following section, the subject matter shaping the terminology and the theoretical 
backbone of this thesis will be discussed, followed by an outline of the related literature. 
Then, the outline of the portion of theoretical framework (“Broadening Participation” 
project) used in this thesis will be introduced, followed by a discussion of the 
advantages and limits of employing this approach, incorporating previous arguments. 
 
 
Terminology and Definitions 
The terms “inclusion” and “participation” are often used inter-changeably in the 
literature on negotiations, whether dealing with peace negotiations or political 
transitions. An ongoing debate has been taking place in both the practice and theoretical 
field about the concept of “inclusion”, and if the participation of women should be 
lumped together with that of civil society and other sectors, and the wider society, or 
not.d Mainly, it is women´s organizations and movements that advocate for and refer to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 	  “Standby Team of Mediation Experts”, United Nations Department of Political 
Affairs, accessed April 12, 2014, 
https://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/standby_team. 	  4	  DESA, Participatory Dialogue: Towards a Stable, Safe and Just Society for All.	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the term “inclusion” (thereby mainly focusing on women’s inclusion) in peace or 
political negotiations, and the wider peace process, while the term “participation” can 
be seen to generally refer to more generally to a cross-section of various social 
groupings. The “Broadening Participation in Track One Peace Negotiations” project,e 
for instance, uses both terms interchangeably in order to focus on the important 
dimension of gender, which cuts across all societal groupings, but also that of wider 
participation of various social groups. Clearly, this is still an emerging field of study, 
with terminological uncertainties persisting, with a need to produce more research and 
standardized clarity in the conceptual literature to inform both theory and practice. 
 
The terms “inclusion” and “participation”, as explained above, will be used inter-
changeably in this thesis, referring in this case to the various mechanisms set in place by 
different social groups, institutions and individuals to prepare, influence, support, 
contest and/or accompany an entire peace process, as well as its future consolidation.  
 
Furthermore, in order to get a clearer picture as to which actors will be examined in this 
research, we should look at the term “civil society”. Definitions of the concept of  “civil 
society” have been a messy and contested, in a wide variety of academic fields. Nilsson, 
2012, sees civil society as  “…as separate from the state and political parties, and 
consists of the wide range of voluntary organizations in society such as religious 
associations, women’s organizations, human rights groups, and trade unions. “ 5 
Paffenholz, 2014, on the other hand, defines civil society as: “…organizations that take 
voluntary collective action around shared interests, purposes, and values and that are 
distinct from those of the state, family, and the market.” 6 The latter author also sees this 
generalized actor as consisting of “… a large and diverse set of organizations such as 
trade unions, professional associations, human rights groups, faith-based organizations, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Desiree Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and 
Durable Peace”, International Interactions, 38 (2012): 2, 243 – 266, p. 245. 
 6	  Thania Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Beyond the Inclusion–
Exclusion Dichotomy”, Negotiation Journal, 30 (2014): 1, 69–91, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nejo.12046/abstract, p. 70. 	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research institutions, social movements, and peace-building NGOs, as well as traditional 
and community groups.” 7 Clearly, the term is far-reaching and seems non-exhaustive. 
 
There is an ongoing debate between notions of what civil society “is”, and what it 
includes, exemplified for instance, in the distinction made between “modern”, 
Westernized and professionalized NGO´s, and “traditional”, Non-Western associations, 
such as religious charities, grassroots or community organizations. 8  The 
professionalization of civil society and NGO´s, and the debate between the roles of 
NGO´s versus grassroots is one particularly important to discussions pertaining to 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, especially in cases of foreign 
humanitarian intervention. However, this discussion is important intellectually, in the 
study of civil society in peace negotiations, processes and political transitions, as well.  
 
In terms of the role of civil society in ethno-political conflict Marchetti and Tocci, 2009, 
argue that the literature in this realm is “largely embryonic”, especially in terms of 
examining the role that civil society may play in both the escalation and resolution of 
such conflicts. 9   While, they argue, civil society in divided ethno-political societies are 
often either analyzed to be fundamentalist or nationalistic, or alternatively, solely as 
drivers of democratization, diplomacy and economic modernization, their further local 
contributions and influence in the dynamics of conflict and peacebuilding are ignored.  
Marchetti and Tocci, coin the term “conflict society”, addressing civil society in 
societies at conflict, in stressing the importance of including society, and civil society 
(and international and trans-national movements, which are not covered in this thesis), 
in the analysis of the dynamics in the propagation, but also in the resolution of 
conflicts. f   They also emphasize the dual character of civil society, which can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”, p. 70. 	  	  8	  For instance: Kaja Borchgrevink, Religious Actors and Civil Society in Post-2001 
Afghanistan, (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2007); Raffaele Marchetti 
and Nathalie Tocci “Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict”, 
Global Change, Peace & Security, 21 (2009): 2, 201-217, doi: 
10.1080/14781150902872091; Paffenholz, Ed., Civil society and peacebuilding (2010). 	  9	  Marchetti and Tocci “Conflict society”, (2009).	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compromise both “civil” and “uncivil” groups. 10 
Paffenholz´s work, 2014,11 provides the first comprehensive attempt at outlining a 
framework to include civil society into Track One peace negotiations, despite previous 
existing studies touching on the same subject.g A tentative framework of 9 non-mutually 
exclusive models of inclusion in peace negotiations and political transitions (negotiated 
track I settlements), were identified by the author. Paffenholz´s theoretical models of 
participation will be used in this research,  as a starting point for the classification of the 
identified instances of inclusion, to test its validity and reach to capture the identified 
participation activities in this case study of the Kurdish peace processes in Turkey. 
 
Although Paffenholz, 2014, deals with peace negotiations, the later ongoing research 
project under the auspices of Paffenholz, as mentioned earlier, entitled “Broadening 
Participation in Track One Peace Negotiations”, is attempting to clarify and find 
empirical evidence for these models, expanding its view to include political transitions 
as well. Moreover, not only civil society, but also other sectors inclusion in negotiated 
settlements such as: religious communities, the business sector, labor unions, “spoilers”, 
individual citizens and grassroots movements, and political parties are studied in this 
research project. The broader view taken on the actors of inclusion and participation 
(not just “civil society”) will also be adopted in this thesis. 
 
However, this thesis will also attempt to further broaden the scope employed in the 
“Broadening Participation” project, by utilizing arguments from peacebuilding and 
democratization literature to examine the trajectory of the wider peace process, which is 
not only limited to the peace negotiation phase. The “Broadening Participation” project 
examines 40 case studies of negotiated settlements encompassing peace negotiations 
and political transitions, and is therefore agreement, and implementation-focused. 
However, this present research only examines one case, where an agreement has never 
been reached, which is that of the Kurdish peace process in Turkey, thereby allowing 
more depth to be pursued. For instance, more detailed and specific activities and 
mechanism of participation/inclusion labeled loosely as “peacebuilding” activities of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Marchetti and Tocci “Conflict society”, (2009). 	  11	  Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”, (2014).	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civil society and other sectors, will be described in this case study; thereby going 
beyond that of solely identifying examples of the “Broadening Participation” study´s 9 
models. This will be an attempt to further broaden and deepen the view on inclusion, in 
not only peace negotiations, but that of the wider peace process, examining the activities 
of a cross-section of tracks and sectors, in their efforts to address peacebuilding and 
conflict resolution activities in conversation, or in parallel, with the peace negotiations. 
 
Paffenholz´s previous study, 2010, outlines different “functions” h  civil society can fill 
for performing peacebuilding roles in peace processes (as opposed to the 9 models of 
the “Broadening Participation” framework, which constitute direct mechanisms of 
inclusion/participation in the negotiation phase of a peace process or political transition). 
Though the discussion of these “functions” is beyond the scope of this thesis, arguments 
will be made conclusively about how the 9 models of the “Broadening Participation” 
framework can be enriched or broadened, by considering the additional, peacebuilding 
(Track 1.5, II and III) instances included in this research, or the functions already 
outlined by Paffenholz. Such a critique can help to push this framework, or similar ones, 
to produce a more “bottom-up” view on participation, as well as to be able to capture a 
wider range of inclusion activities, in the extremely rich and varied realm that is 
participation in the wider lens of a peace process, not limited to the negotiation phase. 
 
 In the following section the currents of literature on these issues will be reviewed in 
order to gain an overview of the multi-disciplined background and composition of the 
study of inclusion and participation in Track I peace negotiations and political 
transitions, but also that of wider peace processes. The review will be structured as 
follows: section a) will look at literature encompassing participation in peace 
negotiations and political transitions; b) democratic governance and social movement 
literature, in the fields of political science and comparative politics; c) Peacebuilding 
literature and the study of multi-track diplomacy in peace processes; and lastly, d) the 
ongoing research project and framework of “Broadening Participation”, will be outlined. 
Lastly, the theoretical approach selected for this present study will be summarized and 
explained, along with the backdrop of the previous conceptual discussion, and the 
following literature review. 
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a) Inclusion Literature in Peace Negotiations and Political Transitions 
This literature on participation in the conflict resolution and transformation field 
stresses why mechanisms of inclusion should be in place throughout the agenda setting 
of a peace process, in order to foster ownership and legitimacy for the process in civil 
society, and thus, also in the wider society.12 The importance of formal and informal 
consultative methods, for receiving input and sharing the content in such, generally, 
elite-driven processes, finds support in the literature.13 Research has demonstrated that 
peace negotiations and political transitions pose a unique political opportunity to 
strengthen and increase democratization and the strengthening of rights, 14 not least for 
disadvantaged groups, as for instance, the most obvious example of women. Conflict 
transformation especially situates such processes in a much broader and further-
reaching view on transforming not only conflict, but also society, in a movement from 
“negative” to “positive” peace, as coined by Johan Galtung,15 or of the structural 
transformation for peace, as outlined and advocated by John Paul Lederach.16  
 
The role of civil society has been studied more generally in peace processes in a range 
of studies.17 However, Paffenholz, 2014, outlines that the particular role civil society 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”, (2014).	  	  13 	  Herbert C. Kelman “Negotiation as interactive problem solving”, International 
Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice, 1(1996): 1, 99-123; Harold H. 
Saunders, “A Public Peace Process: Sustained dialogue to transform racial and ethnic 
conflicts”, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian: 2001). 	  14	  Christine Bell, and Catherine O’Rourke, “The people’s peace? Peace agreements, 
civil society, and participatory democracy” International Political Science Review 28 
(2007): 3, 293–324; Jacqui True, Women, Peace and Security in Post-Conflict and 
Peacebuilding Contexts (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), 
2013).  	  15	  Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, Journal of Peace Research, 6 
(1969): 3, 167–92. 	  16	  John Paul Lederach, “The origins and evolution of infrastructures for peace: A 
personal reflection”, Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 7 (2013): 3, 8-13, doi: 
10.1080/15423166.2013.767604 	  17	  Camilla Orjuela, “Building peace in Sri Lanka: a Role for civil society?”, Journal of 
Peace Research, 40 (2003): 2, 195-212, doi: 10.1177/0022343303040002004; Roberto 
Belloni, “Civil society and peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Journal of Peace 
Research, 38 (2001): 2, 163-180, doi: 10.1177/0022343301038002003.	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actors play has been understudied, with only a small number of studies in the literature 
on negotiations on “…the functions of civil society in peace negotiations, the impact of 
inclusion on reaching and sustaining agreements, the coordination between tracks 
including the transfer of results from Track Two to Track One negotiations, and the 
enabling and disenabling context of these processes.”, demonstrating a lack of detail. 18  
 
Moreover, Paffenholz also found in her 2014 study that not only the mediators, but also 
the conflict parties themselves, may need convincing as to the usefulness of increasing 
inclusion of civil society in a negotiated settlement, specifically in terms of sharing and 
distributing decision-making power and/or the expression to groups with different 
views.19 This point is clearly reflected in ongoing conflicts worldwide today, for 
instance in the debate surrounding which groups (other than the conflict parties) to 
include in the respective Geneva peace conferences that took place for both Syria and 
Ukraine. Furthermore, the author identifies in her study that representativeness, which 
may rely on the vitality of civil, and the greater society, in a given conflict context, can 
also pose a problem in the inclusion these sectors, even when all parties agree to it.  
In the first statistical analysis conducted concerning the likelihood for increased 
sustainability of a peace accord when civil society actors are included, Nilsson, 2012,  
argues that the inclusion of civil society crucially increases the legitimacy of a given 
peace process.20 Moreover, the article concludes that the inclusion of civil society actors 
in peace settlement processes increases the durability of peace, the likelihood for peace 
to prevail where civil society and political parties are involved, and lastly, that the 
inclusion of civil society can significantly affect overall peace in nondemocratic 
societies (taking a longer view on what “peace” actually entails).21 Additionally, these 
results were tested for the effect that the presence of an already “active and vibrant” 
civil society may pose on influencing the likelihood for their inclusion, but the analysis 
showed that there was little bias, making context of less importance. This can lead us to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”, (2014), p. 72.	  	  19	  Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”,	  (2014), p. 72.	  	  20	  Belloni, “Civil Society and Peacebuilding”, (2001); Orjuela, “Civil Society in Civil 
War”, (2004); Paffenholz, Ed., Civil society and peacebuilding, (2010). 	  21	  Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace” (2012), p. 243 
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infer that the inclusion of civil society, even in nondemocratic, repressive and conflict-
affected societies, remains important for the arrival, building and prevalence, of peace. 
 
Paffenholz, 2014, identifies the currents advocating for civil society inclusion in peace 
negotiations, in the peace negotiation literature, as being aligned to normative 
arguments.22 Here a theory-practice divide emerges as Paffenholz, outlines that these 
arguments are also contested: “While most of the literature emphasizes normative goals 
and sustainability objectives, mediators themselves tend to emphasize issues of 
effectiveness.” 23 This means that tension between “how much” to include and exclude 
may arise, in the fine line between theory and practice, and striking a balance between 
the effectiveness and sustainability of a peace process or political transition process.  
Other important functions of civil society inclusion have also been addressed in the 
literature according to Paffenholz, 2014. For instance, increasing feelings of ownership 
of a negotiated process, 24 promoting accountability and legitimacy (not least in the 
implementation stage of an agreement), 25 as well as providing much-needed local 
insight and expertise to the, often far-removed, track I process.26  There are several 
studies on the role of civil society initiatives and activities (Track II, 1.5) as serving as 
areas to test pilot projects and new ideas for a peace process.27 Civil society has also 
been found to be vital in addressing the societal and structural root causes of conflict, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	   Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”, (2014) p. 73.	  	  23	  Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”, (2014)	  p. 73.	  	  24	   Catherine Barnes, “Weaving the web: Civil-society roles in working with conflict 
and building peace”, People building peace II: Successful stories of civil society, P. van 
Tongeren, Ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Wanis-St. John and Kew, “Civil 
Society and Peace Negotiations” (2008). 
25 “Who gets a seat at the table?“ (2011); Wanis-St. John and Kew, “Civil Society and 
Peace Negotiations” (2008).	  	  26	  Barnes, “Weaving the web”, (2002).	  	  27 	  John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled 
Communication in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1969); Ronald J. 
Fisher, "Assessing the Contingency Model of Third-Party Intervention in Successful 
Cases of Prenegotiation”  Journal of Peace Research 44 (2007): 311, DOI: 
10.1177/0022343307076638; Kelman, “Negotiation as interactive problem solving”, 
(1996). 
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beyond the immediate conflict issues discussed in negotiations (at the track III).28 Yet, 
specific mechanisms of participation of civil and other sectors are understudied.29 
Several scholars, including Belloni, 2001 and Barnes, 2002,30 direct criticism at peace 
processes being conducted behind closed doors, without the involvement or input of the 
wider society. Paffenholz, 2014, and Nilsson, 2012,31 outline the scarce, but emerging, 
literature on the role of civil society actors in contributing to sustainable and durable 
peace, underlining however, that this field of research is limited to case studies.i Both 
authors refer to the gap that currently exists in the literature on civil society´s 
contributions to peacebuilding, urging for the need for increased future research on this.  
 
Nilsson focuses in her 2012 article on the formal involvement of civil society, meaning 
whether their participation is secured in the text of a peace agreement, either in helping 
draft the agreement, or being guaranteed participation in the following peace 
implementation.32 The “Broadening Participation” however, focuses on participation in 
the longer view, as taking place at the various stages, prior to a negotiated agreement or 
political transition, during it, and in the aftermath of an agreement, in the process of 
implementation (though the longer, peacebuilding view is not part of its´ scope). 
Nilsson also stresses the discussion in the literature between weighing the potential 
benefits and costs of inclusion of civil society actors in terms of increasing legitimacy33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28 	  Galtung, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, (1969); Landon Hancock and 
Christopher Mitchell, Eds., Zones of Peace, (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press: , 2007); 
Lederach, “The origins and evolution of infrastructures for peace”, (2013); Saunders, 
“A Public Peace Process”, (2001). 
29	  Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”, (2014).	  	  30	  Belloni, “Civil society and peacebuilding” (2001); Barnes, “Weaving the web” 
(2002). 	  31	  Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”, (2014); Nilsson, “Anchoring the 
Peace”, (2012). 	  32	  Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace”, (2012). 	  33	  Barnes, “Weaving the web” (2002); Bell, and O’Rourke, “The people’s peace?“, 
(2007); Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace”, (2012). 
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while simultaneously retaining efficiency in a negotiated process, 34  as a central 
challenge. 
 
Also preoccupied with the different roles that civil society actors perform, Nilsson, lists 
three functions that these actors may fulfill during a negotiated peace agreement in 
order to increase local ownership and the building of “peace from below”.35 The first, is 
through consultations with civil society actors to get to know their views on the process; 
the second, for civil society groups with political support to be directly represented at 
the negotiation table; and thirdly, direct participation at the grassroots level in 
intercommunity meetings and public forums. The participation of civil society in a 
peace process may also increase transparency, and carry the potential for holding 
institutions accountable in carrying out the monitoring of implementation.36 
Clearly, the literature in conflict resolution and transformation dealing with 
participation and inclusion in peace processes and political transitions has generally 
supported the inclusion of civil society (and in some few cases other actors beyond this, 
most saliently, the inclusion of women).j Yet, there still exists disagreement and 
skepticism on the practice side among practitioners and Track I actors.k As an emerging 
subject, which has garnered greater interest in more recent years, preoccupation with the 
functions of civil society and other actors in negotiated processes is at an initial phase, 
despite a wide range of case studies and theory building, most predominantly around 
“how much” and “who” to include/exclude. Paffenholz in her 2014 article stresses the 
need to move “ future need for more holistic theories for mechanisms of participation. 
b) Democratic Participation and Social Movements 
Social movement theory, and the study of societal “contentious” politics and collective 
action (among the pioneers in comparative politics include Charles Tilly and Sidney 
Tarrow, commencing to work on the subject in the 1980´s and 90´s), as well as the 
concept of “social capital” (famously coined by Robert D. Putnam in the 90´s) have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace”, (2012); Wanis-St. John and Kew, “Civil Society and 
Peace Negotiations”, (2008). 	  35	  Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace”, (2012), p. 247–8.	  	  36	  Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace”, (2012); Wanis-St. John and Kew, “Civil Society and 
Peace Negotiations”, (2008).	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been examined largely in the context of democratic participation and voluntary 
associations. However, less attention has been given to the role of civil society and 
social movements in political science in times of political “transitions” (for instance, as 
studied by Guillermo O’Donnell, 37  and Adam Przeworski 38 ), or in instances of 
negotiated peace settlements (this has generally been confined to the realm of conflict 
management, resolution and transformation, though sporadically, as outlined above). 
 
In the literature on democratic participation, and civil society activity in political 
processes, this sector is most commonly studied in relation to evaluating the vitality of 
democracies in peaceful societies, as by Robert D. Putnam,39 Charles Tilly40 and Sidney 
Tarrow, 41 for instance. In the literature on political transitions and democratization, 
Przeworksi 1992,42 for instance argues that a democracy is only complete when there 
are representative institutions to channel societal conflicts (he focuses on economic 
ones, in his Marxist reading). Moreover, Dahl 1971,43 more clearly underlines that a 
democracy is consolidated when there is a real possibility for civil society organizations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule. Vol. 4: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986)	  	  38	  Adam Przeworski, “Games of Transition” In Issues in Democratic Consolidation: 
The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, ed. Scott 
Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela. (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 105-116, 137-42, 148-52; Adam Przeworski, Michael 
Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, “What Makes Democracies 
Endure?” In The Global Divergence of Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. 
Plattner. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 167-184. 	  39	  Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital", Journal of 
Democracy, 6(1995): 1, 65–78, doi:10.1353/jod.1995.0002.	  	  40	  Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, “Contentious Politics and Social Movements”, In 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds., 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).	  	  
41 	  Sidney G. Tarrow, Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action, Social 
Movements, and Cycles of Protest, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1989). 42	  Przeworski, “Games of Transition” (1992). 	  43	  Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1971). 	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and associations to form, and where government policies depend, not only on votes, but 
also on other expressions of opinion (from civil society). Moreover, famously Putnam, 
who coined the term “Social Capital”, which is a concept that describes the social 
connections, trust and interactions that bind a society together, “makes democracy 
work”. Putnam, similarly to the concepts of “civil” and “uncivil” society, distinguishes 
between positive and negative social capital. Putnam also underlines that social capital 
can be unevenly distributed in society (i.e. according to gender and age, but also in the 
case of ethnic minorities or other disadvantaged groups in society), related to excluded 
societal groups and power. The concept of strengthening social capital, and the findings 
on the importance of civil society and citizen participation in democratization and 
transitions can pose important lessons for the study of inclusion in peace negotiations 
and processes, in the re-envisioning and re-building of society and peace after conflict. 
 
According to Marchetti and Tocci, 2009, in their review on literature on democratic 
governance, in peaceful societies, civil society plays a key role in political processes. 
However, they argue that this sector can play an even more prominent role during times 
of conflict, where more intense mobilization of civil society may take place, and where 
stakes also are higher for their success or failure. 44 According to the same authors, the 
heightened activity of civil society during conflict can have the adverse effects of either 
fuelling conflict (referred to commonly in the literature on civil society participation as 
“uncivil” society), sustaining the status quo, or promoting peace, thus presenting 
contrasting options for this sector. If a cross-sectional view is taken, as in this present 
study, (thus looking at sectors also beyond “civil society”, such as political parties, 
business associations, religious actors etc.), it is clear that the actions of these parties 
may have multiple and varied outcomes.  
 
Marchetti and Tocci, 2009, further argue that the general study of civil society has been 
locked in predominantly “Western, peaceful, democratic and developed contexts…”,45 a 
view that is also underlined by Spurk.46 This is clearly a difficulty when examining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Marchetti and Tocci “Conflict society”, (2009), p. 201.	  	  
45 Marchetti and Tocci “Conflict society”, (2009), p. 201. 
46	  In:	  Paffenholz, Ed., Civil society and peacebuilding, (2010).	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conflict-societies that are more often then not, prone to different types of political, 
cultural and historical circumstances and dynamics. The authors look at the trajectory of 
the study of the interaction between civil society and the state, which early on was seen 
as part of the state, and predominantly, the Western one. Nowadays, this forms a more 
unclear picture, as civil society and the influence of other societal actors is seen as 
acting at times to influence, and at other times, separate and in opposition to the state, in 
a variety of contexts.47 This debate arises in connection to the increasing studies related 
also to transnational networks and international non-governmental organizations 
(INGO´s) and institutions (as outlined i.e. by Tarrow, and Sikkink, in various studies).l 
The forces of the inter-connectivity of the market and globalization make social 
movements especially, but states additionally, more reliant and affected by 
developments across the globe. Hereby, also civil society and other societal sectors 
become empowered, professionalized and a growing actor in international disputes.  
However, clearly, such participation mechanisms are not sufficient in themselves, as 
these must also be surrounded and accompanied by a political culture of inclusion and 
openness, for civil society, and society at large, to be potent enough to participate in the 
first place.  This consideration is often the focus of the study of democratic participation 
in political science and comparative politics, which focuses on democratic culture and 
institutions as well. Tilly, for instance, emphasizes the importance of the context in a 
society for the meaningful participation of civil society. This institutionalism view is 
argued for instance in a economic-historical perspective by Daron Acemoğlu and James 
Robinson, whom in their acclaimed book from 2012 advocate inclusive political and 
economic institutions in order to provide incentives for innovation, productivity and 
sustained economic growth, paired with democratization, in order avoid the “failure” of 
the state.48 This point is also re-iterated by Marchetti and Tocci, but specifically for 
conflict-affected states, who point out that the level of democratization before, directly 
impacts on the future the functionality or re-building of the state after conflict.49  The 
political context will in this thesis will simply serve as a backdrop to the main focus of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Marchetti and Tocci “Conflict society”, (2009), p. 202. 	  48	  Daron Acemoğlu and James Robinson, The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty: 
Why nations fail, (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012). 	  
49 Marchetti and Tocci “Conflict society”, p. 203. 
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study (the participation and inclusion mechanisms taking place parallel to the peace 
processes). However, the traditionally institution-centered and mainly “top-down” 
approach employed by political science and comparative politics in their study of civil 
society and social movements is helpful to keep in mind in the study of this phenomena. 
 
c) Peacebuilding and Multi-track diplomacy  
There is a sizeable literature in the conflict resolution and transformation schools of 
thought on the importance of examining the different layers and actors of society during 
times of conflict and its resolution; some in the longer-term, peacebuilding perspective. 
For instance, John Paul Lederach, coined the term “infrastructure for peace” (I4P) in 
order to advocate for a more holistic and coordinated approach to building peace at 
various levels in society, examining the need to also examine dynamics between 
different “tracks” in a society at conflict beyond the Track I negotiation level.50  
 
Oliver P. Richmond´s, 2011 study, 51  offers a more critical voice on liberal 
peacebuilding and international relations, drawing on conflict resolution theories, 
advocating for the need to acknowledge the agency of civil society and social agents,m 
and examining the changing nature of social movements, and the emergence of hybrid, 
transnational and “post-liberal” peacebuilding movements and mechanisms. He 
postulates: “… the agency of the subject is rarely considered or is rhetorical unless mass 
mobilization occurs to shape the state, norms, markets, international organization and 
institutions.”52 This can be seen as important in evaluating the classical focus of 
international relations, and other social science disciplines, in focusing on mass 
mobilization, and over-looking smaller scale, localized initiatives from below. Such 
initiatives are for instance studied in Hancock and Mitchell´s book from 2007,53 on the 
importance of initiatives at the community and local levels to build peace, even in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  John P.	  Lederach, “The origins and evolution of infrastructures for peace”, (2013); 
Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace (USIP), 1997). 
51	  Oliver, P. Richmond, “Critical agency, resistance and a post-colonial civil society” 
Cooperation and Conflict 46 (2011): 419, doi: 10.1177/0010836711422416. 
52	  Richmond, “Critical agency”, (2011), p. 420.	  	  53	  Hancock and Mitchell, Eds., Zones of Peace, (2007). 	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midst of conflict situations, and in ongoing mainstream situations filled with violence.  
Rao, 2013, also points out that the participation of citizens is mostly understood in 
terms of civil society and associations, though individual actions (such as voting in 
referenda) should also be taken into account as a form of participation and influence. 
Adding to this can be that other forms of organizing or action, whether sustained or a 
one-off event, can put varied forms of pressure and inclusion in an ongoing peace 
process or political settlement. Clearly, different mechanisms and models of inclusion 
can come in varied shapes and sizes, and analyzing such phenomena poses a challenge. 
This approach is supported by authors as Harold H. Saunders, for instance, who 
discusses the challenge of conceptualizing a “public” peace process, where the 
individual citizen is engaged in peacebuilding, supporting the previous claims of the 
need for a Track III, societal-level peace process, alongside that of the higher tracks.54 
The varying degrees and levels at which peacebuilding can be studied have sparked the 
discussion of dividing peacebuilding efforts at different “tracks”. Lederach divides 
society into three levels for peacebuilding: Track I (top leadership, mediating parties), 
Track II (mid-level leadership, through problem –solving, conflict resolution 
workshops, think tanks, etc.), and Track III (grassroots, the wider society, conducting 
activities such as community projects and people-to-people encounters).55 Additionally, 
the 1.5 track has emerged as a level occurring between Track I and Track II, of mid-
range community leaders and officials that serve as a bridge between the lower track 
and the Track I process. This demonstrates the porous nature between a Track I process 
and conflict resolution practitioners, scholars and civil society actors and community 
leaders. This approach differs from the multi-track theory outlined by Louise Diamond 
and John McDonald (see below),56 belonging to the conflict resolution school, with 
Lederach´s view on peacebulding considered to belong to the later conflict 
transformation realm.  The approach employed by this thesis will be closer to that of the 
conflict transformation stream, which employs a longer and broader view. This is also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Harold H. Saunders, “A Public Peace Process”, (2001). 	  55	  Lederach, Building Peace, (1997). 	  56	  Louise Diamond and John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy. A System Approach 
to Peace, (Hartfort, CT: Kumarian Press, 1996).   	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because the conflict transformation field increasingly focuses on the “lower” tracks, 
seeing them as actors with agency, in contrast to its earlier predecessors:  
“The largest contribution of the conflict transformation school is its shift in 
focus from international to local actors. It therefore puts even more 
emphasis on civil society and ordinary people than does the resolution 
school. Whereas in the resolution school these actors are subject to 
outsiders’ interventions, within the conflict transformation school they are 
at the center of peacebuilding.”57  
Clearly, the more recent shift in the scholarship on the study of conflict and negotiated 
settlements is growing increasingly detailed and complex, but also more holistic, in the 
incorporation of a wider set of actors and societal levels in the complex and multi-
faceted process of building peace from the roots upwards. 
The concept of “Multi-track diplomacy” was coined by Diamond, who together with 
Ambassador McDonald developed nine tracks of engagement of different sectors in 
peace processes (which do not necessarily intersect with the four tracks outlined 
earlier). They have outline nine different “tracks” that such peacebulding activities 
could take place in, which intersects with civil society.n Clearly, the channels for 
participation are many. However, ultimately, the participation of these different sectors, 
depend on the mechanisms and opportunities made available for participation (from 
“above” and from “below”). These can be set into place by the government, by the 
framework for the peace process itself, or by the contextual factors to the conflict itself.  
 
Marchetti and Tocci, 2009, outline that civil society may contribute to conflict 
escalation, management, resolution or transformation. This way of thinking will 
“…argue that the re-articulation of identities and perceived interests through 
psychological, educative and discursive change is insufficient”, and that more deep-
seated change needs to take place in society to actually build “peace.” 58 Thus, issues 
such as the importance of inclusion in addressing “structural inequality” gains 
importance (i.e. as argued by Galtung in referring to “Positive” and “Negative” Peace, 
and the structural and societal transformation needed for peace, as argued by Lederach). 
As this present study wishes to take the “broad” view on the participation and inclusion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Paffenholz, Ed., Civil society and peacebuilding, (2010) p. 55.	  	  58	  Marchetti and Tocci “Conflict society”, (2009). 	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effects of, not just civil society, but also other sectors, it will identity with the last 
function, of possible conflict transformation, which sees different societal sectors role, 
as engaging not only to access Track 1 in the peace negotiations, but also to aid in 
societal peacebuilding encompassing the larger peace process.59 According to Marchetti 
and Tocci: “Peacebuilding is concerned with issues that go beyond narrowly defined 
conflict issues (such as territorial readjustments, refugee return, property rights, security 
guarantees, etc.), but cover the wider economic, political and social make-up of 
countries before, during and after the end of violent conflict.” 60  
 
The peacebuilding perspective, or lens, also incorporates the long-view when examining 
instances of participation and inclusion for a peace process, as it examines initiatives in 
the parallel of a negotiated settlement or political transition, but also, in the 
implementation and post-conflict situation, where issues of transitional justice and 
societal healing (through psycho-psychological or traditional mechanisms) may be 
needed.  Hence, a detailed and rich description of civil society and other societal actors 
activities towards affecting a peace process or political transition negotiation is needed, 
but this is not sufficient from a peacebuilding view, where the process has preceded, 
and will also follow, a possible agreement.  
 
Such issues are underlined especially in development and social dialogue literature as 
well. For instance, Duthie, 2009, argues that civil society (which he defines as mainly 
NGOs and local organizations, in his study) can be an important avenue for 
strengthening development in post-conflict and transitional societies, especially seen 
through the lens of transitional justice.61  Referring to Putnam, Duthie also argues that 
civil society contributes to the creation of social capital through producing “norms of 
generalized reciprocity”, “facilitating coordination and communication and amplifying 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and 
Civilization (London: SAGE, 1996); Galtung, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, 
(1969); John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across 
Cultures (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995).  
60 Marchetti and Tocci “Conflict society”, (2009). 
61	  Roger Duthie, Building Trust and Capacity: Civil Society and Transitional Justice 
from a Development Perspective, (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009), 
p. 4. 
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information about the trustworthiness of other individuals” and “by serving as a cultural 
template for future collaboration.”62 While the author here argues this perspective of 
social capital as increasing development and economic progress, the same approach 
concerning social organization and their formation of social capital can be linked to the 
re-building of society after violent conflict, and the pushing of agendas of reconciliation 
and reparation in the absence of governmental action in these areas. Moreover, Duthie, 
2009, stresses the expertise and importance of civil society and other organizations and 
associations in their local knowledge and contacts, in order to reach out to the wider 
population. Even though the more long-term post-conflict stage of conflict is beyond 
the scope of this research, these points raised here are all valid for the far-reaching and 
deep-seated effects that civil society and other sectors may play at various stages of a 
peace process, looking beyond the signing of an agreement and its´ implementation. 
 
According to Paffenholz, 2010, within peacebuilding literature the inclusion of civil 
society and other sectors seems like an accepted fact, though it is an area of little study, 
with a current deficiency of theories to this respect.63 The author also underlines in her 
book that the term “peacebuilding”, coined by Johan Galtung, is itself contentious. The 
concept of “sustainable peacebuilding”, attributed to John Paul Lederach, takes a longer 
view on peacebuilding, both in terms of time and scope – this view is closer to the wider 
view on participation and inclusion taken by this study – in terms of constituting an 
inclusive and broad definition.  
 
Though the “Broadening participation” project´s framework, on which this thesis is 
mainly based (which will be explained in the following section d) only focuses on 
different models of direct and indirect participation in peace negotiations and political 
transitions, the scope of this investigation will also include peacebuilding activities. 
This may include; cross-community dialogue, reconciliation activities, academic and 
policy oriented workshops, as well as creative, artistic and other types of projects which 
aim to support or influence the ongoing peace process. Such activities may take place in 
parallel, and not always in direct conversation with the peace negotiations, either due to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Duthie, Building Trust and Capacity, (2009), p. 7. 	  63	  Paffenholz, Ed., Civil society and peacebuilding, (2010), p. 43. 
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lack of will or opportunity to do so. The “Broadening Participation” project is focused 
on models of participation that include an element of “transfer” to Track I. However, 
taking a broader view then the “Broadening participation” project, the widespread roles 
that civil society and other societal sectors perform towards peacebuilding more 
generally, in line with the wider vision of the peace process, will be included as well.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the divide between theory and practice in relation to peace 
negotiations, and negotiated settlements at large has stayed focused on the difficulties of 
including more actors in reaching an agreement, and also facing the issue of which 
groups which should be included.64 The usefulness of problem solving workshops, and 
other related track II (and not to mention track III) activities centered with the 
participation of civil society, despite amble evidence, 65 may be doubted as useful by 
diplomats and other actors at the track I of a negotiation process. There seems to be 
persisting skepticism at the track I levels, beyond the normative rhetoric, on the 
inclusion of a wider array of actors in political negotiations and peace processes, mostly 
due to the practical concerns. This trend may be changing, especially if foreign policy 
endeavors and the current character of conflicts internationally are any indication. 
d)  “Broadening Participation in Track One Peace Negotiations” Project 
Quantitative research from peace agreements demonstrates that the inclusion of civil 
society actors in peace processes increases the durability of peace.66 Paffenholz, 2010, 
argues that civil society can: “…better address underlying conflict drivers; 
counterbalance elites; include broader interests; increase ownership and accountability; 
shift public opinion; and provide expertise, knowledge, and a safe space to work 
together.”67 While her 2010 study focuses on the peacebuilding role of civil society 
within the entire spectrum of peace processes, her 2014 study narrows the focus on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”, (2014) p. 72.	  	  65	  Lanz, “Who gets a seat at the table? (2011); Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace 
Negotiations” (2014); Wanis-St. John and Kew, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations” 
(2008). 	  66	  Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace” (2012) and Wanis-St. John and Kew, “Civil Society 
and Peace Negotiations” (2008) 	  67	  Paffenholz, Ed., Civil society and peacebuilding, (2010), 	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role of civil society during negotiations and their implementation, in particular on 
participation models to impact Track I, and hence, the quality and sustainability of 
peace and political transitions. It is in this context that “9 models of participation and 
inclusion” have been identified in the 2014 study, currently subject to empirical testing 
in 40 case studies. Although the broader view of examining the peace process will be 
employed (as opposed to only a negotiated settlement), these models will be employed. 
Political settlement and peace negotiation literature has in the past tended to be elite 
rather than citizen centered, though this trend may be shifting.68 Paffenholz, 2014, 
outlines a variety of advantages of increased inclusion and participation of civil society 
and other sectors, including: addressing the underlying causes of the conflict; 
counterbalancing elites; ensuring the inclusion of broader public interests in the 
negotiation agenda, increasing public ownership; leading higher levels of accountability 
and greater legitimacy between conflict parties, increasing support for the process; 
offering expertise and local knowledge; providing a space alternative to the Track I for 
new ideas, and a new culture of understanding.69 
The 9 models from the ongoing “Broadening Participation” Project to be pursued in this 
thesis will be listed below, they are set up in form of the most to the least direct form of 
involvement, and can happen simultaneously and with overlap of included actors, and 
are not mutually exclusive. 
The tentative 9 models of Participation and Inclusion from Paffenholz (2014) are:70 
1. direct representation of civil society groups at the negotiation table, either as their 
own delegations to the negotiations or as members of official delegations; 
2. observer status, with no official roles but a direct presence during the negotiations; 
3. official consultative forums that run parallel to  Track I negotiations, and that are 
endorsed by the mediators and negotiators; 
4. informal consultations, that lack official endorsement from all the stakeholders;  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Suhmed Rao, Citizens' role in political settlements, Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, 
University of Birmingham, http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=1014, 
p. 2 
 
69 Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”, (2014). 
70	  Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”, (2014), p. 76 – 77.	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5. inclusive post-agreement mechanisms that involve civil society groups in the 
implementation of peace agreements;  
6. high-level Track II initiatives, nonofficial Track Two facilitation initiatives that take 
place in the pre-negotiation phase or parallel to official negotiations and that use 
a problem-solving approach;  
7. public participation, involving the broader population via public hearings, opinion 
polls, “town hall” meetings, or signature campaigns;  
8. public decision making, via referenda and other electoral forms that put major 
political decisions to binding public vote (e.g., terms of peace agreements, 
constitutional reforms); and  
9. mass action, campaigns, demonstration, street action, protests, and petitions.  
 
The “Broadening Participation” framework focuses on (among a number of other 
variables which are not included in the present study), if an initiative is “bottom-up”,  
“top-down”, or both, moreover, it addresses the issue of “transfer” (to Track-I) of the 
participation mechanisms. The “bottom-up”/”top-down” and “transfer” aspects of the 
framework will also be considered in this study, as this is the defining aspect for 
classifying an participation mechanism as model or not – however, the additional 
variables examined for each model pertaining to the framework will not be addressed as 
they are beyond the scope of this study. Inclusion activities that did not fit the 
framework (mainly due to lack of measurable “transfer” to the Track I negotiations), 
will still be chronicled alongside the models, but will not be classified as model as such. 
Following the conceptual discussion, literature review and explanation of the theoretical 
models from the “Broadening Participation” framework which will be employed in this 
thesis, we can conclude that this line of research is one still in development. Previous 
studies in International Relations and Political Science have explored the concept of 
civil society in negotiated settlements and political transitions, in a mainly state-centric, 
institutionalist, and top-down manner (mainly in comparative politics and political 
science), or in peace process (mainly in conflict resolution and transformation 
literature). Where civil society and social movements have been studied, theses have 
mainly been addressed as Western-biased, associations and mass movements, where the 
smaller scale, communal and informal initiatives have been largely overlooked.  
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However, only recently have the more recent disciplines of conflict resolution, and 
conflict transformation, coupled with the study of peacebuilding and multiple “tracks” 
of societal activity, begun to address the activity of sectors beyond civil society in peace 
processes, in a wider view. The “Broadening Participation” study is novel as one of the 
first comprehensive attempts to create a framework of models on civil society and other 
societal sectors inclusion and participation, in their own right, in negotiated processes. 
The application of this framework to a case study such as the Kurdish Peace Process in 
Turkey is therefore interesting, in order to assess its analytical strength in helping to 
provide an overview of the participation and inclusion taking place, as well as the types 
and mechanisms that occurred. While not claiming to be an exhaustive list, the nine 
models serve as a good point of departure for chronicling this rich and varied realm. 
 
In the following chapter, the methodology of this research will be presented, along with 
the data obtained on nine cases of participation. Chapter 4 will outline the background 
of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, and the various peace process attempts, followed, in 
Chapter 5, by the presentation of the data obtained on the selected cases of inclusion 
activities parallel to these track I peace efforts. The data from the cases will then later be 
analyzed and attempted classified into the nine models presented above to then later be 
further problematized according to the broader, peacebuilding and conflict 
transformation perspective on inclusion and participation presented above. 
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  a	  Such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the European Union 
and the Organizations for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, to name a few. 	  b	  For instance:	  Diana Chigas, “Capacities and Limits of NGO´s as Conflict Managers”, 
Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, Chester A. 
Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, Eds. (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2007); Anthony Wanis-St. John and Darren Kew, “Civil 
Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting Exclusion, International Negotiation, 13 
(2008): 11-36; David Lanz, “Who gets a seat at the table? A framework for 
understanding the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in peace negotiations”, 
International Negotiation, 16 (2011): 275 – 295; Ronald J. Fisher, "Assessing the 
Contingency Model”. 	  c	  “… although most researchers have argued for inclusion, mediators and negotiators 
have tended to favor the exclusion of civil society groups from peace negotiations 
(Chuffrin and Saunders 1993; Fisher 1997; Saunders 1999; Barnes 2002, 2005; 
Hemmer et al. 2006; Bell and O’Rourke 2007; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008; Lanz 
2011; Nilsson 2012).” Thania Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: 
Beyond the Inclusion–Exclusion Dichotomy” Negotiation Journal, Volume 30 (2014): 
1, 69–91, p. 70.  	  d	  For instance, this debate was raised during the OSCE´s launch of their Guidance Note 
on “Enhancing Gender-Responsive Mediation” in Istanbul on October 24th, 2013. 
(http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/en/new/enhancing-gender-responsive-mediation/) At the 
conference, scholars, practitioners and civil society organizations from the member 
states discussed as to whether the inclusion of women in peace process and political 
transition negotiations should be extended, or combined, with the discussion of 
inclusion and participation of different sectors of society, and other marginalized 
groups, more broadly or not.	  	  e	  The details of this project will be outlined in the 4th and final section of this chapter. 	  f	  A discussion of Marchetti and Tocci´s classification of the roles for civil society 
according to the different schools of conflict management, resolution and 
transformation will follow in section d) of this chapter, on peacebuilding literature. 	  g	   For instance: Barnes, C. ‘Weaving the Web. Civil Society Roles in Working with 
Conflict and Building Peace’, People Building Peace II Successful Stories of Civil 
Society, ed. Van Tongeren, P., (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Diana 
Chigas, “Capacities and Limits of NGO´s as Conflict Managers”, Leashing the Dogs of 
War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2007); Anthony Wanis-St. John and Darren Kew, “Civil Society and Peace 
Negotiations: Confronting Exclusion, International Negotiation, 13(2008): 11-36); 
Lanz 2011, “Who gets a seat at the table? A framework for understanding the dynamics 
of inclusion and exclusion in peace negotiations”, International Negotiation, 16 (2011): 
275 – 295; and, Paffenholz (2010, 2011). 	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  h	  The functions of civil society are identified as: protection, monitoring, advocacy, 
socialization, social cohesion, facilitation, and service delivery in Paffenholz 2010. 	  i	  Nilsson (2012) cites as examples: Belloni, “Civil Society and Peacebuilding” (2001); 
Orjuela, “Civil Society in Civil War”, (2004); Paffenholz, Civil Society & 
Peacebuilding (2010); Mashood Issaka and Bushoki Batabiha. Civil Society and 
Democratic Transitions in the DRC, Burundi, and Rwanda (New York: International 
Peace Academy, 2005); Augustine Toure, The Role of Civil Society in National 
Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Liberia. (New York: International Peace 
Academy: 2002); Paul van Tongeren, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema, and Juliette 
Verhoeven, People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society. (London: 
Lynne Rienner, 2005); World Bank, Engaging Civil Society Organizations in Conflict-
Affected and Fragile States: Three African Country Case Studies. (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 2005). 	  j	  To name a few of numerous examples, Bell (2013), calls for the need for increased 
efforts to be made to include women at all stages of peace processes. Similarly, in her 
analysis True (2013), stresses that the post-conflict phase poses an important 
opportunity for increasing the rights and positions of women in newly emerging 
societies. She calls for the need of a gender perspective in post- conflict institution 
building, humanitarian planning, and within the long-term peacemaking process itself. 	  k	  See: Cynthia Chataway, “Track II Diplomacy: From a Track I Perspective” 
Negotiation Journal, July 14 (1998): 3, 269–287; Esra Çuhadar, “Track Two 
Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective: Comparing the Perceptions of Turkish and 
American Diplomats,” International Negotiation, 12 (2007); 1, 57-82. 	  l	  For example, Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Marcharet E. Keck and 
Kathryn Sikkink, “Transational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional 
Politics”, International Social Science Journal, 51 (1999): 159: 89 -101. 
 m	  Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”, 2014, also argues that civil 
society, other sectors, and the wider society, has to be considered an active agent in its 
own right, capable of demanding and pressuring for inclusion instead of a passive role 
of only begging for inclusion. 	  n	  Referring to their work: Diamond and McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy, (1996).   
The tracks outlined by Diamond and McDonald include: (1) government; (2) conflict 
resolution professionals; (3) business; (4) private citizens; (5) research, education, and 
training; (6) activism; (7) religion; (8) funding; and (9) public opinion/communication. 
Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess, Conducting Track II Peacemaking, (Washington, DC: 
Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 2010). 
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 
In this research I will be using a multiple case study with a single unit of analysis, in 
order to assess the analytical strength of the “Broadening Participation” framework in 
the context of the Kurdish Peace Process. The framework will help provide an overview 
of the types of participation and inclusion that took place, while the analysis of these 
will provide insight into additional events that fall outside of the framework´s scope. 
 
For this purpose, this research will rely on a “type 3: Multiple-case holistic design”, as 
identified by Yin.1 This type of research design takes into account various cases (the 
nine case studies) in order to identify and generalize on one single variable; in this case 
inclusion and participation initiatives. The context will be the Kurdish peace process in 
Turkey with the multiple cases being the specific societal actors and/or organizations 
conducting activities of participation and inclusion taking place in the Kurdish peace 
process, during the Oslo Talks from 2008-2011, and later commenced October 2012 
talks, up until the March 2014 elections. These selected inclusion activities, events and 
projects will make up the comparable unit of analysis for this research. The detailed 
data pertaining to each case extracted from the more general data collection process,a 
and the analysis of the nine case studies selected will be presented in Chapter 5. 
 
Specifically, this research will examine initiatives by the Turkish government to engage 
society in the Kurdish peace process, through societal mechanisms to consult grassroots 
movements, organizations and institutions, to influence public opinion and support. 
Moreover, this research seeks to evaluate these societal sectors presence or absence in 
the wider peace process itself, by investigating mechanisms of participation and 
initiated and sustained by such non-governmental sectors themselves. This thesis will 
include a description of the actors activities and projects, as well as looking at the 
motivations and design of different initiatives, making a distinction as to whether they 
were initiated from “above” (state-centric), or from “below” (initiated by citizens or 
other organizations), for the purpose of participation from both directions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Robert K. Yin, “Designing Case Studies: Identifying Your Case(s) and Establishing 
the Logic of Your Case Study”, In Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th Ed.), 
Robert K. Yin, ed., (Sage Publications, 2014), accessed April 17, 2014, 
http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/24736_Chapter2.pdf, p. 47. 	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Data Collection 
A compilation of a chronological timeline of the Kurdish conflict, the related peace 
processes and the parallel instances of participation and inclusion (in terms of events, 
activities and initiatives of different civil society, and other sector, actors) was compiled 
based mainly on a media review of Turkish and international media.b These three 
parallel processes were combined in one timeline (see Appendix A) in order to provide 
a holistic view of participation and inclusion mechanisms ongoing during the different 
Kurdish peace processes in Turkey, in the time period 2008 to March 2014. The 
chronology was also used to compile a general description of all Track 1.5, II and III 
activities identified as ongoing in the time period alongside Track I (see Appendix B). 
 
After the compilation of the chronological timeline and general narrative of 
participation, a selection process took place, where the different activities were codified 
in different colors according to five categories in the timeline in Appendix A. Events or 
activities in the timeline that consisted of instances of Track I initiatives were 
highlighted in light blue, inclusion initiatives coinciding with the models of the 
“Broadening Participation Framework” in green, and additional or other Track 1.5, II 
and III participation initiatives in yellow, while democratization initiatives/policies in 
were highlighted in pink, and international initiatives in dark green.c The background 
events of the conflict, the general political and social scene in Turkey, and the region, 
remained without color, producing the overall historical background and skeleton of the 
context factors influencing the participation events. The colors highlighted different 
track initiatives were later used to describe in detail both the peace process (mainly 
Track I), and the national participation and inclusion activities (mainly Track I, 1.5, and 
III), which can be found outlined in Chapter 3 and 4, and Appendix B, respectively.  
 
Following the compilation of the timeline, the combined Track I, 1.5, II and III 
instances were later used as a pool to extract nine specific case studies of actors who 
had initiated instances of participation and inclusion in the peace process (in green). 
These individuals and organizations from civil society (NGO´s, academic, think-tank, 
grassroots movements, cultural and business sector etc.), were then contacted, or 
otherwise investigated through desk research and media review, in order to obtain more 
information on the participation and inclusion mechanisms they conducted. 
Additionally, the activities by these nine selected actors that were not classified as 
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models (in yellow) were also included in the pool of data in order to add an additional 
layer, and a broader view on participation beyond that of the frameworks 9 models. 
 
The data on the case studies were mainly obtained from semi-structured interviews, 
employing a snowball selection process of interviewees, and again, media-monitoring 
of the previously mentioned news outlets. Moreover, information was gathered from 
primary and secondary sources from the various organizations and activities surveyed 
(retrieved from a variety of sources, including: organizational and activity centered 
websites, reports, leaflets, multimedia material, as well as conferences, workshops, 
participant observation at events and site visits.) The selection of these cases relied on a 
criteria of information availability, as well as accessibility and funds in terms of 
geographical restrictions on the research. Only actors and organizations mainly based in 
the West of Turkey, Istanbul and Ankara, were therefore deemed feasible to study.d  
 
The interviews conducted for this research relied on an interview protocol (see 
Appendix C) which was designed to un-surface particular activities of inclusion and 
participation of each of the identified actor, in order to chronicle and describe the 
relevant events, find out the aim behind organizing these events, and the participation 
mechanism(s) they employed, as well as their outcome.  The five questions asked 
served as a guide during the face-to-face, phone and email interviews conducted.  
 
Two initial face-to-face exploratory interviews were conducted, followed by eleven 
interviews directly aiming at cases. Of these eleven interviews, two were conducted per 
email, one by phone, and the remaining in person. All of the in-person interviews took 
place in Istanbul in the time-span August 2013 to April 2014.e Two of the interviews 
were also undertaken in the context of a protest and/or civil disobedience action, 
meaning that the researcher combined interviewing with participant observation, while 
being present at both events. While the data on each case study was supplemented with 
desk research from organizational websites, documents, and newspaper articles, only 
three additional cases were solely based on such secondary resources.f The interviews 
were semi-structured in nature, though dependent on the interview protocol.g  Probing 
and additional questions were improvised according to each case and situation. Due to 
the sensitive nature of research matter, the anonymity of the interviewee was 
underlined, as well as the consent of the use of the obtained data received.  
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In order to examine the degree of participation and inclusion in the peace process, these 
selected cases were in turn classified and coded according to the “Broadening 
Participation in Track One Peace Negotiations” tentative framework of “9 models of 
Participation and Inclusion”, which was used in the analysis section of this thesis. The 
project builds on previous work on civil society and peacebuilding conducted by the 
Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, at the Graduate Institute Geneva.h 
The nine models identified so far are included in the table below, (in addition there is 
the possibility of a “model x” in this research framework, which is included in order to 
capture any additional or outlying possible models).i 
Table 1: The 9 Models of the “Broadening Participation” Framework 
Model  
1 Direct representation at the negotiation table 
2 Observer status, direct presence during the negotiations 
3 Official consultative forums parallel to negotiations 
4 Consultations, less formal consultations without official endorsement 
5 Inclusive post-agreement mechanisms, participation of societal and political 
actors in implementation institutions and mechanisms 
6 
High-level civil society initiatives, non-official track 2 or track 1 ½ 
facilitation initiatives in the pre-negotiation phase or parallel to official 
negotiations 
7 Public participation, involving the broader population via public hearings; 
opinion polls; town hall meetings or signature campaigns 
8 Public decision-making, referenda and other elective forms putting major 
political decisions to binding public vote 
9 Mass action, campaigns, demonstration, street action, protests, and petitions 
X Anything that follows outside the above mentioned categories, with the 
possibility of constituting an additional model. 
 
According to the classification of the selected cases in this framework, models were 
identified, and three questions were taken into consideration from the analysis and 
coding process in order to produce conclusions on the types and degree of inclusion and 
participation in the Kurdish peace process in Turkey. The first was – does the empirical 
evidence of participation and inclusion in the peace process in Turkey fit into the 
framework of the 9 models? The second question then asked was; If not, why not? 
Thirdly, for the cases that did fit into the models, categories were selected and how they 
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fit was justified. Lastly, the presence of additional or outlying participation 
mechanisms, or modifications of the framework according to the empirical findings, 
was examined. From this analysis of the findings as to the coding of the empirical 
evidence, conclusions as to theory, practice and policy implications were outlined.  
 
Selecting the Case Studies of Participation Actors and Mechanisms 
The following cases listed below were selected as illustrative cases of inclusion and 
participation in the Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey, in order to highlight individual 
cases and actors taking part in these activities. The cases were selected based on their 
perceived influence in the peace process, as well as the availability of information. In 
the list below, the participation and inclusion activities are grouped according to actor, 
by which their activities, aims and points of entry and influence to the peace process are 
described and evaluated in the analysis section. The table of case studies is as follows: 
Table 2: Participation Case Studies: Actors and Initiatives 
1 Free Women’s Democratic Movement: Women´s Initiative for Peace 
(BİKG) 
2 Ekopolitik: “Grand Dome of Turkey”  
3 Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV): 
Democratization and Good Governance Programs 
4 Hafiza Merkezi  (Truth, Justice and Memory Centre): Various Activities 
5 Government (Track I) Initiative: Wise Peoples Commission  
6 Columbia University: Roundtable on Kurdish Peace process  
7 
Constitutional Reconciliation Commission (CRC j /Economic Policy 
Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) - Constitutional Platform: 
Constitutional Citizen´s Assembly  
8 Human Rights Foundation/ İnsan Haklari Derneği (IHD):  
Saturday Mothers - Cumartesi Anneler - Dayîkên Şemiyê (2009 – 2014) 
9 
Social Mobilization/Protest Initiatives of the Kurdish Political and Social 
Movement (2008 – 2014): 
  
 
a. Newroz Celebrations (2008 – 2014) 
 
b. “Peace Tent/Democratic Solution” Civil Disobedience Campaign (March 
2011) 
 
The data compiled under each of the above-mentioned cases was organized according to 
the interview protocol used during the semi-structured interviews (please see Chapter 5 
for the data). The questions from the interview protocol provided a good framework for 
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structuring the data obtained. This is because the questions were designed to obtain a 
general view of the wide array of activities that each actor was conducting, as follows: 
1) Could you give examples of a few projects/events that your organization/initiative 
planned to influence an increased understanding of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? (i.e. 
conferences, protests, workshops, other?) 
2.) When and where did these take place, and how long did they last? 
 
3.) What was the aim behind these projects/events? What did you want to achieve? 
 
4.) Did these projects/events aim to affect the current peace process set in place by the 
government? Were your efforts heard at the higher level? 
5.) What were the results of these efforts/projects? (i.e. publications, change in public 
opinion, changes in society/communities etc.) 
 
As can be inferred from the questions above, the nature of the interview protocol was to 
keep the questions as uniform as possible, to later evaluate, with the data obtained, 
which activities may fit with the models of inclusion and participation from the 
“Broadening Participation” project. (In some instances, the models occurring for one 
actor was obvious, and the basis for the interview being requested in the first place.) 
However, the general nature of the questions produced a wealth of additional empirical 
data as well, that uncovered additional forms of participation activities, which later were 
deemed unclassifiable by the nine model framework. This issue will be expounded upon 
in the following analysis section, however, this serves as a guiding reference when 
examining the wide-ranging and varied inclusion and participation activities discovered.  
 
From the presentation above of the methodology employed to reach the selected cases 
of participation and inclusion in the Kurdish peace processes, a varied and rich picture 
can be obtained (for the general description of all Track 1.5, II and III initiatives prior to 
the selection of the 9 cases, see Appendix B). The following section will provide an 
overview of the history of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey together with an overview of 
the Track I, peace negotiation attempts so far. Chapter 5 will then chronicle and 
examine the extracted activities of participation from the nine cases in order to code and 
analyze them according to the “Broadening Participation” framework. Moreover, 
outlying events and activities will then be discussed in the subsequent analysis of the 
same chapter, in order to shed light on the importance of also looking at these additional 
events, despite their outlying nature to the framework, followed by concluding remarks. 
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  a	  Please see Appendix A for the detailed chronology of the peace process, conflict 
history  and paralell participation activities, and Appendix B for a general description of 
the overall participation activites at the Track 1.5, II and III levels. 	  b	  Mainly the newspaper sources used were online and English language, including: 
Todays Zaman and Al-Monitor, and to a lesser degree Hurriyet Daily News, Rudaw, 
and Al-Jazeera, among others (see the bibliography for more detailed information).  	  c	  International events were considered as part of the background to the inclusion and 
participation initatives ongoing in Turkey, though they will not constitute cases. 	  d	  Although many of the organizations and activities surveyed had their headquarters or 
were based in the West of Turkey (Istanbul/Ankara) many operated and performed 
actions and activities, or visited, the South-East of Turkey, which encompasses the 
conflict zone. However, due to time and funding constraints, visits to this area were not 
conducted for this research, moreover, there is a geographical bias due to the focus on 
organizations operating in the urban and Western areas of Turkey, in contrast to the 
rural and ethnically dominated Kurdish South-Eastern regions. A mapping and 
examination of more informal and less professionalized organizations in this region and 
their influence on the peace process could be the basis for interesting further study, as 
this is a common critique in the literature on civil society and other sectors involvement 
in peace processes and political transitions. Despite the “Western” (in terms of 
geographical location within Turkey) of this research, it should be underlined that many 
organizations and actors surveyed possessed strong links and communication with 
grassroots movements, activists and organizations also in the South-East in the 
execution of their work concerning, or related to, the peace process. 	  e	  An exception to this is one interview based on an earlier, unpublished, research on 
Kurdish Identity construction in Turkey, which was conducted in April 2011 in 
Istanbul, at the site of the “Peace Tent” civil disobedience campaign prior to the June 
12th elections. For a full overview of the interviews conducted, see Appendix C. 	  f	  These are the cases: “Grand Dome of Turkey”, “Constitutional Citizen´s Assembly 
Series”, and the “Newroz Celebrations”. Please see Chapter 5 for further details. 	  g	  Please see Appendix C for the interview protocol in both English and Turkish.	  	  	  h	  I.e.: Thania Paffenholz, “Summary of Results for a Comparative Research Project: 
Civil Society and Peacebuilding” (Geneva: The Graduate Institute, The Center on 
Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, 2009). Accessed June 14, 2014 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ccdp/shared/6305/CCDP-
Working-Paper-4-Civil-Society.pdf;  
The ongoing CCDP project “Arab Spring: Challenges during Political Transitions and 
Comparative Lessons for Civil Societies in the Middle East and North Africa”, under 
the coordination of Dr. Paffenholz, (Website, Accessed June 14, 2014 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/fr/home/research/centresandprogrammes/ccdp/ccdp-
research/clusters-and-projects-1/participatory-peace-processes-an/arabspring.html); and, 
Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Beyond the Inclusion–Exclusion 
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Dichotomy”. Negotiation Journal, 30 (2014): 1, 69–91, Accessed May 8, 2014, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nejo.12046/abstract 
 i	  The models are considered to be tentative as the “Broadening Participation” project is, 
at the time of writing, still in progress and the model´s titles are still open, and may be 
subject to changes according to the findings of this ongoing project. 	  j	  Two other related commissions to the peace process and parallel democratization 
process were also set up in this time period: The Resolution Process Assessment 
Commission and Coup and Memorandum Commission, but will not be examined here 
due to the lack of information available on the dealings of these commissions, as well as 
the lack of inclusivity and participation of the public, while the Constitutional 
Commission, was created with the public mandate of the 2010 Constitutional 
referendum.	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Chapter 4 - Chronology of the Kurdish Conflict and Peace Processes in Turkey 
 
The conflict between the Turkish State and the Kurdish populations of Turkey can be 
summarized into four general time periods: from the 1920’s – 60’s, where the Turkish 
nation was being formed, during the 1960’s-80’s where its foundations began to be 
contested, the 1980’s – to the end of the 90’s, where a civil war ensued, and up until the 
first decade of the 2000’s, where democratization efforts ensued. Following the second 
millennia, and the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
attempts at a political peace process to solve the Kurdish conflict (which had 
commenced already earlier, but without bearing fruit, in the 90´s) increased. Firstly, 
with the secret “Oslo Talks” between 2008 – 2011, and then followed by the on-going 
peace process, which commenced between the State and the PKK in October, 2012.   
 
The current peace talks between the PKK leadership and the Turkish State, commenced 
in October 2012,1 are widely seen as important politically to Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, who is seeking re-election, it is widely thought, as president, in the 
scheduled Presidential Elections of August 2014. The peace process under his auspices 
was also seen as important in receiving the majority for his AKP party in the Municipal 
elections were held in March of the same year.   
 
The period of the AKP’s rule has undoubtedly brought on the largest attempts to solve 
the Kurdish conflict, during which such initiatives as the secret “Oslo Talks”, which 
commenced in 2008 took place.2  These concluded unsuccessfully in September 2011 
due to public leakages of the talks,a as well as the renewal of PKK strikes in mid-2011,3 
making the process politically impossible to pursue at the time. The most recent talks 
are important, but have in the period leading up to the 2014 March local elections 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1  Tulin Daloğlu, “Turkey-PKK Talks Move Ahead”, Al-Monitor, April 3, 2013. 
Accessed February 19, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/talks-
akp-pkk-turkey-kurdish-peace-process-move-ahead.html. 
 
2 Yasemin Ergin, “Kurdish Conflict Takes Toll on Turkey´s Image”, The Washington 
Times, February 15, 2012. Accessed February, 28, 2014, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/15/kurdish-conflict-takes-toll-on-
turkeys-image/#ixzz2tVDOA48o. 
 
3 Ergin, “Kurdish Conflict Takes Toll”. 
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stalled, with one of the main issues of contention being the lack of a legal foundation 
for the talks to continue, and perceived backtracking by both parties on concessions. In 
order to understand the current peace process, and the attempts preceding it however, an 
overview of the conflict origins will be given in this chapter, followed by a chronology 
of previous peace process attempts, culminating in a description of the current, and 
ongoing, peace process. 
 
Chronology of the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey 
The Republic of Turkey was conceived in 1923, under the founder of the nation, 
Mustafa Kemal or “Ataturk” (meaning “ancestor” or “father Turk”), and from this 
period on there have been periodic military coups, at the turn of each decade, in the 
60’s, 70’s and 80’s. These coups produced a pattern of cycles of violence and 
liberalization, in which Kurdish Nationalism was allowed to grow only to be severely 
repressed again. The Republican Peoples Party (CHP) authoritarian, one-party rule 
lasted for twenty-seven years. From then on, Kemalism was instated as the official 
government ideology, which was based on secularism and creating a Turkey that looked 
West. Moreover, the military was appointed as the constitutional “safe-guarders of the 
Turkish Republic”, against the main two threats to the republic throughout the times: 
Islamism and Kurdish nationalism.4 
 
Up until this period, the Kurds had for centuries considered themselves as a people, 
having been unified under the leadership of various Kurdish kingdoms. Their shared 
history, culture and cosmology had since this time been developed, manifesting itself in 
legends, oral history traditions, literature and a shared spoken, and later written, 
language, as well as in cultural and customs, expressions and practices. The Kurds 
fought as allies to the Turkish state in the war of National Independence from the 
Ottoman Empire, under which they had lived with relative cultural freedom, under the 
“millet” system, where ethnic groups were largely respected to practice their culture. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Gönül Tol, “A New Era In Turkey's Civil-Military Relations”, Middle East Institute, 
Washington, D.C., August 30th 2010. Accessed August 23, 2014, 
http://www.themiddleeastinstitute.org/content/new-era-turkeys-civil-military-relations  
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a) 1920-60: Nation Building 
The concept of a “United Kurdistan”, a separate state for those who were identified as 
”Kurds” and lived in the mountainous areas between what is Iraq, Iran, Syria and 
Turkey today, was a real possibility in the 1920’s after World War I. However, this plan 
was counteracted, and Kurdish regions were divided to be part of these four countries 
instead. Under the first constitution of Turkey however, before it was recognized as a 
state, there were amendments for some Kurdish autonomy and local governance within 
Turkey. With the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, however, the claims for an autonomous 
region for the Kurds in Turkey were disregarded, recognizing only the non-Muslim 
religious minorities living in Turkey. With the new constitution in the following year of 
the establishment of the republic, this fact was emphasized with the proclamation of no 
special rights for ethnic groups in Turkey, and going even further, by denying the 
existence of any other cultural or national identity besides the Turkish one.b All these 
moves for the fostering of a strong, united Turkish identity were all part of Ataturk’s 
vision for the newly independent state of Turkey, as a nation-building project to create a 
secularized and Westernized country.  
 
However, what this nation-building project meant in practice for the largest ethnic 
minority in Turkey, the Kurds, was the virtual attempt of the extinction of their unique 
separate cultural identity. These practices of assimilation occurred not only through the 
rhetoric denial, but also through systematic and deliberate actions and policies by the 
state apparatus. These were set in place to suppress the Kurdish identity, and the 
mounting political, social, and later, armed, ethnic nationalist movement, which they 
saw as a threat to Turkish national unity and territorial integrity.  
 
This repression, which was often coercive and violent, took many forms, including 
mass deportations and forced migration of people from Kurdish villages (mainly in the 
South-Eastern part of Turkey), as well as a ”scorched earth campaign” which consisted 
of burning down up to 3500 villages, producing more than 2 million refugees and 
internally displaced peoples5. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Kevin Mckiernan, Good Kurds, Bad Kurds: No Friends But the Mountains, Director 
Kevin Mckiernan, USA: Passion River, 2000. 
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In addition to this campaign, other practices were put into effect such as changing  
Kurdish village names to Turkish ones, outlawing the public use of the Kurdish 
language, and discriminating against the adoption of the Turkish alphabet, the Kurdish 
language and culture, and thus the larger issue of Kurdish identity. In addition, the ban 
on Kurdish music and films, as well as literature and publications,   continued to hold  
Kurdish public and social life under strict controls.   
 
As is emphasized by Watts (2007) in her discussion of Kurdish resistance in this time 
period, and the role of the state and the media:  
 
 In keeping with the state-sponsored emphasis on the Turkish roots of the 
Turkish Republic, the Turkish press confined discussion of the mostly 
Kurdish Southeast part of the country to talk of banditry, smuggling, and, 
at most, underdevelopment, without reference to the non-Turkish 
ethnicity or cultures of the people who lived there.6   
 
In 1925 the Eastern Region Reform Commission was established to look at the situation 
in the East of  Turkey which was economically underdeveloped compared to the West. 
The following year the Eastern Region Reform Commission Plan (ERRCP) was 
established to encourage the “Turkification” of the Kurds through compulsory 
settlement and the opening of boarding schools with instruction in Turkish and state 
controlled curriculums.7 
 
Thus, the Turkish state´s policies of this period can be summarized into three categories, 
a) those of coercion, such as violence; b) political, economic and social marginalization, 
and c) an attempt to redefine or assimilate the cultural identity of Turkey’s Kurdish 
population, through suppressing identity and cultural customs. c  These politics of 
assimilation or denial of the existence of the “other” however, seemed to be paired with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Nicole F. Watts, ”Silence and Voice: Turkish Policies and Kurdish Resistance in the 
Mid-20th Century”, The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism, Mohammed M. A. Ahmed 
and Michael M. Gunter, Eds., Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press, 2006. 
 
7 Mesut Yeğen, “’Prospective-Turks’ or ‘Pseudo-citizens’: Kurds in Turkey”, Middle 
East Journal, 63 (2009): 4, 597 -615. 
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a paradoxical movement by the state to establish stereotypes and negative connotations 
concerning the South-Eastern parts of the country, marginalizing the majority Kurdish 
population that resided there.d 
 
b) 1960 – 1980´s – Contesting the Nation State 
During this time period a ”Reawakening” or “Rebirth” and a political reconstruction of 
Kurdish Nationalism and reformulation of demands took place.e Earlier years had seen a 
very fragmented leadership and civil organization within the South-East and in the 
Kurdish communities in Turkey, which was strongly divided along tribal, religious and 
linguistic lines. In the 60’s however, the political and social climate changed, with the 
influence of the first military coup in Turkey removing the ten-year rule of the 
Democrat Party (DP), which had enjoyed widespread Kurdish support due to the party’s 
movement away from Kemalist politics. 
 
The coup, paradoxically, allowed for more political expression and freedom as well as 
the establishment of labor unions. The new constitution put in place the following year, 
modeled on the European convention on Human Rights, still denied the existence of a 
Kurdish population in Turkey, proclaiming that every citizen is ”accepted as (a) Turk 
regardless of ethnic or religious identity.” 8 An Independent Constitutional Court was 
established, as well as an independent Judiciary, protecting the rights of Kurdish and 
leftist activists, although the involvement of the military in the government was 
extensive, and severe repression on cultural expression and activism remained 
widespread. 
 
During this time period the Worker’s Party of Turkey (TIP) and other leftist as well as 
pro-Kurdish organizations were allowed to form. Moreover, in this cold-war era, and up 
until the 70’s, a new focus of a younger generation of Kurds, who now had more 
possibilities to be educated in the West of the country9, was on overturning the power of 
the landed Kurdish elites, class relations were revolutionized, and the goal was the 
creation of a socialist state.  	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These changes in ideology for the Kurdish struggle brought diverse Kurds together, as 
well as bridged ethnic boundaries inciting cooperation with Turkish leftists who shared 
this common vision for the country. f  However, one can also argue that this 
radicalization of Kurdish ethno-national struggle also created divisions and polarization 
within the Kurdish population, dividing them into ”Marxists” and ”Non-Marxists”, or 
supporters of the traditional, landed elites or tribal elders, and once again along tribal 
and linguistic lines. However, an important change to note was the move away from 
violent and local forms of resistance, to a more ethno-nationally based ideology or 
nationalism to combat the Turkish states repression by intellectual and peaceful means.g 
Moreover, the end of the 60’s saw young Kurdish intellectuals on the left starting to join 
movements of a more radical ethnic and separatist agenda in Turkey. 
 
At the same time, this period also witnessed the publishing of pseudo-scientific articles 
arguing Kurds really stemmed from Turks, resurging traditional stereotypes that Kurds 
were really just ”Mountain Turks”, a common stereotype referring to them as Turks 
who had merely gone to live in the mountain and “forgotten” their language, 
disregarding the Kurds own unique history and culture. In addition, there were renewed 
efforts by the state to consolidate its influence in all parts of the country and pursue its 
former policies to eradicate the strength of minority cultures.  
 
Towards the end of the 60’s, Kurdish language publications, which had been 
flourishing, were proclaimed illegal. Moreover, census material specifically on the 
Kurdish population of the country ceased to be gathered according to minority group. In 
addition, the creation of the National Security Council (made up of top ranking 
militaries), as well as the feared National Intelligence Organization (MIT), showed a 
continued fear of the threat of Kurds and leftists during this time period. Many Kurdish 
activists were jailed during the rule of the military junta accused of wanting to create a 
”communist state of Kurdistan.”10 
 
In the fall of 1967 a massive civil disobedience campaign named the “Eastern 
Meetings” was launched in seven cities of the South-East, coordinated by the TIPs 	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regional offices. This campaign gathered thousands and constituted one of the first mass 
public protests, according to Watts, since the earlier violent uprisings in the 30’s and 
40’s. The meetings were mainly to protest economic inequalities between the East and 
the West of Turkey, as well as the lack of development and democracy. Watts also 
claims this  important event  exposed Western-born Kurds to the bleak situation faced 
by the poorer South- Eastern born Kurds. Kurdish intellectuals and poets were exposing 
their ideas and work publicly, and in Kurdish, something deemed to have been 
“unimaginable” before. Despite this liberty there was a heavy police presence, as well 
as various counter-rallies organized by Turkish nationalist groups. 
 
In the early 1970´s, Turkish military units known as “commandos” began clashing with 
Kurdish and Turkish leftists, operating in the South-East,11 and on March 12th, 1971, 
another military coup was established.h With this the Turkish constitution was again 
amended, as well as the penal code, in order to make it easier to prosecute Kurdish 
activism, as well as martial law was imposed on the South-Eastern region.   The coup 
only lasted four years though, with a return to parliamentary democracy in 1974; in this 
period though, a Turkish ultra-nationalist group called the Grey Wolves, in addition to 
militant youth of the Nationalist Action Party, and left wing and Kurdish nationalist 
groups, engaged in violent conflict in Turkey’s main cities and Eastern Anatolia. A 
couple of years later, in 1978, emerging from this polarized environment, the militant, 
guerrilla Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was founded by Abdullah Öcalan to promote 
Kurdish demands and separatism. This group would play a central role in the “Kurdish 
Question” in Turkey in the following years, and form the armed wing of the Kurdish 
nationalist movement today.  
 
c) 1980 – 90s Civil War 
The decade of the 80’s was again initiated with another coup by the Turkish military, 
this time targeting both Kurdish nationalists, Turkish ultra-nationalists, leftists and 
Islamists; all perceived as ”a threat to the state”.i The 1971 constitution was kept, 
proclaiming continuity with the Kemalist model and refusal to recognize Kurdish 
cultural identity, language, and right of association. The reign of the militaries saw the 
ban on the use of traditional Kurdish names, and a constitutional reform calling for a 	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parliamentary system where 10% of the national vote was needed for a party to be 
represented. j  This military coup was considered to be particularly brutal, with a 
widespread use of arbitrary detention, arrests and torture of anyone perceived to be a 
“threat”, including Kurdish activists and civilians, but also other dissenters to the 
official state policies. According to Yildiz and Muller, the Turkish state at the time was 
a “hostile, all-powerful, unaccountable institution.”k 
 
In 1983 with civilian rule restored, the situation was deemed to have improved, for 
instance with the Turkish President, Halil Turgut Özal, at the time lifting the ban on 
speaking Kurdish in public. However, the stability was not to last, as in the following 
year the PKK insurrections, launched from the Kurdish areas of Northern Iraq, against 
the Turkish military, began. This marked the start of the fifteen year civil war between 
the PKK and the Turkish military in the South-East of the country. Not only did this 
armed conflict produce much suffering on the part of Kurdish militants and guerilla 
fighters, but also affected the entire population, civilians and activists alike. 
Disappearances, torture, forced membership in the army or prescribed membership in 
the paramilitary ”village guard system” (enlisting civilians to aid the military and report 
on and combat the on PKK in the South-East), were just some of the methods in which 
the Turkish state violated human rights and respect for cultural minorities. In 1987, a 
number of provinces under martial law were placed under a Regional State of 
Emergency Government (OHAL), under the rule of a ”super governor” whom had an 
absolute mandate over decisions in the region. Suppression on Kurdish political 
activity, fearing collaboration with the PKK, and evacuation of villages due to the 
unrest were all commonplace. 
 
Into the 1990’s the military regarded Kurdish nationalism and political Islam to be the 
two biggest threats to internal security, and these were heavily cracked down upon. The 
PKK leader Öcalan, sensing the need for a change of strategy, renounced the 
movement’s claims for separatism, but failed in trying to adopt a more formal party 
structure and in the declaration of unilateral ceasefires, as the violent attacks continued 
from both sides. This decade also saw the formation of various Kurdish political parties, 
some of which even gained representation in the Turkish parliament, but were 
consecutively banned as new ones sprang up on claims of collaboration with “an illegal 
organization”, namely the PKK.l Moreover, these parties faced charges of having 
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formulated Kurdish particularistic demands, having incited “separatism” or “ethnic or 
racial hatred”, as outlined in the constitution.  
 
Some progress was made with the legalizing of Kurdish music and music videos which 
had previously been strictly forbidden and confiscated. The beginning of this decade 
also marked the First Gulf war in Iraq which produced an  exodus of millions of 
Kurdish refugees crossing the border to Turkey fleeing Saddam Hussein’s repressive 
regime. The war sparked international awareness and solidarity on the situation of 
Kurds in the area. However, it also produced a situation where the Kurds of Iraq became 
viewed as the ”good” Kurds fleeing repression, while the Kurds in Turkey, were seen as 
”bad” Kurds, due to the PKK´s armed struggle in Turkey, and their case being less 
known and sympathized with.m In the midst of the atrocities and violence, Öcalan, the 
leader of the PKK, was arrested in 1999 in Kenya, with the help of US intelligence. 
Upon his capture he called for another unilateral ceasefire which would last for five 
years. The event was deemed to be turning point for the Kurdish struggle, as well as for 
the following attitudes of the Turkish state towards the country’s Kurdish population. 
With this Öcalan´s capture, the fifteen year civil war in Turkey was considered over, 
although tension and incidents between Kurdish activists and politicians and the 
Turkish state remained frequent, with violence persisting. 
 
d) 2000 – 2009 ”Democratic Opening”               
Between February 2002 and July 2004 Turkey underwent an intense period of 
legislative reform, with eight “harmonization packages” were passed, under the 
auspices of the ruling AKP party, at a time where membership in the EU was 
considered to be much higher up on the political agenda then it is today.  
With the perceived end of the armed conflict, Turkey’s consideration as an official EU-
candidate just before the turn of the millennia, and the Islamist Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) coming to power, there were a lot of expectations for change in Turkey. 
The party undertook various reforms in anticipation of EU accession and this brought 
about hope especially for the improvement of the situation of the Kurds in the country. 
The same year that the party came to power, a New Penal Code came into action with 
the lifting of the State of Emergency in the South-East, shorter police detention periods, 
as well as the lifting of the ban on the use of the Kurdish language in public. In addition, 
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in efforts to adopt the EU-criteria and fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria, the Turkish 
Parliament abolished the death penalty and legalized private Kurdish language classes 
(though several ”bureaucratic hurdles” restricted and delayed the implementation of 
these.)n To this day, the easing on language rights still bans the teaching of the Kurdish 
language from the state education system (article 42 of the constitution on “mother-
tongue”), as well as at a university level, except for in private universities and as an 
elective course. 
 
Moreover, the constitutional changes enacted that same year did not provide much of an 
improvement to rights and protection for minorities, while the 6th and 7th pro-EU reform 
packages applied did improve the fields of freedom for Kurdish language in the areas of 
broadcasting, personal names, and language tuition,12 as well as allowing Kurdish to be 
spoken in prison.  The situation for Kurdish political prisoners and activists saw a slight 
turn of events, with the premature release of four former members of Parliament, among 
them the renowned Kurdish politician Leyla Zana. These parliament members had 
originally been sentenced for 15 year, for speaking Kurdish and wearing the Kurdish 
colors at their swearing in ceremony to Parliament.  
 
The situation in the South-East even seemed to be changing with the PKK reorganizing 
itself as KADEK, the Congress for Democracy and Freedom in Kurdistan, as well as the 
continued upholding of the unilateral ceasefire. Later on KADEK converted into 
Kongra-Gel or the Peoples Congress of Kurdistan, seeking a more civilian and political 
path, moving away from the more militarized and radically separatist rhetoric of the 
past. However, in 2004, Kongra-Gel ‘s listing as a terrorist organization by the EU was 
later that year revoked, up until the five-year-long unilateral ceasefire. These changes 
all took place as Turkey, in 2005, commenced its formal negotiations for EU-accession, 
causing considerable pressure on the government to tackle the ”Kurdish Question”. 
Renewed violence and a PKK attack in November of 2008 on the Aktutun military base 
in the Semdinli region of Hakkari province overshadowed the attempts at 
democratization reform, however. 13 	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In March 2008, the General Penal Board of the Court of Cassation outlined that 
individuals joining demonstrations where the PKK  called for public participation 
should be charged with  “membership” in the PKK.14 (This piece of legislation is 
frequently used to prosecute Kurdish activists and politicians even today.) In Spring of 
the same year, talks of a peace initiative to disarm the PKK began to circulate.15 In July, 
the ruling AKP narrowly avoided closure, as a complaint targeting its “anti-secular 
activities” failed to convince the supreme court. 16 After the 2008 Zap operation failed, 
the government approach to the PKK changed; Ilker Basbug, Chief of Staff of the 
Military, and Prime Minister Erdoğan agree on pursuing a relaxation on culture and 
language rights. This culminated for instance, in the launch of a Kurdish language TV 
channel, which entered the agenda prior to the local elections of 29 March 2009.”17  
The first half of 2009 was still marked by societal tension with widespread and violent 
protests. For instance, in February, marking the 10th Anniversary of Öcalans capture, 
which culminated in clashes between protestors and police for several days in several 
South-Eastern cities.18 That same month, Ahmet Türk, then chairman of the pro-
Kurdish DTP, gave a speech in Kurdish with the state TV channel, which immediately 
cut the live broadcast.19 In the lead up to the March 29 local elections, however, the 	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PKK vowed to keep its´ armed activity to a minimum. After the elections, the ruling 
AKP party remained a majority, though declined considerably in comparison with the 
2007 elections. In mid-April the KCK  declared that the non-conflict situation pursued 
before the local elections should be maintained, also in view of the increased standing 
of the Kurdish democratic movement in the local elections, giving renewed hopes for a 
political solution. o However, the day after the KCK declaration, on April 14, several 
members of the Kurdish nationalist political movement were arrested, comprising 
hundreds of Kurdish politicians, elected mayors, branch and provincial administrators. 
20 In the same month, PKK leader Öcalan sets up a new roadmap to peace and sends 
“Peace Groups” (of former PKK combatants) to Turkey, in a renewed attempt to signal 
the need for a political solution.21 Throughout this time period arrests and military 
operations continue in the South-East of Turkey. 
 
In May of 2009, the seasoned reporter Hasan Cemal conducted an interview with Murat 
Karayilan, an active PKK leader, for the Turkish newspaper Milliyet. In the interview 
the PKK declares its readiness for dialogue, and welcomes the increased openness in 
discussing the topic in the media. Moreover, the idea of a “wise man´s committee” 
(later to become the “wise peoples commission”,p which would be initiated by the 
government to explain and prepare the public on the peace process)  was already 
mentioned as an idea at this time. 22 The increasing openness did not come with its 
pitfalls, as Cemal is later accused of conspiring with the PKK  for his article.23 As of 
May 2009 however, the official position of the Turkish government was still that it did 
not “negotiate with terrorists”.24 This hardline position coexisted however, unknown to 
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the public, with a secret dialogue process between the State and the PKK, which was 
dubbed the “Oslo Talks”, due to the location of the talks. 
 
It is clear that throughout the Kurdish conflict´s history in Turkey, there has been a 
dissonance between the official rhetoric and the actual attempts at solving the conflict 
politically and peacefully, which though frequently kept out of the public eye, have 
taken place. The next section will outline the chronology of the two most recent track I 
peace processes (the Oslo Talks, and the most recent process), in order to provide the 
basis for the chronology of the inclusion and participation mechanisms which took 
place at lower tracks parallel to, and in the same time period (outlined in Chapter 4). 
 
Chronology of the Peace Processes to solve the Kurdish Conflict (2008 – 2014)  
In this section, a chronology of the peace process, and earlier attempts will be given, 
focusing on the Track I attempts to resolve this conflict. In the next chapter, a 
chronology of participation will be provided, in order to highlight the same time period, 
but centered on the activity of the lower tracks (Track II, III and 1.5) in the peace 
process, by their parallel as well as participatory activities in the ongoing Track I 
process. This will produce to complementary chronologies (combined in Appendix A), 
utilized later on to select specific case studies of participation for study and analysis.q  
 
a) Earlier Attempts at Track I Peace Initiatives 
Already in the years of his leadership of Istanbul’s Metropolitan Municipality (in the 
mid-1990s), Prime Minister Erdoğan formed a working group on the Kurdish question 
and its possible solutions.r Erdoğan´s background as part of the Turkish Islamist leader 
Necmettin Erbakan´s movement, were popular in the Kurdish regions, giving him 
considerable influence and legitimacy, in some sectors, even before he became Prime 
Minister.25 Even before the AKP came into power however, it has been known that 
Turkish authorities had held open a dialogue channel with PKK leader Abudullah 
Öcalan about ending the PKK armed conflict, ever since his capture in February 1999.26 
In what can be classified as the “first attempts” at negotiations and the granting of 	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increased rights for Kurds, the presidency of Turgut Özal, between 1991-1993, involved 
a partial lifting of the ban on the use of the Kurdish language in schools and government 
agencies. His unexpected death in 1993 prevented meetings he had planned with the 
leadership of the PKK from taking place.27 Thereafter, Prime Minister Necmettin 
Erbakan's attempted to hold indirect talks with the PKK leadership in 1997, though he 
was unseated by the military and could not follow through on his planned attempts. 28 
 
b) The  “Democratic opening” 
In the summer of 2009, the government seemed to shift their strategy and launched a 
new project called the "Democratic solution to the Kurdish problem" (later called the 
“National Unity Project”, and known as the “Kurdish” or “Democratic” opening) in an 
attempt to make steps towards initiating negotiations through democratic reform. The 
process was portrayed as an attempt at initiating public consultation and negotiation to 
address Kurdish grievances and put an end to the PKK armed activity. Initiated with the 
opening of a 24-hour state-run Kurdish-language television channel and the promise of 
other reforms to end discrimination,29 the project also aimed at re-integrating PKK 
fighters in Northern Iraq, by having them return to Turkey and laying down arms. In 
July 2009, Prime Minister Erdoğan even held a long awaited meeting with Kurdish 
politician Ahmet Türk concerning the commencement of a dialogue process, though 
nothing concrete was announced at the time.30  
 
This process also suffered from mixed signals however, especially in relation to the 
“opening up” of increased cultural rights for  Kurds. For instance, in August, 2009, on 
the 25th anniversary of the first PKK attack in Eruh, Kurdish Singer Ferhat Tunç gave a 	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speech which later landed him criminal charges.31 Moreover, The National Police 
Academy held a workshop on the government's "Kurdish Opening" initiative, but were 
conversely later prosecuted for said attempt at raising awareness on the government´s 
new initiative.32 These are just a few examples at the time of back-tracking of the 
governmental decision for increased liberalization in the social and political realms for 
Kurds, (a practice which is still ongoing). However, the general political shift also 
brought some progress, as in September of the same year, trials began in Diyarbakir 
looking into state perpetrators of extrajudicial killings and disappearances; on trial stood 
a colonel, village guards and informers for the murder of 20 individuals in the period 
1993-5 in Cizre, in the South-Eastern province of Şırnak.33  This landmark step was 
seen as signaling a willingness to look into Turkey´s “Dirty years” of civil warfare, and 
at least partially admit the mistakes of previous government´s policies towards Kurds. 
 
In October, 2009, a group of PKK militants crossed into Turkey from Iraq at the Habur 
border gate in what AKP officials claimed was the beginning of a process that would 
result in the entire organization laying down its arms. 34 The project of the Democratic 
Opening was thus partially implemented, but efforts remained strained after PKK 
supporters gave a warm “hero's welcome” to these militants returning to Turkey from 
Northern Iraq, which also sparked a strong counter-reaction from the Turkish 
opposition, Nationalist groups and the general public, with violent protests erupting. 
The government canceled the return of more groups, and several fighters who had been 
promised immunity from prosecution were arrested and imprisoned under Turkey’s 
anti-terrorism laws. 35 Öcalan had dubbed these groups “peace groups” which were 
meant to show the PKK´s willingness to disarm and re-integrate in return for democratic 	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rights. Thus an opportunity to commence an actual open negotiation process, through 
this attempt at a confidence building measure, was missed due to the lack of inclusion 
and preparation of this process of the public. 
 
Though the “Democratic Opening” was considered dead after this, secret talks 
continued between the government and the PKK in this period (later, these would 
become known as the  “Oslo Talks”). During this period both conflict parties decreased 
their armed activity. 36  The process was poorly planned and hastily implemented. In its 
anxiety to reap the political benefits of putting an end to a conflict that had already cost 
nearly 40,000 lives, the AKP failed to both prepare the Turkish public and to create a 
legal framework for disarming PKK militants. 37 However, that year saw a shift in 
discourse as DTP Co-Chairman and head of the Kurdish Democratic Congress (KTK), 
Ahmet Türk, started to use the term “Kürt coğrafyası” (Kurdish geography), for 
instance referring to the majoritarian Kurdish populated areas. 38   At the time a 
conversation was increasingly emerging among various politicians, civil society 
organizations, academics and the media, as well as the president, Abdullah Gül (and not 
without its critics), about how the “Kurdish Question” in Turkey should be solved 
through peaceful means.39 Moreover, the media especially saw a shift away from self-
censorship towards the calls for the need for a solution to the “Kurdish issue.”40 The 
political parties were viewed as slowly changing position as well: the AKP seemed to 
be considering steps towards dialogue, while the CHP met representatives from the 
DTP for the first time. 41  	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November 2009, saw the AKP government addressing parliament in terms of its 
intentions to strengthen Kurdish human rights in Turkey.42 Meanwhile, anti-terrorism 
arrests and trials continued however, for instance with 31 members of the mainly-Izmir 
based trade unions affiliated to the public sector workers´ trade union confederation 
KESK standing trial on charges for being members of the PKK. In December of the 
same year however, the government strengthened Kurdish language rights and reduced 
the presence of the army in the South-East.  Yet, on December 11, the pro-Kurdish 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) faced closure, as well as the banning from politics for 
5 years of 37 of its members, including the co-chairs Member of Parliament Ahmet 
Türk and Aysel Tuğluk.43 The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) was formed in its 
place, maintaining the Pro-Kurdish stance of its predecessor, and currently still exists.  
 
For many, the disappointment of the AKPs 2009 “Democratic” or “Kurdish” opening 
was only too clear, bringing disillusion in the government as a whole. Many accused the 
government of not being genuine, and argued that the initiative had in fact failed 
completely.s The focus on social and development issues in its approach,t and the lack of 
acknowledgement of identity, social and political issues and demands at hand proved 
the strategy unsuccessful, rightly pointing towards the need for more involvement and 
consultation from the stakeholders themselves in such a process. As is outlined by Ömer 
Taşpınar, referring to the PKK´s persistent popularity in Turkey: “Breeding grounds for 
radicalism and terrorist recruitment emerge not necessarily under conditions of abject 
poverty and deprivation, but rather when negative social, economic and political trends 
converge.”44 The increase in PKK attacks in the summer of 2009 also didn’t help the 
government’s Kurdish initiative or sway public opinion. However, the last years have 
also seen increased action by civil society organizations for the PKK to lay down its 
weapons, as well as for military operations in the South-East to cease, in order to look 	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for a political settlement solution instead. The September 2009 referendum to amend the 
1980’s constitution from the military coup showed a will to move away from Turkeys 
militarized past. Moreover, progress was later seen, as in August of 2009, a unilateral 
ceasefire was established after a meeting between the Democratic Society Congress 
(DTK), Kurdish intellectuals, members of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party 
(BDP), civil society groups and PKK-affiliated organizations.45 
 
As outlined in the EU Commission‘s 2010 Turkey Progress Report, and part of the 
conference’s final resolutions the “…specific areas of concern include freedom of 
expression and association, access to justice and independence of the judiciary, freedom 
of religion, children‘s rights, gender equality and the harsh treatment of human rights 
defenders”, as well as the task of supporting Turkey’s EU-accession and urging all 
parties to commit to negotiation and dialogue process. For instance, one of the concerns 
of the yearly International Conference on “EU, Turkey and the Kurds” in 2010, was that 
although Turkey had undergone certain reforms and constitutional amendments in the 
right direction, these had not been exercised with a consultation with political parties 
and civil society organizations and therefore lacked legitimacy. 
 
c) Oslo Talks 
In what can be considered the second generation of attempts to solve the Kurdish 
question, the AKP launched their Democratic opening, followed by the so-called “Oslo-
Talks” between 2008 – 2011. However, the “Democratic Opening” was viewed to 
basically be abandoned in the period leading up to, and during, the Oslo talks.u There 
were some easing of restrictions during 2010, specifically targeted at the Kurdish 
question, but in practice easing language use for other minorities as well, as radio and 
television stations were allowed to broadcast in the following “languages besides 
Turkish” during this year: Arabic, Bosnian, Circassian, and Kurdish (both Kurmanci 
and Zaza dialects). 46 Despite these moves from the government, violence continued in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Gönül Tol, “Turkey's Chance for Reconciliation”, Middle East Institute (Washington, 
D.C.) September 10, 2010. Accessed March14, 2014 
http://www.mei.edu/content/turkeys-chance-reconciliation  
 
46 “2010 Human Rights Report: Turkey”, U.S. Department of State.  
	   55	  
demonstrations related to the Kurdish problem during the rest of the year in the South-
East of the country. 47  
 
Indirect talks were said to have been pursued between the PKK and the Turkish State 
already in 2008, mediated and organized by a Norwegian civil society group and the 
Norwegian government. 48 Between 2009 and 2011 talks,49 or rather “talks about talks” 
commenced between the Turkish state and the PKK, dubbed the “Oslo talks” (due to 
some of the face-to-face meetings being held in Oslo).50 After Hakan Fidan was 
appointed the new undersecretary of the MİT, replacing Emre Taner in 2010 the talks 
continued.51 Little information is available from these talks, as they were conducted in 
strict secrecy, and only concluded with the leaking of tapes from the talks, sparking 
public outrage, in 2011. The new Pro-Kurdish party, the BDP, played an important role 
at the time, with Deputy Sırrı Sakık and previous DTP Co-chair and independent deputy 
Ahmet Türk, providing contact between the two parties in the lead up to the Oslo Talks 
between 2006 and 2010. This process commenced after “positive signals” had been 
received by the two Kurdish politicians from undisclosed government sources that 
rapprochement between the two conflicting parties was desired. 52  The deputy 
undersecretary of the Prime Ministry at the time, Hakan Fidan, (who became the head 
of the MİT later), MİT deputy undersecretary Afet Güneş, and three members of the 
European wing of the PKK, Mustafa Karasu, Sabri Ok and Zübeyir Aydar, attended the 	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various meetings that constituted the “Oslo Talks”,53 of which further detail as to the 
talks extent and content is not readily known to the public to date. 
 
In April of 2010, debates on constitutional reform began arising, most prominently due 
to the pressure that the Kurdish question was putting on Turkey´s political consensus, 
but also on its international image. Subsequently, easing on restrictions on the use of 
Kurdish language continued, with the amendment on April 11 of the political parties 
law and the election law in order to allow the use of “languages other than Turkish” 
during election campaigns, as well.54 In May of the same year, the conflict faced 
renewed intensification after one year of relative calm, with the stepping up of military 
operations and respondent PKK attacks. 55  
 
In July 2010, the PKK leader Karayilan issued a statement saying that the PKK were 
willing to disarm in return for increased legal rights for Kurds. This could be interpreted 
as a series of public statements and signals by the PKK leadership to test the waters for 
a future negotiation process at the time. Moreover, it was speculated at the time that this 
may be an outcome of the secret, ongoing talks. On 13 August, 2010, further progress 
was made with a ceasefire being called by Öcalan, complying with the request of the 
Turkish government for non-violence ahead of the September 12th constitutional 
referendum. The ceasefire was later prolonged until the general elections held in June 
2011, producing almost a year-long period of non-violence. 56 On August 20, 2011 the 
CHP leader Kemal Kıdıçdaroğlu publicly referred to the ongoing Oslo talks between the 
government and the PKK, underlying the party was not against said talks. Prime 
Minister Erdoğan, in response strongly, denied the talks were taking place.57 However, 
on September 19, 2011, and following the leaks and the end of the Oslo talks, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan admitted that they had taken place, underlining however: “The state 	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had talks (with the PKK) not the government.” (Referring by the “state” to the 
intelligence agency MİT which had conducted the talks representing the state). 58 
 
For as long as they lasted, the secret Oslo talks take place in a climate of much domestic 
political turmoil. Throughout the year of 2010, prosecutors in Istanbul continued to 
arrest and indict prominent military, business, and media personalities on charges of 
plotting to foment unrest and topple the elected government as members of an alleged 
network known as "Ergenekon". The network was accused of attempting a military 
coup in 2003, with more than 250 persons being indicted by that year's end. 59 On 
December 16, the first session of a trial of 195 suspects in the alleged "Sledgehammer" 
coup plan began. Suspects included active-duty military generals and civilians, accused 
of obstructing the government and plotting to overthrow it. The trial continues until the 
year's end. Many observers see this trial as politically motivated, similar to the 
Ergenekon case, while others see it as bringing to justice those who attempted to 
overthrow the government. 60   
 
Parallel to this process, was the “KCK trials” (referring to the Kurdish Communities 
Union) which were ongoing in this period.v The first session of a case against 151 
suspects, including several elected mayors, political party officials, and human rights 
activists, began in Diyarbakir on October 10, 2010. These individuals were charged 
with disrupting the integrity of the state; being members and/or administrators of the 
KCK, and assisting and sheltering a terrorist organization under Turkey´s “anti-terror” 
legislation. The suspects requested to defend themselves in Kurdish, but this was denied 
in court as constituting an “unknown language”.61 The KCK trials commenced at a time 
of relative inactivity of the Oslo process, and were seen to reverse the positive efforts 
which had initially spurred the process on in the beginning. 62 Years later, on February 
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15th, 2012, a bill regulating the MİT was changed in a move to protect the intelligence 
agency from being obligated to testify in the still ongoing KCK probe. Fidan, Güneş, 
and Taner (active in the Oslo talks) were invited to testify, but it was speculated that this 
was to question them on the Oslo talks.63 This move shows the prevalent culture of 
secrecy surrounding the actual extent and content of these initial talks. 
 
The last meeting, according to the Chief of the PKK´s Europe branch, Zübair Aydar 
(who was present at the Oslo talks) between the PKK and the MİT, took place in May 
2011.64 According to him, by this time three protocols had been prepared by Öcalan for 
discussion with his counterparts. After that no other meeting took place, though they 
were expecting a follow-up to take place in June. The year of 2011 proved not to be one 
of much progress for the nascent political peace process.  On March 1 the PKK ended 
its ceasefire though it said it would not re-commence violence before the June 
elections.65 The political moves toward reconciliation came to a halt finally though, 
after PKK militants began launching strikes in mid-2011 on Turkish soldiers and 
police.66 A sharp escalation in violence was continuously accompanied by growing 
political repression, including a massive crackdown on pro-Kurdish media and arbitrary 
arrests of thousands of Kurdish activists, intellectuals and politicians. 67 Finally, the 
“Oslo Talks” faltered in the run up to the June 12th elections,68 whereby the ceasefire 
called almost a year before was finally breached. 
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After the June 12th, 2011 elections, the AKP won an overwhelming majority. 69  
Following these elections, Erdoğan was increasingly perceived as adopting a hardline 
stance on the Kurdish issue, and military operations increased in the South-East. 70 This 
culminated in the increased incidence of PKK attacks, and a bitter end to the hope of a 
resolution as started by the Oslo process.71 Moreover, de-facto “Democratic Autonomy” 
was announced by the Democratic Society Congress (DTK) a platform of Kurdish 
parties and organizations. The government responded with anger to this declaration, and 
guerilla and military clashes followed, with a sharp increase in violence and continued 
arrests. This period until Autumn 2012 proved to be the most deadly in the conflict, 
with the AKP government choosing to try to again solve the conflict militarily instead 
of non-violently through continued talks and negotiations. 72 
 
In September 2011, an almost 50-minute long voice recording revealed the secret talks 
that had taken place between representatives of the Turkish government and members 
of the PKK in Oslo, Norway, as well as Imrali Island, in the Marmara sea of Turkey, 
held sometime in 2010. 73  The leaks from the secret Oslo Talks faced various 
accusations as to who could have produced the leak willingly, in terms of spoiling the 
process. PKK member Zübair Aydar, for instance, accused the religious Gulen 
Movement of leaking the Oslo talks to the media.74  75  For instance, a video message 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ergin, “Kurdish Conflict Takes Toll”. 
 
70 Jenkins, “The AKP´s new dialogue with Öcalan”.   
 
71  Ergin, “Kurdish Conflict Takes Toll”. 
 
72  “Democratic Resolution Declaration From KCK”, Kurdish Info. 
 
73 “PM Erdoğan: PKK leaked secret Oslo talks to media”, Today´s Zaman, September 
28, 2012. Accessed 28 March, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-293692-pm-
erdogan-pkk-leaked-secret-oslo-talks-to-media.html.  
 
74 “PKK accuses Gülen Movement of leaking Oslo talks”, Kurd Press, 28 January, 
2013. Accessed May 5, 2014, 
http://www.kurdpress.com/En/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=3665#Title=%0A%09%09%0
9%09%09%09%09%09PKK%20accuses%20Gulen%20Movement%20of%20leaking%
20Oslo%20talks%0A%09%09%09%09%09%09%09  
 
75 Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, “Turkish power struggle leaves new questions on Kurdish 
issue”, February 4, 2014. Accessed February 19, 2014, http://www.al-
	   60	  
released at the time by the leader of the Gulen Movement, Fetullah Gulen (in exile in 
the United States) was interpreted by the PKK leadership as hostile towards their 
movement and Kurds in general.w  Prime Minister Erdoğan later blamed the PKK for 
the leaks as well.76 Although much remains unclear about the process, Murat Karayılan, 
the leader of the PKK, admitted in an interview on June 15, 2012 that “the solution was 
very close in Oslo.”77 Moreover, later on, in Sept. 18, 2012, CHP spokesperson Haluk 
Koç argued that the PKK and the AKP had signed an agreement in Oslo and reveals the 
alleged documents. 78 
 
August 2011 brought the appointment of new top generals to the TSK, reviving hopes 
towards renewed democratization efforts in Turkey, increased governmental control 
over the military and better civil-military relations.79 In October the PKK killed 24 
soldiers in Çukurca and Yuksekova, in South-Eastern Turkey, constituting the deadliest 
attack of the group since the 1990s. 80 In turn, 53 PKK fighters were killed in three days 
in the same region81 with the Turkish army conducting bomber plane attacks in 
Northern Iraq on PKK bases as well.82 These events, together with the renewal of PKK 
strikes in mid-2011, and the leaking of the talks, meant that the secret talks became 
politically impossible to pursue. However, democratization and reform initiatives 	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continued, and on October 19, a Constitutional Reconciliation Commission (CRC) was 
set up to outline a new civilian constitution, with the membership of all parties in 
parliament represented equally, encompassing the AKP, CHP, MHP and Pro-Kurdish, 
BDP. However, 2011 culminated tragically, putting a stop to these efforts for increased 
political reconciliation for that year. As on December 28th the Roboski/Uludere 
bombings take place, in which 34 Kurdish civilians, mostly young teenage boys, were 
killed while smuggling goods, constituting food supplies and cigarettes, over the 
Turkish border. This produced a national outcry, not least among the Kurdish 
population, who recalled previous atrocities perpetrated towards Kurdish civilians in the 
past.x The government did not handle the situation well in relation to the ongoing 
reconciliation efforts, and instead of quickly acknowledging the situation, called the 
young smugglers “terrorists”, which in turn sparked more outrage in Kurdish society. 
 
d) Recent Peace Initiatives (2012 – 2014) 
In the third attempts at talks, again pursued by the AKP government, under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Erdoğan, the negotiations had many names (perhaps 
reflecting the stop-and-go dynamic that characterized and still characterizes it). Initially 
it was referred to the “Imrali” process, named after the island where leader Öcalan sits 
imprisoned. Later on Erdoğan coined it the “Solution process” (Çözüm süreci), which 
later became known as simply the “Peace process.”  
 
Following up on their previous attempts to employ a dual strategy of democratization 
and reform, going hand in hand with political dialogue, the AKP started again in the 
interval between 2011 – 2013 (and following the failures of both the “Kurdish opening” 
and the “Oslo Talks”), with releasing four judicial reform packages, culminating in a 
constitutional reform package in September 2013. The year of 2012 also brought about 
an attempt at renewed talks (which are at the time of writing, currently taking place). 
Officially commenced in October 2012, these were widely seen as important politically 
to Prime Minister Erdoğan. Moreover, in difference to the first round of “Oslo Talks” 
these renewed talks were attempted in a more public fashion, with media coverage of 
the meetings taking place (though not much insight into their content), and with official 
declarations by the Prime Minister and other politicians, acknowledging the process.  
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The first half of the year leading up to renewed talks in October 2012 was marked by an 
escalation in the armed conflict, as well as regional turmoil in Syria. January, seemed to 
start off on a promising note, with a parliamentary inquiry created to look into the case 
of the Roboski/Uludere bombings of the previous year.83  However, in June, a civilian 
court in Diyarbakir conducting the investigation issued a controversial decision of non-
jurisdiction on the case, transferring it to military prosecutors.84 February of that year 
brought about an escalation in the armed conflict, with cross border raids in Iraq on 
suspected PKK bases, with hundreds killed, lessening the hopes that a non-violent 
solution would be possible to the conflict.85 Moreover, that year´s Newroz celebrations 
in March were marked with clashes between demonstrators and police,86 with many 
injured and hundreds arrested, and with one protester killed, namely the head of the 
Istanbul branch office of the BDP, Haci Zengin.87. There was political disagreement 
surrounding the yearly event as the BDP wanted to organize it on the 18th of March, a 
Sunday, while the government wanted Newroz celebrations to take place on the usual 
day, the 21st. This rift lead to an all out ban of the celebrations that year, though crowds 
gathered regardless.88  
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In June of the same year, the government announced that schools were permitted to 
offer Kurdish classes (though only as an elective course). 89  Moreover, violence 
escalated again as PKK bases were struck in Iraq, after 8 TSK and 10 PKK fighters 
were killed in the South-Eastern Hakkari province in clashes between the two sides. 
With the increased fighting that took place that autumn, and in July, a Turkish plane by 
was shot down by Syrian forces, there were increased worries as to how the conflict 
would impact Turkey, as well as its ongoing Kurdish peace talks. In September, there 
were further air strikes on PKK bases in Northern Iraq, with the TSK gaining military 
advantage and inflicting heavy casualties on the PKK.90 These events brought about 
renewed calls by the BDP to recommence negotiations to avoid further loss of life in the 
military conflict.91 With the PKK gaining military advantage in October, legislation was 
also passed allowing cross border military raids into Northern Iraq, in order to be able to 
target PKK headquarters.92 On the 20th of November, a Major PKK branch leader and 
151 members of the “Self-defense Units” (ÖSB) of the PKK were detained in the 
South-Eastern province of Diyarbakir in a sweeping operation against the guerillas.93 
 
In the summer of 2012, the PKK experienced an increase in its´ self-confidence in terms 
of gaining support from Kurdish nationalists in the region. Looking to its neighbors, 
with the increased independence of the semi-autonomous region of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG) from the Iraqi central government, and with the separate 
majority Kurdish population area called “Rojava” (North-Eastern and Northern Syria) 
emerging in the increasingly chaotic Syria, under the control of the PKK related 	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Democratic Union Party (PYD), throughout July 2012, the PKK began to attempt 
holding control over territory gained from its armed attacks for the first time in 20 
years. 94 By September, the Turkish armed forces seemed to be retaining the upper hand 
militarily, with only the harsh winter conditions in the South-East putting the situation 
on hold, but demonstrating a military stalemate on both sides, which seemed to produce 
the adequate conditions for a renewal of talks. In addition to this, on September 12, 
Kurdish prisoners began a hunger strike campaign in order to continue the pressure felt 
by the government to make advances in its dealing with the Kurdish issue. People both 
inside and outside of prison joined the strike, with over 700 people taking part by mid-
November 2012. Those striking proclaimed to be doing so in accordance with the 
demands of the PKK: for the recognition of full Kurdish language rights, an easing of 
the policy of isolation Öcalan in prison, the devolution of some of the powers of the 
central government to local authorities in the South-Eastern, Kurdish dominated areas, 
and the establishment of  “democratic autonomy” in these areas. 95 
 
There was a whole back-channel political process also leading up to the commencement 
of renewed talks in October of 2012, built on the contacts and lessons already learned 
from the earlier rounds of talks mentioned before. For instance, on June 1st, 2012, the 
opposition CHP proposed the launching of an initiative to find a resolution to the 
Kurdish issue with two commissions; a joint parliamentary commission and another 
“wise peoples” committee to work with the parliamentary commission. The latter idea 
has also previously been an idea launched by Öcalan. The AKP responded positively to 
these ideas, making them their own, while the MHP refused them in principle, with the 
BDP gradually agreeing to the proposition, and their participation. 96  Diyarbakır 
independent deputy Leyla Zana met with Erdoğan on July 1st, two weeks after she said 
that it was “Erdoğan who could solve the Kurdish issue,” suggesting talks with the PKK 
should be re-started.97 There was support for renewed talks from the opposition CHP 
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with an official statement of leader Kılıçdaroğlu on September 21st. 98 
 
The talks began with the Prime Minister sending Hakan Fidan, the head of the MİT, for 
an initial face-to-face meeting with Öcalan, on İmralı island, South of Istanbul, where 
he is currently imprisoned for life. 99 From January 2013, there takes place 10 such 
visits, with MP´s from the BDP also taking part in these high level political dialogues.  
However, critics viewed these talks as increasingly giving the upper hand to Öcalan and 
the PKK. For instance, Öcalan issued a statement asking to meet more people while in 
prison, where he had been kept in isolation, like civil society representatives and 
journalists. Moreover, the wording of using “negotiations” instead of “dialogue”, and 
insisting on his demands to be met in order for the continuation of the process, were 
interpreted by political commentators as a sign that the jailed leaders was pushing his 
agenda primarily.100 The whole process commenced to slow down as the PKK was seen 
to be “rushing” a democratic reform package in September 2013 through parliament, 
before its July 2013 break, The government on the other hand accused the PKK for not 
being efficient enough in withdrawing their militants from Turkish soil, as agreed upon 
in their negotiations. 101 
 
The visits to İmralı continued, and on November 17, 2012, Öcalan´s younger brother 
Mehmet was granted a visit to the prison. After the visit his brother announced Öcalan´s 
wish for an end to the hunger strike (ongoing since September), before any deaths took 
place. His wishes were granted immediately, demonstrating the great power that the 
PKK leader still wields over the Kurdish movement in Turkey. 102 On December 28, 
2012, (on the one-year anniversary of the Roboski/Uludere bombings coincidently), the 
Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan announced the beginning of a new dialogue process 	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with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, in order to disarm the organization.103 
There was an interesting use of rhetoric with the government framing the process as 
mainly one of “disarmament”, while the PKK attempted to paint the process as one of 
“negotiations”, and mutual concessions. The tension between these contesting views 
from either side was demonstrated on January 1, 2013, when Murat Karayılan, the most 
influential of the PKK commanders in Northern Iraq, answered Erdoğan´s statement 
with one of his own, underlying that it was the Turkish army that should be 
withdrawing its forces from “Kurdistan” (referring to South-Eastern Turkey), and not 
the other way round. 104 
On January 3, 2013, two Kurdish nationalist members of parliament, Ahmet Türk and 
Ayla Akat Ata, visited Öcalan on İmralı.105  Highly reported in the media as a step 
forward in the peace process, the two MP´s made a declaration announcing that the 
PKK leader wished to pursue the resolution of the Kurdish issue through “democratic 
means”. However, critiques remarked that the process was still rather cosmetic, with the 
government not actually including wider elements of the PKK, or the BDP, in actual 
negotiations.106 Suspicion remained in the Kurdish nationalist movement as to whether 
the only aim of the government with this process was simply to disarm the PKK, and 
not to actually grant increased rights and address the deep-rooted causes of the conflict. 
Clearly, the lack of trust between the two parties persisted. To compound the tensions, 
on January 7th 2013, 100 PKK fighters attacked a military post close to the Iraqi border, 
in Çukurca, an unusual event in the winter months when the weather makes armed 
activity in this area extra difficult. Although the media professed the “end” of the 
dialogue process, the attack turned out to actually be a retaliation for the death of Ertem 
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Karabulut on December 31, 2012, a PKK regional commander and member of its ruling 
council, thus, the event did not actually have major repercussions.107 
On January 9th, 2013 three Kurdish women activists, Sakine Cansiz (founding member 
of the PKK), Fidan Doğan (member of the Kurdistan National Congress in Paris) and 
Leyla Saylemez (member of the Kurdish youth movement) were killed in Paris. The 
assassinations was seen by both the Turkish government and the Kurdish political 
movement as a major attempt to try and derail the peace talks with the PKK. One year 
later, leaks to the media brought suspicion as to whether the government was 
responsible, 108  with accusations being made, particularly by Kurdish Nationalists, 
targeting the AKP.109 On January 10th, Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç issued a 
statement condemning the Paris killings, however, the majority of the other AKP 
officials, including Prime Minister Erdoğan also tried to use it as an opportunity to 
speculate in whether the PKK had factions within it opposed to the peace process.110 
 
Peace seemed to be far away from the agenda when on January 13-14, 2013, Turkish 
warplanes bombed PKK camps and bases in Northern Iraq yet again.  Parallel to this 
military activity was the mass funeral of the three slain Kurdish activists in Paris which, 
upon their arrival in Diyarbakir, were met by masses of people.111 In February, an 
Istanbul prosecutor who oversaw the investigation into the KCK trials for links to the 
PKK asked the Ankara Prosecutor´s Office to hear the testimony of MIT undersecretary 
Hakan Fidan, as well as obtaining warrants for four other MIT officials. Fidan was also 
asked to testify in the ongoing Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) trials.112 This was 	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seen as an infringement on the governments authority and independence in pursuing the 
peace process in some circles, and is also as an attempt to investigate the Oslo talks. 
 
However, March 2013 brought perceived steps forward endorsing the peace process, 
with a ceasefire being called in mid-March by Öcalan during the Newroz celebrations, 
which were conducted more peacefully then previously in the anticipation of his 
announcement.113 From March to June, the “Government Take a Step” (Hukumet 
Adim) civil disobedience campaign was launched by the BDP to keep pressure towards 
this end.114  In March, the Parliamentary report on the Roboski/Uludere bombings, 
following 15 months of inquiry, was released, concluding that there was no evidence 
found to prove the attack was intentional. It cited “poor coordination” between the army 
and intelligence as the main reason behind the deaths, 115  resulting in great 
disappointment from large segments of the Kurdish population who were demanding an 
official apology from the state, for this deeply symbolic event, standing in their mind 
for present and past violations perpetrated by the state towards Kurdish people. 
In April, 2013 the government announced a plan for the “Wise persons” commission. 
The senior PKK commander Karayılan said that Öcalan had proposed the establishment 
of eight commissions to facilitate the process. “… a justice commission, a socio-
economic commission, a National Pact [Misak-I Milli] commission, a women’s 
freedom commission, an ecology commission, a civil society commission, a security 
commission and a truth commission”116 On April 4, the first meeting of the Wise 
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Peoples committee took place in Dolmabaçe palace, the Prime Ministers Office in 
Istanbul, with the Prime Minster and several other officials present.117 After their initial 
meeting, the Wise Persons commission began public meetings throughout all the 
regions of Turkey in order to gather views on the conflict, and inform the public on the 
ongoing peace process, through town hall style public meetings. There was some 
progress as on April 25th, PKK commander Karayilan said the PKK would begin their 
withdrawal from Turkish territory on May 8th.118 The PKK honored this promise (with 
only the PKK´s Lice group objecting), following the orders of Öcalan.119 In May, in a 
perceived increased political rift, Karyilan, publicly blamed the Gulen movement for the 
Paris killings of three Kurdish women activists, as well as for the Uludere bombings.120 
On May 10th, the Prime minister was briefed by the Wise Peoples Commission on their 
findings.121 The next day saw the Reyhanli bombings in Hatay province (bordering 	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Syria), with speculations linking the two car bombs that claimed 46 lives and injured 
more than 100, to the faltering Assad regime in neighboring Syria. This bombing was 
considered the worst terror attack in Turkey’s history (as the largest PKK attack claimed 
33 lives in 1993, in Bingol).122 June saw renewed national unrest in Turkey with the  
anti-government Gezi protests taking place in Istanbul, and throughout the country, seen 
as one of the major political challenges faced by the AKP government. Kurds were 
accused of being largely missing in the demonstrations due to the fear of derailing the 
peace process, and therefore made their presence in the protests less visible. On June 
28th, a protestor of Kurdish origin was killed protesting the construction of a military 
police “jandarma” post in Lice, a historically rebellious town in the South-East, 
sparking increased protests in Lice and throughout Turkey in the aftermath of Gezi.123 
 
July 2013 saw a stalling in the peace process with the PKK announcing a stop to the 
actual withdrawal of its forces from Turkish territory. They were accused by the 
government again of not being sincere in the peace process, as at the beginning of the 
year, the total number of PKK fighters were estimated to be around 5,000, but since the 
commencement of the peace process, the PKK was found to have added more than 
2,000 new recruits to its ranks from among young Kurds, according to an intelligence 
report released at the time.124 Thus they were accused of using the withdrawal and 
negotiation process to add new members to its ranks, showing the continued and 
pervasive mistrust on all sides. On July 9th, Öcalan sent a letter with the BDP to the 
PKK Kandil base. During this period the PKK and the BDP are were vocal on the need 
for democratic reforms to initiate the “2nd phase” of the peace process. During this 
month the Wise peoples commission presented its report to the government, however, it 
was not publicly accessible, and none of the findings were discussed openly (though 
they later become accessible individually online on the different regional groups 	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websites, and in 2014 were gathered on one website.) No governmental effort was made 
to widely disseminate and follow up on the reports findings. On July 21, the BDP met 
again with Öcalan, and in a written statement announced that that he wanted to meet 
with the press and civil society to be able to make a stronger contribution to the 
settlement process,125 in what was perceived as an attempt to move the stalled process 
forward. 
 
In July 2013, the administration of the KCK changed, and Cemil Bayık, known for 
close ties with Iran, replaced Murat Karayılan.126 At the same time, the situation in 
neighboring Syria intensified with Arab Islamists, represented by the Al-Nursa group 
battling Kurdish militants for control of key towns close to the Turkish border, and an 
announcement of the Kurds in Syria who declared local autonomy.127  Turkish Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu quickly stated that Turkey had no enmity for any ethnic 
group in Syria, but that Ankara opposed a bid by Syrian Kurds to create an autonomous 
region along the Turkish border, saying steps that could generate further conflict should 
be avoided, referring to a recent political rift in the Kurdish politically armed group 
PYD, which is affiliated with the PKK.128 Also, in July, and in a perceived attempt to 
gain control over the regional dimensions of the Kurdish conflict, Prime Minister 
Erdoğan hosted the Iraqi Kurdish leader Nechirvan Barzani, ahead of a planned “grand 
Kurdish conference” in Arbil in August, which was expected to bring together major 
Kurdish political groups in the Middle East.y Barzani's visit also followed Ankara´s 
hosting of Saleh Muslim, the leader of the PYD, with whom the Turkish-Kurdish peace 	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process was then discussed.129 During an “iftar”, the fast-breaking dinner in the Islamic 
holy month of Ramadan, Erdoğan met with families of the Roboski/Uludere bombings, 
underlining that he did not order the strike,130 in a symbolic display of reconciliation. 
 
In August 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan announced that Turkey's parliament would 
reconvene early from its summer recess to pass laws to expand Kurdish rights through 
democratization, a move seen as crucial to resolving this almost 30-year old armed 
conflict.131  Öcalan later issued an ultimatum to the government to “announce the 
reform plan, required for the second stage (of the peace process), by September 1st and 
start implementing it by October 15” as well as an appeal for the formation of 
parliamentary commissions to “contribute to the process,” 132 demonstrating his still 
strong drive to move the process forward, and also to tell to attempt to steer the process. 
 
In September 2013, Cemil Bayık, the new leader of the military wing of the PKK, 
announced that the PKK had halted the withdrawal of its members from Turkish soil to 
Northern Iraq and would retaliate if the TSK attacked, setting September 1st as a 
deadline for the government to take further steps to move the stalled process forward.133 
This announcement was perceived as a threat. On September 1st however, Bayık´s 
comments were clarified by the BDP as not meaning the end of the peace process, but 
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as a warning to the government, showing some backtracking and confusion.134 Earlier, 
on the third anniversary of the constitutional referendum of September 12, 2010, it had 
already been noted that the Parliament had yet to bring its legislation into harmony with 
the amendments the referendum requires, causing grave concerns about the 
government's willingness to continue with the reforms required for democratization,135 
as well as needed in order to move meaningfully forward with the peace process. In the 
same month, the opposition CHP party announced it would continue its visit to the 
mostly Kurdish-populated South-Eastern Turkey to explain the party's stance on the 
decades-long Kurdish issue and peace process,136 demonstrating the clearly politically 
importance that this issue retained for both the governing and opposition parties.  
 
On September 9, the KCK released a statement saying that the withdrawal of PKK had 
halted,137 further creating confusion as to how the peace process would move forward, 
and whether violence would in fact resume.138 On September 11, at a security summit, 	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government members discussed plans by the PKK to resume armed action should the 
process fail. A security report on the latest situation in the peace process  at the time 
stated that the PKK had outlined plans for violent action in 10 areas if the government 
fails to take steps on democratization. The plan included raids on offices of political 
parties in the South-East and the abduction of parliament members.139 According to this 
intelligence report, which obtained by the Taraf Newspaper at the time, claims were 
made that the withdrawal had in reality halted already in mid-August, claiming that 
most of the PKK fighters had taken up position in the border region of Hakkari (within 
Turkey), with others going to urban areas. The report also estimated that around 600 
militants had pulled out of Turkey, going to Northern Iraq, but that they were mostly 
sick or elderly individuals. 140 Moreover, the intelligence services collected information 
demonstrating changes in the higher echelons of the KCK and the PKK, determining 
that armed units had been restructured accordingly, raising fears as to the possible 
renewal of violence should talks fail.141 
On September 30th, as expected, Prime Minister Erdoğan announced the content of a 
new democracy package,142 which was welcomed, but also criticized143 for not living up 
to the widespread hopes, especially for the increased protection and demands for ethnic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
resume military operations?”, Al-Monitor, September 15, 2013. Accessed September 
12, 2013,  http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/09/pkk-plan-resume-action-
reconciliation-fail.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter; “Öcalan talks about 
new format, gov´t says not worth commenting on”, Today´s Zaman, September 16, 
2013. Accessed September 12, 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-326546-
ocalan-talks-about-new-format-govt-says-not-worth-commenting-on.html. 
139 Özay and Çelik “Is PKK planning to resume“. 
 
140 Özay and Çelik “Is PKK planning to resume“. 
 
141 Özay and Çelik “Is PKK planning to resume“. 
 
142  “Erdoğan to announce comprehensive democracy package”, Today´s Zaman, 
September 11, 2013.  Accessed September 12, 2013,  
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-326104-erdogan-to-announce-comprehensive-
democracy-package.html.  
 
143  “News of consulting Öcalan on democratization package causes controversy”, 
Today´s Zaman, September 13, 2013. Accessed June 16, 2014, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-326347-news-of-consulting-ocalan-on-package-
causes-controversy.html.  
 
	   75	  
minorities and women.144 The package also contained symbolic measures, relating to 
reconciliation in relation to the Kurdish issue, for instance, in the returning of the 
Kurdish city Dersim back to its original name of Tunceli.145  With expectations running 
high throughout Turkey ahead of the democratization package however, 146  such 
symbolic changes were not seen to be satisfying the expectations of the public, and 
particularly that of Kurdish segments of the society in relation to the ongoing peace 
process. Among the reactions and criticism to the democratization package147 was the 
lack of any substantial reform to the anti-terror law, which has imprisoned many 
Kurdish activists, journalists and politicians, as well as the lack of changes to the 
election system to change the election threshold for parties to be represented in 
parliament, which was seen to particularly affect Kurdish parties, like the BDP.z Other 
measures deemed to be important to ethnic minorities, like Kurds, however was the 
abolishment of the National Oath, seen to discriminate minorities from the schools, as 
well as the establishment of anti-discrimination commission to combat hate crimes.148  
The issues of media freedom, women's rights, freedom of speech, rights to protest, 
police violence, and judicial independence were not largely prioritized though, 	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according to critics. Moreover, the move to make political propaganda legal in Kurdish 
was noted to have been mandated by the constitutional court several years before, 
thereby actually not bringing about any major change. However, the reform package 
was generally heralded as the first formal step indicating that the government took the 
peace process seriously. One of the first reactions from the BDP however was that this 
move was positive, but not sufficient, as in their view (which is largely shared by many 
Kurds in the nationalist movement) these rights belonged to Kurds in the first place.aa  
During this time, the PKK bombed a construction site at a military post in South-
Eastern Turkey, also briefly kidnapping four workers in the Pervari district of Siirt 
province. 149 In mid-September, the final and 10th visit to Öcalan took place with BDP 
Co-chairperson Selahattin Demirtaş and parliamentary group deputy chairwoman 
Pervin Buldan travelling to İmralı Island, amid mounting concerns over the fate of the 
peace process.150   
 
In October 2013, Murat Karayılan, leader of the KCK maintained that the ceasefire 
would be respected while underlining the process was in a “fragile stage.”151 In the 
same time period, polls showed overwhelming societal support for the peace process.152 
Moreover, the BDP was in this month declined its request to undergo another visit to 
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Imrali,153 seemingly signaling a shift in the governments approach to the process. On 
October 15th, Öcalan issued a long-awaited statement on the reform package.154 On 22 
October, at 12:30pm, Cemil Bayık, KCK Executive, declared that the ten-month-long 
peace negotiations between the Turkish state and the Kurdish movement had come to a 
halt. Shortly after, at 12:48pm: PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan communicated via his 
brother that. “If the Turkish state authorities do not visit me once again (concerning the 
peace negotiations), I suppose this indicates that peace talks are over for them, and 
thereby it is over for us too.”155 However, on October 24th, continuing with the 
inconsistency in public statements seen before in this process, with all parties involved, 
in a letter disclosed by BDP Chairman Selahattin Demirtaş, Öcalan stated he could still 
contribute to PKK fighters “coming home” and laying down arms as part of the ongoing 
peace process.156  
 
During this time, a new political party was formed, the Peoples Democratic Party 
(HDP), managed by co-chairs Sabahat Tuncel and Ertuğrul Kürkçü, who were, 
respectively, İstanbul and Mersin deputies from the BDP.157 The party is viewed as 
providing a left-leaning alternative with less of a focus on Kurdish identity, as 
compared to the BDP. In discussions on the role of Öcalan in the peace talks, BDP 
parliamentary deputy group chairman İdris Baluken suggested that the PKK leader be 	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named “Chief Negotiator”.158 This comment came as part of an ongoing political debate 
as to the Kurdish side´s demand for the official recognition of Öcalan as an equal party 
to the negotiations, as well as the need for a legal foundation to back up the talks. 
 
In November 2013, Prime Minister Erdogan announced, around the 10 year anniversary 
of the AKP, that he wished to change Turkey´s parliamentary system to a presidential 
one. This created tension in the Constitutional Commission, and increased political 
stalemate nationally.159 On November 15th the PKK fired on four military convoys, 
putting the ongoing ceasefire in danger, though it was not called off (and is at the time 
of writing still in place). With things worsening in Syria, Cemil Bayık, a founding 
member of the PKK announced that the group had the right to retaliate if the 
government did not proceed with negotiations, interpreted by the government as a 
veiled threat. 160 The construction of a security wall between the Kurdish populated 
areas of Turkey and Syria was halted, among large protests.161 On November 15th, 
another near breach of the ceasefire took place, as the PKK fired on a Turkish military 
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convoy in the South-Eastern province of Mardin. This was the biggest attack to occur 
since the eight-month cease-fire, with the Turkish army responding with fire.162   
 
Barazani of the KRG paid another visit to Turkey to discuss with Erdoğan the peace 
process, the role of the PKK, and the situation of Syrian Kurds, in increasing improved 
relations between the Northern Iraqi Kurdish leadership and Turkey.163 While on 
November 16th, Prime Minister Erdoğan paid a visit to Diyarbakir,164 the spiritual 
capital of the mainly Kurdish populated South-East, where a symbolic meeting and 
concert was held with KRG leader Barazani, and Kurdish artists Ibrahim Tatlises and 
Siwan Perwer. This was seen as a symbolic confidence building measure to back up the 
faltiering negotiation process. 165 There was attention in the media brought to the fact 	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that Erdoğan used the term “Kurdistan” in his speech, following which Diyarbakir 
Mayor Osman Baydemir also adopted the use of the term in public as well.166 The 
polarization and stalemate was not only within the peace process, but also the 
constitutional reform and democratization process nationally. This was demonstrated 
when the Parliamentary Constitutional Reconciliation Commission on the Constitution 
de-facto dissolved in this time period. The Parliament Speaker Cemil Çiçek said he did 
not believe the commission would come up with a new constitution, adding that he 
would write a letter to the leaders of the four political parties represented in Parliament, 
who are the only ones who could in fact terminate it. 167   
 
On November 12th, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled on an 
important case of village destructions and executions (the “Scorched earth campaigns”) 
in the 90´s, fining the Turkish State.168 Afterwards, the Justice Minister, Sadullah Ergin, 
issued a statement saying there would be a national investigation into the historical 
cases we as well, signaling a will to take on cases of past atrocities committed by the 
state towards its Kurdish citizens.169  On November 13th, the national political scene 
was hit with another tumultuous event as a bill was announced by the AKP to close 
down Gülen movement schools, in a move seen to curb the political influence that the 
movement had exercised in the police forces and the legislature. Moreover, it was seen 
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as move in response to the earlier probe into the operations of the MİT, which was 
interpreted as a hidden attack on the government by the religious movement.170  
 
On December 8, the PKK kidnaps four Turkish soldiers on the highway from 
Diyarbakir to Lice, however, the local people protested against this and they were 
released.171  Later on in December, the possibility of granting amnesty to former PKK 
combatants was discussed as a possible part of the negotiation agenda.172 In parliament 
however, there was renewed tension as all four deputies of the Peoples' Democratic 
Party (HDP), Sebahat Tuncel, Ertuğrul Kürkçü, Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Levent Tüzel, 
started a hunger strike in Parliament in protest of court rulings that recently rejected a 
demand to release five Peace and Democracy (BDP) deputies in the South-Eastern 
province of Diyarbakır. 173   A major national political battle was simultaneously 
unleashed on December 17th 2013, as a Graft Corruption Probe commenced in the 
government. 174 Erdogan was quick to label the probe a ‘coup attempt’ by those who 
wanted to undermine the Kurdish peace process, and blamed the Gülen movements 
supporters in the government and the judiciary.  Protesters clashed with the police over 
the Corruption Probe, as anger over the leaked recordings of alleged government 
corruption were released.175  The increased focus on the government´s increasing “feud” 	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with the Gülen movement, and its internal problems were, in light of the upcoming local 
elections of March that year, were consuming much more political capital then the 
peace process.  
 
However, in the same month, and following the MİT´s contacts through Fidan, Öcalan 
delivered a message to his followers via BDP deputies to not violate the de facto cease-
fire with government until the end of the March 30th elections,176 as had been the 
tradition of the PKK previously. On December 20th, BDP chairman Selahattin 
Demirtaş, Kars deputy Mülkiye Birtane and Van deputy Nazmi Gür went to Kandil to 
get a letter, but the KCK said the letter was not yet ready. The BDP deputies said 
instead that the KCK conveyed a verbal message on the settlement process for them to 
deliver to Öcalan. 177  On December 28th, 2013, on the second Anniversary of 
Roboski/Uludere bombings, protests were convened in Diyarbakir and elsewhere, 
stressing the need for an apology and fair investigation and trial.178 On December 30th, 
an opening of a monument to commemorate the Roboski/Uludere bombings in 
Diyarbakir took place,179 demonstrating the continued symbolic meaning of this event. 
By the end of the year, Öcalan’s Newroz letter hinting at an end to the PKK’s 30-year 	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armed campaign, Erdoğan’s switch from calling the dialogue process a “peace process” 
and the beginning of the withdrawal of militants from Turkish territory had created 
hopes for a political solution to Turkey’s long standing Kurdish conflict. 180 
 
2014 – Elections and a stalled process? 
In January 2014, and in the following months, both the BDP and the PKK repeatedly 
accused the government of not taking sufficient steps to move the political process 
forward, especially stressing the points relating to democratic autonomy in South-
Eastern provinces and the need for a legal foundation to the peace process. 181 During 
this month, a military prosecutor rejected the further investigation of the 
Roboski/Uludere bombings. 182The decision outraged relatives and lawyers, and the 
Diyarbakir Bar Association announced they would appeal to the ECHR if their 
individual complaint to Turkey’s Constitutional Court would be rejected. 183 On January 
6th, representatives from the AKP, the CHP and the BDP resolved to form a 
commission to resolve the problem of arrested lawmakers by amending relevant articles 
of the Constitution (five jailed deputies from the BDP, two from the CHP and one from 
the MHP were elected to Parliament in June 2011.184) On January 7th, the five 
lawmakers from the BDP (Selma Irmak, Faysal Sariyildiz, Gulser Yildirim and Ibrahim 	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Ayhan) and independent MP Kemal Aktas were sworn in after they were released from 
prison, seen as another confidence-building measure for the stalled peace process.185 A 
MİT statement released on January 15th maintained that the attempt to implicate it in 
the Paris assassinations was an aim to discredit the agency, 186 which had played an 
active role in the settlement process. It described the ongoing leaks of secret political 
dealings and meetings as “an operation to expose functionaries involved in the process 
so as to render them incapable of carrying out their duties”. 187 The agency went on to 
specifically blaming the Gülen movement for trying to hamper its activities related to 
the peace process. 
 
Also in January 2014, Öcalan sent letter to Barzani to ask for his support of the 
autonomous “Rojava” region in Syria, and to back the Turkish-Kurdish peace 
process. 188  On January 21st, Kurdish Autonomy was declared in Northern Syria 
(“Rojava”), ahead of the Geneva II Peace talks on the Syrian crisis.189On the same day 
Erdoğan visited Brussels and met with the leaders of political groups in the European 
Parliament, where he, among other issues, discussed the ongoing peace process, 
demonstrating its international reach and interest beyond Turkey. On the 28th and 29th 
of January Kurds declared a second and third autonomous administration in Afrin, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Wilgenburg, “Turkish power struggle leaves”; “Turkey´s pro-Kurdish MPs sworn in 
after freed from prison”, Reuters, January 7, 2014. Accessed April 16, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/07/us-turkey-kurds-
idUSBREA060RW20140107. 
186 “Dudak uçuklatan iddia”, Taraf, January 15, 2014. Accessed February 16, 2014, 
http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/dudak-ucuklatan-iddia.htm.  
 
187 Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “New developments in Paris killings threaten to derail PKK 
peace talks”, Al-Monitor, January 20, 2014. Accessed February 16, 2014, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/turkey-military-mit-kurds-murder-
paris-activists.html.  
 
188 “Öcalan letters asks Barzani support in Rojava, peace process”, Rudaw, January 31, 
2014. Accessed February 16, 2014, 
http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/310120141. 
 
189 Isabel Coles, “Kurds solidify autonomy in Syria on eve of peace talks”, reuters, 
January 21, 2014. Accessed February 16, 2014, 
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSBREA0K1KD20140121?irpc=932; “Syrian Kurds 
declare autonomy on eve of Geneva 2”, RT, January 21, 2014. Accessed February 16, 
2014, http://rt.com/news/syria-kurds-autonomy-geneva-989/.  
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Kurdish-populated area in Rojava, about a week after declaring autonomy in Cizîre and 
Kobani, two other Kurdish-populated areas of Northern Syria190 There was tension on 
the Turkish/Iraqi border as local residents of Roboski/Uludere village protested the 
construction of a road and the bolstering of border security.191 
 
In February and March 2014, in the lead up to the local elections, there was violence 
perpetrated against opposition parties headquarters, including the CHP192 and HDP, 193 
in Istanbul and other cities throughout Turkey, as the national political situation tensed. 
On February 2nd, Vatan newspaper published an interview with one of the leaders of 
the PKK, Cemil Bayik, where he sided with the Erdoğan government in its political 
strife with the Gülen movement, stating a “foreign based conspiracy” attempted to 
undermine the peace process, thus clearly siding with the AKP, seen as a sign of trust 
emerging.194 On February 15th, a law to allow more control of the executive over the 
judiciary, the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) was passed in 
parliament over mounting tensions in society in general over back-sliding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 “PYD declares autonomy, seeks recognition from int´l community”, Today´s Zaman, 
January 29, 2014. Accessed February 16, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
337963-pyd-declares-autonomy-seeks-recognition-from-intl-community.html; “Syrian 
Kurds declare new autonomous administration in Kobani”, Today´s Zaman, January 28, 
2014. Accessed February 16, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-337839-syrian-
kurds-declare-second-autonomous-administration-in-kobani.html.  
 
191 “Seven detained as gendarmerie raids houses of Uludere residents ”, Today´s Zaman, 
January 19, 2014. Accessed February 16, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
336985-seven-detained-as-gendarmerie-raids-houses-of-uludere-residents.html 
 
192  “Main opposition CHP´s election bureau in Istanbul attacked with Molotov 
cocktails”, Hürriyet Daily News, March 11, 2014. Accessed June 19, 2014, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/main-opposition-chps-election-bureau-in-istanbul-
attacked-with-molotov-
cocktails.aspx?pageID=238&nid=63441&NewsCatID=338&utm_content=buffer5dc54
&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer. 
 
193 “Pro-Kurdish HDP office attached in Fethiye, 28 taken into custody”, Today´s 
Zaman, March 10, 2014. Accessed March 11, 2014, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-341667-pro-kurdish-hdp-office-attacked-in-fethiye-
28-taken-into-custody.html. 
 
194 Mustafa Akyol, “Why is the PKK siding with the AKP in the AKP-Gülen conflict?”, 
Al-Monitor,  February 3, 2014. Accessed February 19, 2014, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/pkk-supports-akp-gulen-conflict.html.  
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democratization.195 On February 18 President Gül signed a controversial internet bill 
into law, further limiting the shrinking space for freedom of expression in Turkey.196 
The bill faced national and international reactions as it was seen as a step back for 
democratization. On February 25, following the leaks of corruption of members of the 
government having emerged, protestors clashed with the police in Istanbul, Ankara and 
throughout Turkey.197  
 
The following month, on March 11th and 12th, widespread protests took place again in 
Istanbul, Ankara and various other cities in Turkey protesting the death of the 8th victim 
of the Gezi protests, who was until then lying in a coma.198 On March 18th the lifetime 
imprisonment of Öcalan was announced as being a violation of the European 
Convention on human rights by the ECtHR.199 On March 21st, Newroz celebrations 
took place, with tensions ahead of the day due to fear for the renewal of violence, which 
seemed probable after the lack of progress in the previous months in the peace process. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 “Turkey to bid farewell to rule of law if president approves HSYK law”, Today´s 
Zaman, February 17, 2014. Accessed February 19, 2014, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-339715-turkey-to-bid-farewell-to-rule-of-law-if-
president-approves-hsyk-law.html.  
 
196 “Turkey´s Gül approves tigher control of internet”, Today´s Zaman, February 18, 
2014. Accessed February 19, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-339798-
turkeys-gul-approves-tighter-control-of-internet.html.  
 
197   “Turkey protesters clash over ´fake´ wiretap”, Al-Jazeera, February 26, 2014. 
Accessed February 26, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/02/turkey-
protesters-clash-over-fake-wiretap-
2014226531712540.html?fb_action_ids=10153885667335503&fb_action_types=og.lik
es&fb_source=other_multiline&action_object_map=[216900938518483]&action_type_
map=[%22og.likes%22]&action_ref_map=[; Nar photos, “Protest against government 
corruption”, photo album, n.d. Accessed February 26, 2014,  
http://www.narphotos.net/SpotNews/Thumbnail/protest-against-government-
corruption/117/. 
 
198  Fevzi Kizilkoyun, “Two million marched, 417 arrested during Berkin Elevan 
protests as ´disproportionate force´probed”, Hürriyet Daily News, March 14, 2014. 
Accessed March 11, 2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/two-million-marched-
417-arrested-during-berkin-elvan-protests-as-disproportionate-force-
probed.aspx?pageID=238&nid=63566&NewsCatID=341.  
 
199 “PKK leader´s life sentence ´right violation´, European court rules”, Today´s Zaman, 
March 18, 2014. Accessed March 11, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
342426-pkk-leaders-life-sentence-rights-violation-european-court-rules.html. 
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However, the celebrations took place with relative calm, with a new letter urging the 
formalization of the talks by Öcalan, in a move interpreted as a continued support for 
the peace process, at least ahead of the upcoming local elections.200 
 
 The March 30th local elections produced a convincing victory for the AKP yet again, 
and were also seen as a referendum for the continued leadership of Erdoğan, who 
seemed likely at the time to run for the August 2014 presidential elections.201 Apart 
from this, the election could be seen to give a renewed and strengthened political 
mandate to continue pursuing the peace process. There were around a hundred arrested, 
and ten reported deaths during the day of the election, as well as numerous electrical 
black-outs and allegations of election fraud, however.202   
 
In this mixed picture, and ongoing situation of political turmoil, the current peace talks 
have taken a back-seat to more pressing national political issues. Large expectations are 
being placed on the scheduled presidential elections of August 2014, and it seems that 
in an election year, larger steps forward in the ongoing peace process is unlikely. 
Despite this slow process, and its perceived stalling of late, the landmark achievements 
of this process should be considered as a first for Turkey, and of great importance to one 
day solving the Kurdish issue of the country peacefully. However, in line with other 
democratization challenges and a fast-changing political landscape, the peace process 
will remain largely dependent on national, regional and international developments, not 
least due to the trans-national character of the conflict. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 “Despite noting flaws, Öcalan makes fresh push for stalled peace process”, Hürriyet 
Daily News, March 21, 2014.  Accessed March 23, 2014, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/despite-noting-flaws-ocalan-makes-fresh-push-for-
stalled-peace-process.aspx?pageID=238&nID=63925&NewsCatID=338; “PKK head: 
Dialogue should turn into negotiations”, Today´s Zaman, March 21, 2014. Accessed 
March 22, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-342728-pkk-head-dialogue-
should-turn-into-negotiations.html. 
 
201 “Turkey PM Erdoğan claims election victory”, BBC, March 31, 2014. Accessed 
March 31, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26807067.  
 
202 “10 die, dozens wounded, hundreds detained on election day across Turkey”, 
Today´s Zaman, 31 March, 2014. Accessed March 31, 2014, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-343440-10-die-dozens-wounded-hundreds-
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The section above presented the background of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, and the 
associated Track I peace negotiation attempts initiated in this respect. The following 
chapter will detail the activities of participation of the 9 selected cases of actors of 
inclusion in the various Kurdish peace process in Turkey (for a general overview of the 
parallel inclusion attempts to the wider peace process see Appendix B). The selected 
actors activities will then be coded according to the “Broadening Participation” 
framework, and the broader view on their participation events discussed as well, in 
order to discuss what activities could be coded and which not, and the implications. The 
next chapter will be followed by a concluding chapter discussing this thesis´s findings. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  In September 2011, an almost 50-minute long voice recording revealed secret talks 
had taken place between representatives of the Turkish government and members of the 
PKK in Oslo, Norway, as well as Imrali Island, in the Marmara sea of Turkey, held 
some time in 2010. (“PM Erdoğan: PKK leaked secret Oslo talks to media”, Today´s 
Zaman, September 28, 2012. Accessed March 28, 2014, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-293692-pm-erdogan-pkk-leaked-secret-oslo-talks-
to-media.html) 
 The Gulen movement was at the time accused by the PKK of leaking the Oslo 
Negotiations between the state and the MIT and the PKK to derail the talks, even 
though the ceasefire remained intact, talks ceased. (Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, 
“Turkish power struggle leaves new questions on Kurdish issue”)  	  b	  With statements such as: “The state does no recognize any other nation then Turks” 
and “Turkey is not a multi-national state”. Mesut Yeğen “’Prospective-Turks’ or 
‘Pseudo-citizens’: Kurds in Turkey”, The Middle East Journal, 63 (2009): 4, 597 -615.	  	  c	  ”The state’s primary goals towards Turkey’s Kurdish communities throughout these 
years can be roughly summarized as seeking to destroy Kurds as an independent power 
base, and to suppress collective, public expressions of Kurdish Identity in the name of 
Turkish national unity and security. Watts, ”Silence and Voice”, p. 56. 	  d	  Kurds at the time were associated with ”threat, backwardness, pre-modernism, 
conservatism, and Islamic fanaticism”, Watts, ”Silence and Voice”, p. 66. 	  e	  ”Decades of silence (ended in the 1960´s) Kurdish intellectuals began publishing 
Kurdish-language periodicals; politicians, activists, editors and journalists began 
publicly debating the status of the country’s Kurdish communities – explicitly naming 
them as such; and Kurdish activists founded new organizations intended to articulate 
Kurdish grievances and further Kurdish ethno national interests.” Watts, ”Silence and 
Voice”, p. 52. 	  f	  ”Kurdish activists were integrated into the political process and student organizational 
life through the Turkiye Isci Parisis (TIP, or the Worker Party of Turkey) and through 
left – wing student organizations. Kurds and Turks working in these organizations, as 
well as through the socialist and liberal press, re – cast Kurds in the public realm as an 
oppressed and revolutionary national population.” Watts, ”Silence and Voice”, p. 54. 
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  g	  ”Whereas an earlier generation of Kurdish activism was led primarily by religious and 
tribal elites who challenged the state through armed uprisings, this one was led mostly 
by an educated intelligentsia using legal, non-violent repertoires.” Watts, ”Silence and 
Voice”, p. 54. 	  h	  The ”Kurdish Threat” was sufficient to rationalize the Turkish militaries March 12, 
1971”Coup by memorandum”, Watts, ”Silence and Voice”, p. 53. 	  i	  “Turkey´s penal code and other legislative provisions have traditionally been geared 
overwhelmingly towards protecting the state against “attacks” by individuals, rather 
than, as the rule of law is commonly conceived in liberal democracies, protecting 
vulnerable individuals from arbitrary incursions by the state.” Kerim Yildiz and Mark 
Muller, The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights, London/Ann Arbor, 
MI: Pluto Press, 2005, p. 43. 	  j 	  Until today this is still a major demand from the Kurdish social and political 
movements in Turkey as it prevents smaller parties from being represented in the 
parliament. 	  k	  Kurds were particularly subject to torture especially under martial law and the state of 
emergency in the 1980´s – 90´s, according to Yildiz and Muller, The Kurds in Turkey: 
EU Accession and Human Rights, p. 45. 	  l	  The PKK is on the US and EU terror list, as well as it is seen as an illegal, terrorist 
organization by the Turkish state, charging pro-Kurdish or Kurdish parties and 
politicians for links to the PKK is still commonplace today and reason enough to 
sanction or ban these from elections. 	  m	  This distinction is made in: Kevin Mckiernan, Good Kurds, Bad Kurds: No Friends 
But the Mountains, Director Kevin Mckiernan, USA: Passion River, 2000. 	  n	  Among these: restrictions on timetables permissible, content of curricula, and no state 
funding. Yildiz and Muller, The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights, p. 
67. 	  o	  ”According to Cemal, President Gül, State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Cemil 
Cicek, and Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan initially scheduled meetings with him 
following his trip to Qendil, but then suddenly either postponed or cancelled the 
appointments because they did not want to be victims of the same accusations. (Milliyet, 
May 30, 2009)” Servet Tosun and Jeff Allen, “Is Turkey-PKK dialogue on the horizon”, 
Kurdish Herald, 1 (2009): 2. Accessed 26.02.2014, 
http://www.kurdishherald.com/issue/002/article03.php  	  p	  Details on the Wise Peoples Commission can be found in Chapter 4 outlining the case 
studies of different forms of participation in the ongoing peace process. 	  q	  Appendix B chronicles the more general picture of the Track 1.5, II and III initatives 
ongoing in parallel to the peace process. While by no means attempting to be an 
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exhaustive overview of the initatives of participation, detailed and important events and 
activities are highlighted to give a general overview of the wider inclusion at the time. 	  r	  Please see Nimet Beriker (“The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties and 
Prospects”, Security Dialogue, 28 (1997): 4, 439-452) for a comprehensive presentation 
of the political dynamics and peace attempts in the mid-90´s, as this period is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 	  s	  Based on interviews done in April 2011 in Istanbul, this view was repeated in 
interviewes conducted with stakeholders in 2013/2014, again in Istanbul, as well. 	  t	  “The Turkish military and Turkey’s Kemalist establishment have a tendency to see the 
root causes of the Kurdish question in two major sources, social and economic problems 
in south-eastern Anatolia and external dynamics… This approach presents a number of 
problems. Perhaps the most important one is the fact that it misses the “identity” 
dimension of the problem and all the faults committed by the Turkish Republic in 
repressing this Kurdish identity.” Ömer Taspinar, “Dancing with the Kurds”, Today´s 
Zaman, Brookings Institute, October 20, 2008. Acessed June 14, 2014, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/10/20-kurds-taspinar  	  u 	  Although later on, and starting in 2011 until 2013, the AKP continued its 
democratization efforts related to the Kurdish issue by releasing four judicial reform 
packages and a constitutional reform package in September, 2013.	   Ergin, “Kurdish 
Conflict Takes Toll”. 
 
v This court case is an ongoing and drawn-out one, with cases ongoing in 2014. 	  w	  Referring to this quote: “ “Destroy their unity, burn their houses and exterminate 
them” (Wilgenburg, “Turkish power struggle leaves”.)	  
x Please see: “'Uludere'ye sivil savcı baksın' talebine ikinci ret”, Radikal, July 24, 2013. 
Accessed December 8, 2013, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/uludereye_sivil_savci_baksin_talebine_ikinci_ret-
1143145;  
“Judiciary to seek accounting for Uludere incident, Erdoğan says”, Today´s Zaman, July 
30, 2013. Accessed Febuary 19, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-322240-
.html;  
“Roboskili aileler, katliamın 645'inci gününde yürüyüş gerçekleştirdi”, Hür Bakis, 
October 3, 2013.	   Accessed October 4, 2013) http://hurbakis.net/content/roboskili-
aileler-katliaminin-645inci-gununde-yuruyus-gerceklestirdi; 	  
“ECtHR finds Turkey guilty of violating convention in village bombing”, Today´s 
Zaman, November 12, 2013. Accessed November 12, 2013. 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-331233-ecthr-finds-turkey-guilty-of-violating-
convention-in-village-bombing.html 	  y	  In November 2013 however, this long-awaited Kurdish National Convention, was 
delayed for the third time, this time indefinitely. (“Long-awaited oan-Kurdish National 
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conference postponed indefinitely”, Ekurd, November 11, 2013. Accessed Febraury 19, 
2014, http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/11/state7483.htm)	  	  z	  Currently the threshold is a 10% of votes, though the Kurdish political and nationalist 
movement have for years demanded a reduction of this in order for their MP´s to be 
able to be elected through parties and not as independents as has been done previously. 	  aa	  Please see the following articles for more details:	  	  
Göksel Bozkurt, “Turkish PM Erdoğan to unveil”; “Kurds, BDP unsatisfied with 
democratization package”, Today´s Zaman, September 30, 2013. Accessed September 
30, 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/national/news-327784-kurds-bdp-unsatisfied-
with-democratization-package.html; “Turkey presents reforms aimed at pressing 
Kurdish peace process”, Reuters, Septmeber 30, 2013. Accessed April 21, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/30/us-turkey-reform-
idUSBRE98T09D20130930; “Kurds and women top Turkish PK reform plans”, Al-
Jazeera, Last modified October 1, 2013. Accessed March 12, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/09/kurds-women-top-turkish-pm-reform-
plans-201393095032209408.html; Andrew finkel, “With neighbors like these”, The 
New York Times, September 20, 2013. Accessed December 8, 2013, 
http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/20/with-neighbors-like-these/?_r=0; Letsch 
and Pidd, “Turkey names new military chiefs”; “Turkey´s democratic reforms fall short 
according to Kurds”, Euronews, October 1, 2013. Accessed October 1, 2013, 
http://www.euronews.com/2013/10/01/turkey-s-democratic-reforms-fall-short-
according-to-kurds/; Jose Miguel Calatyud, “Turquia anuncia reformas democraticas 
que favorecen a kurdos e islamistas”, El Pais, September 30, 2013. Accessed December 
8, 2013, 
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/09/30/actualidad/1380535016_57471
0.html; Yavuz Baydar, “Erdoğan´s democracy package gets cool reception”, Al-
Monitor, September 30, 2013. Accessed December 8, 2013, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/erdogan-democracy-package-reception-cool.html; 
“PKK says reform package is not aimed at peace”, Today´s Zaman, October 1, 2013. 
Accessed October 1, 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/national/news-327879-pkk-
says-reform-package-is-not-aimed-at-peace.html; Emre Kızılkaya, “5 reasons why 
Erdoğan´s package is more about elections than democracy”, The Istanbulian, 
September 30, 2013. (Accessed 01.10.2013) http://istanbulian.blogspot.com/2013/09/5-
reasons-why-erdogans-package-is-more.html; “Kurdish intellectuals: PM´s reforms 
opened the way for progress”, Today´s Zaman, October 1, 2013. Accessed October 1, 
2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/national/news-327899-kurdish-intellectuals-pms-
reforms-opened-the-way-for-progress.html; Hugh Pope, “Ottoman Ghosts”, The 
Majalla, October 1, 2013. Accessed December 8, 2013, 
http://www.majalla.com/eng/2013/10/article55245700; Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “What 
does Erdoğan´s democratization package offer Kurds, minorities?”, Al-Monitor, 
September 30, 2013. Accessed December 8, 2013, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/democratization-package-kurds-turkey-
minorities.html?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=8280; “Hate crime 
law positive step, but not without pitfalls”, Today´s Zaman, October 1, 2013. Accessed 
December 8, 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/national/news-327885-hate-crime-
law-positive-step-but-not-without-pitfalls.html; Tulin Daloğlu, “The democratization 
package that missed the point”, Al-Monitor, October 2, 2013. Accessed October 3, 
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2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/democratization-package-
missed-opportunity.html?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=8290; 
Cengiz Çandar, “Mysterious reform package disappoints Turks”, Al-Monitor, October 
2, 2013. Accessed December 8, 2013, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/turkey-reacts-to-reform-
package.html?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=8290; Jonathan 
burch and Gulsen Solaker, “Kurdish rebels, politicians say Turkish reforms not aimed at 
peace”, Reuters, October 1, 2013. Accessed December 8, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/01/us-turkey-kurds-pkk-
idUSBRE9900WO20131001; Amed Dicle, “Rojava´s political structures”, Jadaliyya, 
September 23, 2013. Accessed January 31, 2014, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/14272/rojavas-political-structure	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Chapter 5 - Analysis: Participation Mechanisms in the Kurdish Peace Processes 
 
Chapter 4 provided an outline of the conflict history, as well as the previous, and 
current, Track I peace processes ongoing in the Kurdish issue in Turkey  (please see 
Appendix A for a more detailed trajectory). It is in the establishment of a wider peace 
process, that the activity of “lower” tracks often precedes the activity of higher tracks in 
the initiation of political peace process. This high-level process is then continuously 
accompanied and mirrored by a rich and vast activity at the societal level, as the 
discussions at the higher political level do not exist in a vacuum. The history as to the 
activity of participation in the peace processes taking place at the Track II, III and 1.5 
levels are outlined in detail in Appendix B (organized by year). From this general 
overview, 9 cases outlining different actors of participation in the peace processes in 
Turkey were selected, in order to chronicle the specific activities employed by each. 
From these activities, specific models of participation to influence Track I, according to 
the “Broadening Participation” framework, were selected. Moreover, additional 
peacebuilding activities were also included in the description of each case, in taking the 
broader view beyond the 9 models, including participation in the wider peace process. 
 
Selected Cases of Participation  
The selected cases of participation and inclusion activities will in this section be 
presented according, firstly, to the actor which was executing them, and then structuring 
the data obtained on each actor´s activities according to the interview protocol questions 
(see Appendix C). Below, are the accounts that were documented with the help of 
interviews conducted with civil society and organizational actors, as well as desk 
research, media monitoring and information gathered from organizational material and 
primary sources (like websites, leaflets, audio-visual material and site visits). The 
answers listed constitute the data used for the subsequent analysis of this thesis. 
  
Case 1) Free Women’s Democratic Movement (Demokratik Özgür Kadın Hareketi, 
DÖKH): Women´s Initiative for Peace  (Barış İçin Kadın Girişimi, BİKG)1 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Personal correspondence, member of BİKG, August 14, 2013 and August 15, 2013.	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1) Could you give examples of a few projects/events that your organization/initiative 
planned to influence an increased understanding of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? (i.e. 
conferences, protests, workshops, other? 
BİKG has conducted monitoring of the commenced withdrawal of the PKK fighters in 
the South-East, organized an international conference on women´s participation in 
peace processes in Istanbul, published research and reports and presented their findings 
to Wise Peoples Commission initiative of the government. They work for the 
implementation of UN SCR 1325 (on Women´s participation in all levels of peace 
processes and peacebuilding for a sustainable peace) in the current peace process, as 
well as for the adoption of Turkey of a National Action Plan for Gender Mainstreaming. 
 
The organization follows the work of previous organizations working with women and 
conflict, including Barış İçin Kadın Girişimi/Women's Initiative for Peace (1996), 
Arkadaşıma Dokunma/Touch My Friend (1993), Barış Anneleri/Mothers for Peace 
(1993), Barış İçin Kadın Buluşmaları/ Women's Encounters for Peace (2004), Vakti 
Geldi / Time Has Come ( 2005).2  There are some parallel events and organizations 
currently addressing similar issues of women and conflict as well, for instance the 3rd 
International Feminist Forum, held in Ankara by the LGBT organization Kaos GL 
Association, the Women’s Problems Research and Implementation Centre (KASAUM) 
of the Ankara University Department of Women’s Studies, on the 14-16 March 2014, to 
discuss the participation of women in peace and peace-making processes (with the 
presence of members of BİKG too).a However, at the present time, BİKG are at the 
forefront of this conversation, in their goals of the pursuing gender issues and 
representation in the Kurdish peace process, and for a national action plan for Turkey, 
which would target all levels of government and policy, including the peace talks.3  
 
The Women´s Initiative for Peace was created in 12 towns and cities along with a 
women’s press agency (JINHA). The initiative sprang out of the Free Women’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Observation Report on Dersim, (Istanbul: Barış İçin Kadın Girişimi (BİKG), July 
2013). Accessed June 30, 2014, http://www.barisicinkadinlar.com/en/popup/haber-
yazdir.asp?haber=370.  
 
3 Teri Murphy and Maria Christina Vibe, Gender Mainstreaming: Turkey´s policies and 
practices in peacebuilding initatives, (Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, 2013). 
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Democratic Movement (Demokratik Özgür Kadın Hareketi, DÖKH), which was created 
in 2003, which “unites hundreds of activist Kurdish women from civil society, women’s 
organizations, youth groups, political parties, and local government bodies. It has 
created Women’s Assemblies in 25 cities, women’s shelters for victims of gender-based 
violence, 17 women’s cooperatives, six women’s associations and three women’s 
academies that provide training for academics from all disciplines in gender equality.” 4 
DÖKH as a whole is also responsible in ensuring that the Kurdish political party 
ensures gender equality in their policies. The umbrella organization is made up of: 
“political parties, women assemblies and women MPs, locally elected women 
politicians, syndicated women laborers, women activists in civil society organizations, 
women associations and institutions, cooperatives, women workers in press and 
publications, women working in the sphere of art and culture, women in academia, and 
women activists from people’s delegates.”5 
 
2.) When and where did these take place, and how long did they last?  
 
Women´s Initiative for Peace was established in 2009, however after the peace initiative 
formally began in January 2013, they began pushing for women's participation in the 
peace process based on UN SCRS 1325, as well as local experiences, taking the form of 
workshops, lobbying and activism. An international conference was held on May 4th 
2013, after that various commissions were established on thematic areas. A monitoring 
of the retreat process later that month was also conducted in Dersim/Tunceli. 
 
Other activities took place with the networks groups in Bursa, İzmir, Antalya, Mersin, 
Diyarbakır, Ankara, Denizli, Van and Istanbul. Their email list includes 400 women 
from all sections of society including feminists, leftists, Islamic, Alevi, non-Muslim, 
Muslim, young, old, Kurdish, and Turkish.  Until January 2013, most of their activities 
were aimed at consciousness raising and organizing a demand for peace on the part of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Eva Bernard, “Women and the Kurdish Movement in Turkey: ´There will be no 
turning back´”, The WVoice: A Publication of Women´s Voices Now, Heidi Basch-
Harod & Molly Lower Eds., 2 (2014): 4.	  	  5	  “Democratic Freewomen Movement”, Middle East Women´s Conference. Accessed 
May 26, 2014, http://middleeasternwomenconference.wordpress.com/democratic-
freewomen-movement/. 	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women. Most of their activism involved street demonstrations and sit-ins. However, 
they also organized many workshops to come up with a list of all the ways in which 
women were harmed by the ongoing war both in the East and in the West of the country 
in order to raise awareness on the gender-dimensions of the war. 
 
For instance, on February 24th 2013, a group of 60 women, comprised of activists, 
writers, journalists and academicians belonging to different social groups, convened to 
discuss how women could participate in and influence the on-going peace process. Dr. 
Nazan Üstündağ, assistant professor in the Department of sociology of Boğazici 
University, made a presentation on the roles played by women during 102 peace talks 
realized around the world, in order to employ a comparative perspective to Turkey.6 
Their discussions and ideas were presented at a press conference on March 3rd 2013.7 
 
Moreover, the network organized an international conference entitled “Women are 
taking an active role in the peace process!” on May 4th, 2013 at Boğazici University. 
200 women were in attendance, among them were “…members of the women's 
movement in Turkey, feminists, women from the Democratic Free Women's 
Movement, women's organizations, women from different religions and ethnic groups, 
women from the LGBT community, women from trade unions, women from 
professional organizations, women from political parties, women in the parliament, 
journalist women, women from academia, human rights defender women, and women 
from various provinces.” 8 
 
Following the conference, various working groups were created. A monitor group, 
consisting of 12 members of the Women’s initiative for peace visited the 
Tunceli/Dersim region on 29-30th May, 2013 in order to observe the peace process and 
the retreat process. Through the visit they observed the retreat of the PKK fighters, as 
well as the state and army activity in the area, talked to women, met with women 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 “The role of women in peace processes around the world 24th February 2013”, Women 
for Peace Initaitve/Barış İçin Kadın Girişimi, July 20, 2013. Accessed March 3, 2014, 
http://www.barisicinkadinlar.com/en/haber_detay.asp?haberID=367. 
 
7 “The role of women in peace processes”, BİKG. 
 
8 “The role of women in peace processes”, BİKG. 
	   97	  
activists from different parties including the AKP, CHP and EMEP, and talked to 
female staff of the municipality and visited KAMER (The Women’s Centre, a women´s 
rights organization with a strong presence on the ground assisting women in various 
ways in the South-East, and elsewhere, in Turkey), and the women’s observation tent of 
BDP. The group then published a report, which discussed the issues especially 
pertaining to women in the aftermath of the conflict situation, as well as in the 
transitional period of the (tentative) de-militarization of the area. 9  Research was 
conducted, and interviews were made with different social groupings, in different 
Kurdish provinces, as well as the West, (for instance, Çanakkle, Antalya and Ankara), 
in order to understand the different perceptions on the conflict and future peace. 
Additionally, an observer group was established to “…monitor the parties for a 
sustainable negotiation process, warn the parties of violations, insist on the equal and 
qualified representation of women and share the criticisms with the public and prepare 
reports.” 10 
 
A contact group was created to “…conduct transparent and open meetings with all 
parties of the negotiation process; with women from the political parties in the 
parliament, minister women, guerrilla women, and women's organizations from all the 
regions. The group will share the results of these meetings with women.” 11 While 
additionally, a lobby group was created to disseminate the findings of the network, 
presenting their findings and demands to the Solution Commission, and talking to 
women parliamentarians, as well as the conflict parties, such as women guerrillas.12 
 
Additional working groups created for future projects were the Truth Commission 
Work group, the Security Reform Group, the Gender Equality, and the New 
Constitution Group. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Observation Report on Dersim, BİKG.  
 
10 “Women´s Initiative for Peace will meet all parties!”, Women´s Initative for Peace/ 
Barış İçin Kadın Girişimi (BİKG), May 19, 2013. Accessed March 3, 2014, 
http://www.barisicinkadinlar.com/en/haber_detay.asp?haberID=364.  
 
11 Women´s Initiative for Peace will meet all parties!”, BİKG. 
 
12 Women´s Initiative for Peace will meet all parties!”, BİKG. 
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Lastly, an all-day film festival and event was held on September 14th, 2013, in Antalya, 
sponsored by the Women´s Initiative for Peace and the Flimmor Women´s Co-operative 
(an organization of women filmmakers and activists). More than 100 women were in 
attendance watching films and discussing issues of women in Turkey, and particularly 
in relation to the ongoing peace process, and the importance of including women,  but 
also reaching out to different segments of society and the different parties to the 
conflict. Further plans for events in Diyarbakir and Van, in the South-East, were 
announced during the event.13  
 
3.) What was the aim behind these projects/events? What did you want to achieve? 
The group was created in response to the arrests of many Kurdish women with whom 
the group was working with in feminist projects and activities in 2009.  With the peace 
process the group changed their focus, and are now trying to get Turkey to make its own 
national action plan for women in accord with 1325. Moreover, the group is fighting for 
the enforcement of the presence of women and women´s issues in the ongoing peace 
process. Women were only represented at 14% in the “wise peoples” commission, and 
are virtually not part of the peace process at all. 14 
 
The group wishes to engage in both the formal government driven process as well as 
community, informal processes of building peace. According to the group, while men 
see the peace process as “..a new repartition of a old hegemony, and power over what 
piece of land,” 15 women are seen as addressing other issues, and  having experience in 
peacebuilding in communities and from their everyday lives (for instance, referring to 
the activism of women against the security wall being built with Syria by the 
government.) 16 Moreover they stressed that the increased militarization (despite the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  “Ses Türkiye-Women in Antalya recently attended a film festival and held a 
discussion about peace in Turkey”, Women´s Initative for Peace/ Barış İçin Kadın 
Girişimi (BİKG), October 3, 2013. Accessed March 3, 2014, 
http://www.barisicinkadinlar.com/en/haber_detay.asp?haberID=371. 
 
14 “Women and Peace in the Middle East” panel discussion, Istanbul Policy Center, 
March 6th, 2014, with participation of member of Barış İçin Kadın Girişimi (BİKG). 
 
15 “Women and Peace in the Middle East”, panel discussion. 
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started withdrawal process) of the South-Eastern region, with the construction of police 
stations and military outposts (“Jandarma”) in regions such as Lice, have led to 
demonstrations and the need to examine how these development affect women, in the 
aftermath of the retreat of the PKK guerillas. 
 
The group recognized the importance of having more contact between women (across 
the East/West divide in Turkey) and to understand the conflict and examine the future 
for peace; promoting understanding through creating a widespread women´s coalition. 
Through collaborative learning the group believes that women can eventually become 
leaders in this peace process locally and nationally. 
 
4.) Did these projects/events aim to affect the current peace process set in place by the 
government? Were your efforts heard at the higher level? 
The group met with a wide range of actors, from female parliament members, to women 
in the (PKK) guerrilla and talked to all of them about 1325.  
 
Moreover, the group has made a presentation to the "Resolution Process Assessment 
Commission" created in the Parliament), and met with the so-called “wise women” (of 
the “wise peoples commission” assigned by the government). 
 
5.) What were the results of these efforts/projects? (i.e. publications, change in public 
opinion, changes in society/communities etc.) 
 
The group has held numerous workshops and one international conference. They have 
conducted observations and monitoring in various Kurdish cities regarding the 
withdrawal process of the PKK fighters to Northern Iraq. A report based on the trends 
observed in the withdrawal process and other work done by the network, in order to 
highlight the underlying issues for women in peacebuilding and in the current peace 
process. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  “Women and Peace in the Middle East”, panel discussion. 
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The network have through collaborative workshops and meetings identified demands in 
relation to the ongoing peace process, which are: 
 
a) the creation of a truth commission investigating crimes against women during 
conflict 
b) equal representation of women in all commissions created for peace including the 
parliament 
c) gender based security reform 
d) change of the constitution so that discrimination against women in general, and 
Kurdish women in particular, will stop. 
 
 
Case 2) Eko-Politik: “Grand Dome of Turkey” (Turkiye´nin Büyük Çatısı )17 
 
1.) Could you give examples of a few projects/events that your organization/initiative 
planned to influence an increased understanding of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? (i.e. 
conferences, protests, workshops, other? 
The organization Ekopolitik engaged in academic and policy-oriented activities and 
research organized the  “Grand Dome of Turkey” meetings over a two year period, 
facilitated by Professor Vamik Volkan, famed inter-group relations social-psychologist. 
This was done in order to bring together individuals from various sides of the conflict, 
including Turkish and Kurdish Nationalists, former intelligence and military officials 
from the Turkish side, as well as former BDP Members of Parliament, as well as PKK 
members, from the Kurdish side, among other sectors represented from society at large. 
 
Issues discussed included language rights, legally securing human rights, removing the 
humiliation historically faced by Kurds, as well as opening schools where classes would 
be taught in Kurdish, and restoring original Kurdish names to certain towns and cities 
where Kurdish citizens were the majority. There was agreement that geographically 
separating Turkey´s Kurds and Turks was unrealistic. There was also a key discussion 
on how to reintegrate PKK fighters from the Kandil mountains into society. Similar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Vamik D. Volkan, Enemies on the Couch: A Psychopolitical Journey Through War 
and Peace, (Durham, NC: Pitchston Publishing, 2013). 
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discussions continued, with the aim of coming up with “prescriptions” for a peaceful 
solution to the Kurdish issue, with the aim of bringing these to the authorities attention 
afterwards. b 
 
2.) When and where did these take place, and how long did they last? 
 
Ekopolitiks project “Turkey´s Grand Dome” first gathering took place on November 16 
and 17, 2009. There were three preparatory meetings in January, and one in October. 
Several gatherings and related activities took place up until late 2011 in Istanbul, 
Ankara, and various Western and South-Eastern cities of Turkey. 
 
There were 17 groups of Turkish and Kurdish Nationalists facilitated by Professor 
Volkan on various occasions, the meetings took place allover the country, in both the 
East and the West. Professor Volkan worked as a consultant, maintaining his role as an 
independent academic, while Ekopolitik operated as a civilian think tank. The process 
was aimed at being transparent and accessible to society, in order to raise the level of 
awareness in society for a possible negotiated solution, and to come up with solutions. 
The meetings took place on a large scale, and were of a public and inclusive nature. 
 
Ekopolitik considered itself to be a politically independent initiative, with its 
proceedings and findings being entirely available to any political party. The facilitator 
Volkan insisted that women be actively part of this project. The facilitator was not 
present at all the meetings and gatherings, but helped develop a “core group” of Turks 
and Kurds after the first meeting. From this group eventually would emerge a “task 
group” overseeing the projects activities together with Ekopolitik staff, keeping contact 
with the facilitator that was based in the United States.c  
 
General Coordinator of Ekopolitik Tarik Çelenk and Director Murat Sofuoğlu selected 
the most influential Turks and Kurds that would also represent the diversity existent 
within these non-monolithic groups. Participants were granted participation on a 
voluntary basis, and represented “nationalist” Turks and Kurds, as well as “religious” 
Turks and Kurds, with both men and women represented from influential political and 
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societal spheres.18 The dialogues took place with participants and observers present 
(who were asked not to intervene but keep their comments until the end.) Following the 
first meeting of the group, all the participants met with the minister of interior and 
“other distinguished guests” to inform them on their progress. 19  The dialogue was 
meant to be the start of a longer process to find common issues and areas for discussion 
pertaining to the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The whole dialogue process was transcribed 
(from November 16 – 17, 2009), and was made available by Ekopolitik (in Turkish).  
 
The first dialogue Project had seventeen dialogue participants and around thirty 
observers, among these were members of “Core group” (which emerged in later 
sessions), as well as other participants, all from different groups and walks of life: 
 
The Core group included: Cezmi Bayram (Turkish Nationalist, leader of various 
Turkish culture and business organizations), Murat Belge (well-known Liberal Turkish 
scholar), Musa Serdar Çelebi (former Director of the Turkish Islamic Togetherness 
Association and former politician, and member of the Foreign Economic Relations 
Board, Istanbul), Seydi Fırat (former PKK member, but who surrendered in 1999 to the 
Turkish government with Öcalans permission), Ümit Fırat (political of Kurdish origin, 
former member of Kurdish Labour Party until be founded the first Kurdish organization 
in Turkish in 1969, active in organizing Kurds in Eastern Turkey politically), Altan Tan 
(of Turkish/Kurdish background, conservative and religious politician, architect and 
newspaper columnist, was member of core group until summer 2011 when he was 
successfully elected to parliament), Mete Yarar (former military officer in the Turkish 
Army Special Forces, with more than 10 years experience in Southeastern Turkey´s 
conflict affected region), Cevat Öneş (former assistant director of the Turkish secret 
service (MIT), Avni Özgürel (Nationalist Turk, writer for various Turkish newspapers 
and often appearing on television), Özdem Sanberk (past Turkish Representative to the 
European Union and former Turkish ambassador to Great Britain, former director of the 
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)), Halit Yalçin (conservative 
Kurdish activist from Hakkari, past political prisoner, author and Kurdish 
spokesperson). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p. 379. 
 
19 Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p. 379. 
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Other participants included: Bayram Bozyel (Politician and writer of Kurdish origin and 
former political prisoner, founder of political party Hak-Par), Cengiz Çandar (advisor to 
former President Özal, and well-known newspaper columnist), İbrahim Kalın (author of 
books on Islam, adviser on international affairs to Prime Minister Erdoğan), Gültan 
Kışanak (Kurdish, journalist and elected MP for the BDP since 2007) Deniz Ülke 
Arıboğan (Political scientist, then rector of Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul), Ayşe Betul 
Çelik (Associate Professor teaching conflict resolution at Sabanci University, Istanbul), 
Esra Çuhader Gürkaynak (Political scientist, Bilkent University, Ankara), Sema Sezer 
(retired member of MIT). 
 
The core group that emerged from the first meeting, had one more meeting in Istanbul, 
followed by a first trip to Hakkari (in South-Eastern, mainly Kurdish populated, Turkey, 
close to the Kandil Mountains and the Iran-Iraq border where the PKK have their base) 
in January, 2010. This was deemed a landmark step for the group, especially for the 
Turkish members of the core group, as the meeting with political, civilian and youth 
groups who were not members of the PKK were eye-opening for some members (as a 
large portion of the youth that joined the PKK were from Hakkari.)  
 
A third meeting with the core group with Professor Volkan took place in July 2010. 
Between this, which was to be the last meeting with Professor Volkan, Ekopolitik made 
three more trips to Hakkari, in February and July (2010), and also to Mersin on the 
Mediterranean coast, were several displaced Kurds had immigrated too. In their meeting 
there the core group talked to local leaders and planned larger gatherings for the near 
future. Representatives from these trips from Hakkari and Mersin were thereafter 
incorporated to the final July meeting in Istanbul as well, with a visible expansion of the 
consultation process to include a widening audience, as well as geographical reach.  
 
A meeting including President Gül took place on August 26, 2010, with 16 of the core 
members, as well as the recent members from Hakkari and Mersin. The meeting took 
place in the summer residence of the president in Istanbul. Professor Volkan facilitated 
the talk, which was scheduled to be 1.5 hours, but ended up lasting 3 hours. The 
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psychologist/advisor to the group, Ayla Yazıcı, presented findings from her report on 
conflict affected individuals in Hakkari, highlighting the psychological dimension. 20 
 
In early December 2010, Professor Volkan and members of the core group members 
went to Mersin, meeting with the governor, the mayor, political leaders from the AKP, 
CHP and representatives from business and civil society for a Grand Dome meeting. 
The participants made public speeches, appeared on television and collected 
information on the effects of this conflict on this particular city. After this visit the 
facilitator urged Ekopolitik to concentrate on Mersin and Hakkari, where they had 
conducted previous visits, before visiting other cities (which also had been done), in 
order to concentrate and deepen their efforts. However, the need for funding kept the 
group concerned with remaining in the public eye and demonstrating their outreach. 
 
In a core group meeting in Istanbul in December 2010, there were over one hundred 
observers, and the facilitator was taken back by the demand to speak by the audience, 
proving a turning point for the exercise, especially in the eyes of the facilitator, who 
found the meeting unmanageable. 21 After this very crowded meeting, the Deputy 
Director of Ekopolitik and Professor Volkan again flew to Ankara and to the 
presidential palace to brief the president. However, someone at Ekopolitik had typed up 
seventy-six “prescriptions” presented at the “huge and chaotic” meeting,22 which had 
not been properly discussed and without the permission of the facilitator, was publicly 
disseminated. News quickly spread in the media of the “76 prescriptions” (some of 
which were quite unrealistic) and publicized in the media as “Dr. Volkan´s list”, dealing 
a heavy blow to both the Grand Dome Project, and himself, according to the facilitator.  
 
After this incident, despite the facilitators wish for a more slow and focused process, the 
activities of Ekopolitik seemed to continue at a fast rate, taking place in more and more 
locations throughout Turkey (and even including meeting in Mosul, Iraq). However, 
positive developments remained, for instance Ekopolitiks 5th meeting in Hakkari in 
January 2011, which included a “nationalist” core member, along with a close aid of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p. 385. 
 
21 Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p. 386. 
 
22 Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p. 386. 
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Öcalan and a respected journalist, deepening the work in this location. This meeting 
also included meetings with governors and other community leaders. The last meeting 
facilitated by Professor Volkan took place in mid-July 2011, with several guests, 
including former lawyers of Öcalan, after a related seminar to university students as to 
the work of Ekopolitik.  
 
Other activities, included the participation of young student volunteers, inspired by the 
activities of the “Grand Dome”, it seems; “Soon students from different universities in 
Istanbul, both religious and nationalistic, men and women – including women who wore 
a head covering – volunteered to become involved in Ekopolitik. These young persons´ 
enthusiasm for doing something for their country was most impressive.” 23 
 
Moreover, the facilitator took part in several public events and conferences. In May 
2010, Professor Volkan met with these student volunteers to give seminars introducing 
them to psycho-political concepts. He also (in 2009 and 2010) attended Turkish Police 
Academy meetings in Antalya, Turkey, to explain Kurdish children´s psychological 
dilemmas particularly, for cadets assigned to conflict affected areas.24 
 
3.) What was the aim behind these projects/events? What did you want to achieve? 
Taking a psycho-psychological approach, this initiative seeks to address the deep- 
rooted causes of the conflict, including issues of identity and facing “the other”.d 
 
Turkey´s Grand Dome project was considered to also be a major response to the call 
from the AKP´s “Democratic Initiative Project” or the “Kurdish Initiative”, (though in 
fact the dome commenced its activity before the government´s project was launched, 
leading some to say that the dome was in fact a “pilot” for a larger initiative.)  
 
4.) Did these projects aim to affect the current peace process set in place by the 
government? Were your efforts heard at the higher level? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p. 383. 
 
24 Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p. 383.  
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The track I was highly interested in the initiative and followed it closely. For example, 
President Gül acknowledged the meetings and was even was present at one.25 Often, 
either before or after Ekopolitik meetings Vamik Volkan the facilitator/consultant, 
together with Tarik Çelenk (the leader and general coordinator of Ekopolitik) would 
brief President Abdullah Gül on the progress of the dialogues.26 For instance, In 
February an December 2010, the facilitator had a meeting with President Abdullah Gül 
and Tarik Çelenk (director of Ekopolitik) in Ankara to brief him on the Grand Dome 
meetings. Ekopolitik took pride in that their initiative preceded that of the governments 
own initiative to solve the Kurdish question. 
 
Moreover, after the third meeting (in-between the two previous ones, in July 2010) the 
General Director of Ekopolitik Tarik Çelenk, and Professor Volkan again flew to 
Ankara to brief the president on the progress of the dialogue group. According to the 
facilitator, the President wanted to ensure himself that all members of the group really 
were supportive of a peaceful initiative to end the conflict, before commencing a similar 
initiative at the political level. After this briefing, it was agreed on that a session would 
be conducted with the president present (it took place on August 26th, 2010). After this 
the hope of the facilitator was that the government would conduct an initiative to follow 
up Ekopolitiks work, however no such initiative was announced. 27 
 
The group focused on close contact with politicians and local authorities to make the 
process inclusive. For instance, during a meeting in 2010 in Mersin and Hakkari, the 
group met governors and mayors from the BDP.28 Minister Beşir Atalay, minister of 
interior at the time, was in charge of the governmental initiative for the attempt for 
“democratic solution” to the Kurdish conflict and wanted to consult intellectuals from 
different professions in order to gather their suggestions for this new initiative. On 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 “Ekopolitik sets up moderate meeting of Turkey´s extremists”, Hürriyet Daily News, 
17 August, 2012. Accessed February 21, 2014, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=ekopolitic-brings-
together-polarized-actors-to-solve-kurdish-problem-2010-08-17. 
 
26 Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p. 378. 
 
27 “Ekopolitik sets up moderate”, Hürriyet Daily News. 
 
28 “Ekopolitik sets up moderate”, Hürriyet Daily News.  
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August 10th, 2009,29 he met with Professor Volkan, discussing for three hours the 
methodology used in the “dome”.30  After this initial meeting, the then minister of 
interior (Beşir Atalay, and the previous deputy prime minister, until June 2011, Cemil 
Çiçek) joined the members of Ekopolitik, dialogue participants, observers of the 
dialogue, and other guests (numbering more than 100), in order to listen to the dialogue 
participants reports and in order to take part in the discussion of issues pertaining to the 
Kurdish conflict. 31 
 
5.) What were the results of these efforts/projects? (i.e. publications, change in public 
opinion, changes in society/communities etc.) 
 
The “Democratic Initiative Project,” “unity and Fraternity Project,” or the “Kurdish 
Initiative” (it would go by several names, but mostly referred to as the “Democratic 
Opening” or “Kurdish Opening”) would be launched shortly after the commencement of 
the Grand dome activities in 2009, and can be seen as an outcome of the activity. 32   
 
The activities of the Grand Dome project became well-known in Turkey, as it was 
highly publicized in the media (through frequent television appearances of the core 
members and of Professor Volkan, for instance), and helped raise awareness of the need 
to solve this issue in the Turkish public.  
 
The outreach done by the facilitator, Professor Volkan himself, as well as the societal 
enthusiasm created, for instance as witness by the young student volunteers, are 
considered important in awareness-raising of society towards toward these issues.e 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Tolga Korkut, “Minister Atalay speaking to political parties about initative”, Bianet 
English, August 11, 2009. Accessed April 15, 2014, 
http://www.bianet.org/english/minorities/116395-minister-atalay-speaking-to-political-
parties-about-initiative. 
 
30 Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p.373,  
 
31 Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p. 385. 
 
32 Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p. 373. 
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According to Professor Volkan, the document produced from the dialogues, with the 
“76 prescriptions” constituted “…a significant historical document illustrating how 
influential citizens of Turkey with various backgrounds can talk very openly and 
respectfully about the ethnic problems in Turkey and create a “public voice” after 
decades of terroristic, militaristic, and political ways of dealing with these problems. 
This document is a marker illustrating that a civil investment in this chronic tragedy has 
its own significant place.” 33 
 
Following the last meeting of the Grand dome in mid-July 2011, an internal rift 
appeared with Director Murat Sofuoğlu leaving Ekopolitik to start his own civil society 
organization, and General Coordinator of Ekopolitik Tarik Çelenk remaining with the 
organization (including some of the staff members too) ending the “dome”.  
 
After this last meeting of the Grand dome, in September 2011, Professor Volkan visited 
Beşir Atalay, then deputy prime minister, though still in charge of overseeing the 
“Kurdish issue”. The political climate at the time was that of thinking that the PKK was 
loosing power and would soon be persuaded to pursue a political, as opposed to 
military, solution. With the earthquake that took place in the South-East at the time, as 
well as the flourishing “Arab Spring” revolutions the dynamics again changed, and the 
Kurdish issue was not seen as the main policy priority for Turkey at the time though.  
 
Case 3): Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV): Democratization 
and Good Governance Programs34 
 
1.) Could you give examples of a few projects/events that your organization/initiative 
planned to influence an increased understanding of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? (i.e. 
conferences, protests, workshops, other? 
The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) is an independent 
organization, with no political affiliation, which sees itself as neutral but trying to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p. 379. 
 
34 Interview, representative from TESEV, Istanbul, March 10, 2014.  
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influence policy on the Kurdish issue and process. Its funding comes from the business 
sector, the EU and research grants. 
 
Activities organized under the Democratization program have included: 
- The production of a documentary about the “compensation law” for IDP´s. 
- Publications, workshops and conferences, under the programs of democratization and 
good governance.35 
-  A constitutional process monitoring project, which has its own website.f 
- Various research reports on the Kurdish issue, the ongoing peace process, and 
constitutional and judicial reform have been produced to support this process. 
 
2.) When and where did these take place, and how long did they last? 
 
2010 
- 24 – 25 June, Nippon Hotel, Istanbul TESEV organizes its first Democratization 
Program Conference “Politics, Institutions and Citizenship in a Changing Turkey: Is It 
Possible to Live Together?”36 
 
2011 
-­‐ March 27, Istanbul, TESEV Democratization Program holds a press conference and 
panel on its report “What Sort of Constitution Are We Heading Towards?”, as the 
third report in its Monitoring the Constitutional Process Project.37 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35  “Kurdish Question”, TESEV Website. Accessed April 3, 2014, 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/kurdish-question/working/1234.html. 
 
36 “Democratization Program Conference, 2010: ´Politics, institutions and citizenship in 
a changing Turkey: Is it possible to live together?”, TESEV website. Accessed February 
20, 2014, http://www.tesev.org.tr/democratization-program-conference,-2010---
politics,-institutions-and-citizenship-in-a-changing-turkey--is-it-possible-to-live-
together--/Content/1136.html. 
 
37 “Press Conference and Panel: What sort of constitution are we heading towards?”, 
TESEV website. Accessed February 20, 2014, http://www.tesev.org.tr/-press-
conference-and-panel--what-sort-of-constitution-are-we-heading-
towards/Content/1452.html. 
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-­‐ September 23, Istanbul, TESEV Democratization Program organizes a press 
conference and panel on its report “Judicial Reform Packages: Evaluating Their Effect 
on Rights and Freedoms”, under its Constitutional Monitoring Project.38 -­‐ October 3, Istanbul, TESEV organizes a press conference and panel on its report “The 
Basic Principles and the Choice of Government System in the New Constitution”, the 
4th monitoring report for its Constitution Monitoring Project.39 -­‐ November 21, 2012 Ankara, TESEV Democratization Program hold a press 
conference and panel on its report (based on a public survey done by KONDA) 
“Definitions and the Expectations Regarding the New Constitution”,  under 
Monitoring the New Constitutional Process Project.40 -­‐ November 25, Amsterdam, TESEV and the Turkije Instituut, Supported by the 
University of Amsterdam, organized the conference “The Need for Consensus: 
Overcoming the Rift in Turkey on the Kurdish Issue”41November 25, TESEV 
organizes a press conference and panel in connection with the launching of its report 
“The Other side of the Ergenekon: Extrajudicial Killings and Forced 
Disappearances”42  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 “Judicial reform packages: Evaluating their effect on rights and freedoms´ Press 
conference and panel”, TESEV website. Accessed February 20, 2014. 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/judicial-reform-packages--evaluating-their-effect-on-rights-and-
freedoms-press-conference-and-panel/Content/1554.html. 
 
39 “Press conference and panel: ´The basic principles and the coice of government 
system in the new constitution”. Accessed February 20, 2014,  
http://www.tesev.org.tr/press-conference-and-panel--the-basic-principles-and-the-
choice-of-government-system-in-the-new-constitution/Content/1463.html. 
 
40  “Press conference and panel: ´Definitions and expectations regarding the new 
constitution´”. Accessed March 22, 2014, http://www.tesev.org.tr/press-conference-and-
panel--definitions-and-the-expectations-regarding-the-new-
constitution/Content/1057.html. 
 
41  “Conference in Amsterdam: ´The need for consensus: Overcoming the rift in Turkey 
on the Kurdish issue”. Accessed February 20, 2014,  
http://www.tesev.org.tr/conference-in-amsterdam--the-need-for-consensus--
overcoming-the-rift-in-turkey-on-the-kurdish-issue/Content/1049.html. 
 
42 “The other side of Ergenekon: Extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances´ 
Report and press conference”. Accessed February 20, 2014, http://www.tesev.org.tr/the-
other-side-of-the-ergenekon--extrajudicial-killings-and-forced-disappearances-report-
and-press-conference-/Content/1566.html. 
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-­‐ November 28, TESEV Democratization Program together with the EU Parliament 
Greens Group hold a panel in Brussels on the democratization process and EU reforms 
in Turkey, issues debated including “the Human Rights Aspect of EU-Turkey 
Relations”, “the New Constitution Making Process and Judicial Reform Packages”, 
“on the Kurdish Issue and KCK Trials”, and on “Civil Military Relations and La won 
Court of Accounts”.43 
 
 2012  
- February 9, Istanbul, TESEV Democratization Program organizes a film screening of 
“Settlement” (“Sulhname”), a documentary about the  “Law on Compensation for 
Losses Resulting from Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism”, or the 
“Compensation Law”, enacted ‘in 2004, for the purpose of partially compensating the 
losses of more than one million individuals forcefully evicted from their villages in the 
1990s. 44 
-  February 9, Istanbul, TESEV Democratization Program organized a panel “Is Turkey 
back to square one? The Kurdish Question, 1990s and Today”.45 
- March 2, Istanbul Conrad Hotel, TESEV Democratization Program shares its first 
studies on the constitution making process in a public press conference, through the 
launching of its first Constitution Monitoring Report, and the launching of a 
Constitution Monitoring Website. Parliament Speaker Cemil Cicek was also present.46 
- 4 – 7 March, Brussels, TESEV Good Governance Program and Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation Brussels Office organized the Brussels Dialogue Program Conference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43  “Panel: ´Perspectives on democratization and EU reforms in Turkey”, TESEV 
website. Accessed February 20, 2014, http://www.tesev.org.tr/panel--perspectives-on-
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44 “Documentary screening: ´Settlement´(Sulhname)”, TESEV website. Accessed May 
5, 2014, http://www.tesev.org.tr/documentary-screening--settlement-
%28sulhname%29/Content/1169.html. 
 
45 “Panel: ´Is Turkey back to square one? The Kurdish question 1990s and today”, 
TESEV website. Accessed February 20, 2014, http://www.tesev.org.tr/panel--is-turkey-
back-to-square-one-the-kurdish-question,-1990s-and-today/Content/1065.html. 
 
46  “Press conference and panel: ´Monitoring the constitutional process´”. TESEV 
website. Accessed February 20, 2014, http://www.tesev.org.tr/press-conference-and-
panel--monitoring-the-constiutional-process/Content/1027.html. 
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“European Experiences in Regional Governance: Lessons for Turkey” (Deputies Nihat 
Zeybekçi, AKP; Melda Onur, CHP and Demir Çelik, BDP participated).47 
-  April 6, Diyarbakir, TESEV Good Governance Program (with contributions of the 
Friedrich Ebert Association) organizes a workshop “Local and Regional Government 
in the New Constitution”. The results were afterwards presented to the conciliation 
commission in the Turkish National Assembly.48 
- November 14, Stockholm, TESEV Democratization Program and Olof Palme 
International Center and Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Lund University, hold 
panel on “Democratization Process and Reforms in Turkey”.49 
-   May 8, NYU New York, TESEV Democratization Program and the Center for 
Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law School organize a panel on “Turkey’s 
Constitutional Transition: Institutional Reform, Regime Change and Bill of Rights: 
Are They Possible?”50 
- May 9, New York, TESEV Democratization Program and World Policy Institute 
organizes a closed meeting “Democratization in Turkey: Progress and Pitfalls”.51  
 
Other projects included: -­‐ The “Encounters project: In Trabzon and Diyarbakir”, to produce meetings between 
the East and West of the country. The people in Trabzon said they didn’t know any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 “Brussels dialogue program and conference”, TESEV website. Accessed February 20, 
2014), http://www.tesev.org.tr/brussels-dialogue-program-and-
conference/Content/1019.html. 
 
48 “´Local and regional government in the new constitution´- Diyarbakir workshop”,  
TESEV website. Accessed February 20, 2014,  http://www.tesev.org.tr/local-and-
regional-government-in-the-new-constitution--diyarbakir-workshop/Content/1089.html. 
 
49  “Panel: ´Democratization process and reforms in Turkey´”, TESEV website. 
Accessed February 20, 2014, http://www.tesev.org.tr/panel--democratization-process-
and-reforms-in-turkey/Content/1127.html. 
 
50 “Turkey´s constitutional transition, institutional reform, regime change and bill of 
rights: are they possible?”, TESEV website. Accessed May 5, 2014, 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/turkey%E2%80%99s-constitutional-transition,-institutional-
reform,-regime-change-and-bill-of-rights--are-they-possible-/Content/1159.html. 
 
51  “Democratization in Turkey: progress and pitfalls”, TESEV website. Accessed 
February 20, 2014,    http://www.tesev.org.tr/democratization-in-turkey--progress-and-
pitfalls--/Content/1204.html. 
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Kurds or what they wanted, and wanted to meet them. First the project travelled to 
Trabzon, and then the Trabzon group went to Diyarbakir. However, finally the 
Diyarbakir group were not able to go to Trabzon. Trabzon is a traditionally nationalist 
stronghold and this exchange was meant to challenge peoples perception of the other 
so they could get to know each other. -­‐ For the “What Kurds want” report, workshops were held in Diyarbakir, and the report 
was brought to Ankara, Izmir, Diyarbakir and Trabzon to be discussed. 
 
Current projects: -­‐ Their current project concerning “Disarmament and Re-integration” Is looking at the 
possible return of militants, and Diaspora from various European countries. This 
process has taken place interviewing over 400 individuals, in Kandil mountains, 
Mahmur camp (Iraq), and Europe. As well as in prisons: includes individuals with ties 
or alleged ties to PKK. -­‐ They have asked these individuals if the peace process is sustainable, will forced 
migrants outside of turkey like to return to obtain their citizenship, integrate again, 
what do they  need? And what would be possible problems? -­‐ The questions involved 4 areas: That of social integration, economic/work, what they 
would do upon return (join political party etc.) and questions on psychological well 
being upon return, these are central to the peace process. 
3.) What was the aim behind these projects/events? What did you want to achieve? 
Their vision for their various projects is bringing together of academia, civil society and 
various political parties, combining the inclusion of different tracks. They take 
advantage to introduce government officials to civil society organizations that do not 
traditionally meet with the government – as the government most usually meets with 
their affiliated civil society. They also chose to pursue close links to the government and 
political parties, though TESEV is independent.  TESEV wants to prepare the ground 
for when the peace process reaches the point that people and activists may return to 
Turkey. 
 
4.) Did these projects aim to affect the current peace process set in place by the 
government? Were your efforts heard at the higher level? 
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For instance, when Beşir Atalay was interior minister (until July 2011, he is now 
Deputy Prime Minister), they kept him informed on the progress and findings of the 
“What Kurds Want” report. In their research they prefer to keep a dialogue open with 
the politicians involved in these issues. During the constitutional writing process, the 
think tank also remained connected to the parliamentary commission on constitutional 
reconciliation, to inform their constitutional monitoring program to inform about their 
progress. They are in contact with people responsible for the peace process (Track 1) in 
order to share with them the findings (through regularly briefings) and will present their 
findings (of their most recent report “Disarmament and Re-integration”, coming out 
after summer) to them even before making it public.  
 
Local governance is also important in collaboration to their projects, at the Trabzon-
Diyarbakir “Encounters” meeting in Diyarbakir for instance, the Mayors office provided 
the location and support, and was very interested in the initiative. Individual´s from 
Mayor Osman Baydemir´s party (the BDP) and the Diyarbakir municipality hosted the 
group and followed their project.  
 
Their reports have always been publicized with a press conference, and Members of 
Parliament from all of the four major parties the AKP, CHP, MHP and BDP, (with the 
MHP only attending the constitutional related events though) have been invited and 
been in attendance to be informed on their research findings. It is part of the vision of 
TESEV to always involve the government, and to do policy oriented and influencing 
activity, contacting to the related ministries. For instance, for their report on IDP´s the 
Ministry of interior was involved and alerted, as well as governors in the South East and 
civil society organizations. Furthermore, a future project is doing continued work on 
judicial reform and on the legal profession in Turkey. This project will be pursued in 
consultation with policy makers and the relevant ministries, and they are conducting 
meetings with the ministry of interior and justice in order to look for areas for future 
collaboration and in order to provide briefings. Transfer to Track 1 from this actor to the 
peace process happens through research and reports mainly, as well as informal contact 
and consultations. 
 
5.) What were the results of these efforts/projects? (i.e. publications, change in public 
opinion, changes in society/communities etc.) 
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- During the constitutional reform process (which has slowed as of late) they helped 
increase the participation of civil society to give input to this process. 
- Their activities helped connect civil society to have a voice in the media too. 
- Following the Trabzon people-to-people meeting an aid tent for migrated South 
Eastern workers was set up along with other small scale projects in Trabzon, due to 
the interest sparked by the meetings with Kurds and the visit to Diyarbakir. 
- There have been 4 reports published on the Kurdish issue and settlement process, 
entitled: “What Kurds Want”, “What Turks Want”, “Constitutional and legal 
solutions”, and “Disarmament and Re-integration” (in progress). 
 
Future projects: -­‐ Includes research on extrajudicial killings and disappearances in the 90´s. -­‐ They are following the KCK cases in Diyarbakir, and working with the Diyarbakir Bar 
association, which is very influential in the region. They have produced a website 
which is monitoring and following these cases: www.failibelli.org. 
 
 
Case 4) Hafiza Merkezi – The Truth, Justice and Memory Center: Various activities52 
1.) Could you give examples of a few projects/events that your organization/initiative 
planned to influence an increased understanding of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? (i.e. 
conferences, protests, workshops, other? 
Hafiza Merkezi was established in November 2011 by a group of human rights activists, 
journalists and lawyers “to advocate for an adequate institutional and societal response 
to past grave violations of human rights targeted especially against national minorities.” 
53  The NGO grew out of larger foundation, namely Anadolu Kültür, and transitioned 
out of, and built further on, previous activities commenced under this umbrella 
organization, which had been operating since 2008 (they still work closely and overlap,) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Interview, representative from Hafiza Merkezi, Istanbul, February 24, 2014. 
53  Hafiza Merkezi website, homepage. Accessed March 3, 2014,  
http://www.hakikatadalethafiza.org/sayfa.aspx?PageId=52&LngId=5. 
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The  main focus of Anadolu Kültür initially had been enforced disappearances. DEPO is 
an art and exhibition space in Istanbul where Hafiza Merkezi has their offices. 
 
Hafiza Merkezi has conducted various activities, regarding culture and memorialization, 
transitional justice and addressing past human rights violations in accordance with 
minorities especially. They also conduct research and hold conferences and workshops 
to highlight these issues in Turkish society. They have especially been proponents of 
addressing transitional justice issues in the Kurdish peace process through events and 
research addressing issues pertaining to the conflict. They have also suggested the 
establishment of a truth commission, and the need for the state to address past 
grievances in order for conflict resolution and transformation to take place in Turkish 
society. 
 
The organization conducts three main activities: 54 
Legal advocacy: Legal documentation, a database on court cases, contact with the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), with law offices in Diyarbakir, Sirnak and 
Istanbul. Basic information about enforced disappearances is also collected and 
advocated. 
Dissemination: Informative workshops of truth, justice and memory. (i.e. Sabanci 
University academic workshops in 2013, 2014), Operating social networking sites. 
Reaching out to other NGOs and academics. Providing essential tools and trainings.  
Documentation: In their research they conducted interview with the families of  
disappeared persons for instance (with a team collecting oral history, with narrative 
evidence through video and audio recording, with 80 interviews conducted so far. 
Estimate 850–1200 disappeared, in Cizre, Sirnak, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Idil and Istanbul) 
2.) When and where did these take place, and how long did they last? 
 
2008 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 “Enforced disappearances”, Hafiza Merkezi website. Accessed February 20, 2014, 
http://www.hakikatadalethafiza.org/calisma.aspx?PageId=102&LngId=5. 
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- March 11 - Anadolu Kültür: “Civil Organizations: New Perspectives in Developing 
Intercultural Dialogue”, in Antakya. Organized within the scope of the 11. International 
Istanbul Biennial’s Cultural Movement program.55   
 
2010 
Anadolu Kültür (of which later is to emerge Hafiza Merkezi) starts Project “Towards A 
Blueprint for Reconciliation: Engaging the Civil Society and Capacity Building”, 
conducting activities between February – December.56 Through this Project interviews 
with 28 civil society organizations in Istanbul and Diyarbakır whose work concerns the 
solution of the Kurdish situation were conducted, as well as the creation of the Hafiza 
Merkezi website on transitional justice and reconciliation. 
- May - June, Anadolu Kültür organizes “Human Rights Documentaries Project” in 
Batman and Mardin (later on, also in 4 Western cities). 57  
October – December, Anadolu Kültür organizes “Human Rights Documentaries 
Project” in Afyon, Bursa, Canakkale, Eskisehir, Izmir (earlier on, in the East.)58  
- December 4 – 5, Istanbul, Anadolu Kulutur organizes the workshop “Truth, Justice, 
Memory: Experiences, Testimonies, Quests” 59 
 
 2011 
- Anadolu Kültür /Hafiza Merkezi conducted a study trip from 11-15 April 2011 in 
order to study initiatives of confronting the past. These experiences were shared in 
September in a report, as well as in a presentation/discussion at DEPO Istanbul.60- 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  Anadolu Kültür website, events. Accessed January 31, 2014, 
http://www.anadolukultur.org/en/areas-of-work/projects/other-events/114. 
 
56 “Towards a blueprint for reconciliation: Engaging the civil society and capacity 
building – II”, Hafiza Merkezi website. Accessed February 20, 2014,  
http://www.hakikatadalethafiza.org/calisma.aspx?PageId=180&LngId=5. 
 
57 “Human rights documentaries”, Anadolu Kültür website. Accessed January 31, 2014, 
http://www.anadolukultur.org/en/areas-of-work/projects/human-rights-
documentaries/119. 
 
58 “Human rights documentaries”, Anadolu Kültür website.  
 
59 “Workshop on truth, justice, memory”, Hafiza Merkezi website. Accessed February 
20, 2014,  
http://www.hakikatadalethafiza.org/duyuru.aspx?NewsId=15&LngID=LngId=5. 
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- March – December, Anadolu Kültür and Hafiza Merkezi Phase II of the “Towards A 
Blueprint for Reconciliation: Engaging the Civil Society and Capacity Building”61  
June 15 – September 15, Anadolu Kültür organizes artistic initiative “Remembering 
with Photography Workshops” (1) in Batman, Mardin, Sirnak, Van and Yuksekova)62 
- 23 – 24 July, Cezayir Meeting Venue in Istanbul. Together with the Human Rights 
Foundation of Turkey, YAKAY-DER, Göç-Der, the Foundation for Social and Legal 
Studies (TOHAV), and the Legal Aid Office Against Custodial Sexual Harassment and 
Rape, Hafiza Merkezi organized a meeting called  "Civil Society Initiative for Truth 
Commissions" (54 people from 26 Civil Society organizations participated) 
- October 15 – 16, Istanbul, Anadolu Kültür/Hafiza Merkezi organized a meeting on 
“Truth Commissions: Turkey in Light of World Experience”, with Turkish, as well as 
US, South African, Peruvian and Serbian experts, and attended by CSO representatives, 
MPs, activists, academics, journalists and artists.63 
- 21 November – 24 May (2012), Anadolu Kültür: Bilingual Children’s Books Project. 
64 (Related Panel at the Istanbul book fair “Bilingual Children´s Books and the Use of 
the Mother Tongue in Early Education” 20 November 2011, 30th International Istanbul 
Book Fair, Istanbul)65 
- December 17 – 18, Hafiza Merkezi organizes “Monuments, Museums and Memorial 
Initiatives Workshop”66, first workshop on  Memorialization. 
 
2012 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 “Towards a blueprint for reconciliation”, Hafiza Merkezi website. 
 
61 “Towards a blueprint for reconciliation”, Hafiza Merkezi website. 
 
62 “Events”, Anadolu Kültür website.  
 
63 “Civil society meets for truth commission”, Hafiza Merkezi website. Accessed 
February 20, 2014, 
http://www.hakikatadalethafiza.org/duyuru.aspx?NewsId=18&LngID=LngId=5. 
 
64 “Bilingual childrens books”, Anadolu Kültür website. Accessed January 31, 2014, 
http://www.anadolukultur.org/en/areas-of-work/projects/bilingual-childrens-books/120. 
 
65 “Events”, Anadolu Kültür website.  
 
66 “Anıtlar, müzeler ve anma girişimleri atölyesi”, Hafiza Merkezi website.  Accessed 
February 20, 2014, http://hafiza-
merkezi.org/duyuru.aspx?NewsId=27&LngID=LngId=1.  
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- May 4 – June 6 Anadolu Kültür organized ¨Remembering with Photography 
Exhibitions¨ (2) (Photo exhibition of photos taken by residents in South Eastern cities 
reflecting on their lives.) 67 
 
2013 
- February, Hafiza Merkezi organizes a workshop in Mardin in order to explore further 
memorialization and the ways in which it can contribute to human rights and democracy 
that came up during this first workshop, brining together Turkish participants from 
various political, ethnic and religious groups.68 
- 25 October 2013 - 15 December, DEPO: Exhibition “Bir Daha Asla” (“Never Again: 
Apology and Coming to Terms with the Past “)69 
- October 25 and 26, the Columbia Global Centers office in Turkey hosts an academic 
conference in connection to the “Istanbul Workshop on Regional Network for 
Reconciliation and Historical Dialogue”, with members from Hafiza Merkezi (Truth, 
Memory and Justice Center) and the Institute for the Study of Human Rights at the 
School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Columbia University.70 
 
Project descriptions: 
1. Enforced Disappearances (work commenced with Anadolu Kültür in 2008): “The 
Unspoken Truth: Enforced Disappearances” 71 
- Koridox – a Swiss NGO – built the database on enforced disappearances for them. 
- The disappeared are catalogued here, with information on them and their case. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 “Events”, Anadolu Kültür website.  
 
68  “Memorialize Turkey”, Hafiza Merkezi website. Accessed February 20, 2014, 
http://www.hakikatadalethafiza.org/calisma.aspx?PageId=191&LngId=5. 
 
69  “About”, DEPO website. Accessed January 31, 2014,  
http://www.depoistanbul.net/en/about.asp. 
 
70 “Istanbul workshop on regional network for reconciliation and historical dialogue”, 
Columbia Global Centres – Turkey website. Accessed January 31, 2014, 
http://globalcenters.columbia.edu/istanbul/content/istanbul-workshop-regional-network-
reconciliation-and-historical-dialogue. 
71 “Towards a blueprint for reconciliation”, Hafiza Merkezi website. 
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- They also interviewed 150 of their relatives (for the last two years). 
- There are videotapes  and transcriptions on the website with photos. 
- There is also a tab for suspects of the enforced disappearances. 
- The number in the database of disappeared is compiled from lists from all the Human 
Rights organizations (for instance IHD) with an estimated 1350 in total. They are trying 
to verify each of these. They have verified close to 300 (meaning they have checked at 
least two sources connected to the disappearance). 
2.  “Towards A Blueprint for Reconciliation: Engaging the Civil Society and Capacity 
Building” (started within Anadolu Kültür in 2010, which entered its second stage 
between March 2011 – December 2011) 72  
Activities that took place under this project included: 
- “Interviews with 28 civil society organizations in Istanbul and Diyarbakır whose work 
concerns the solution of the Kurdish situation. Among the organizations we spoke with, 
there were individuals working on gender, children, poverty, forced migration, health, 
disappearance, the construction of peace, human rights advocacy, and education.” 73 
(With the findings from these interviews, the “Civil Society Organizations Interview 
Report”  was published.) 
- A meeting, entitled "Truth, Justice, Memory: Experiences, Testimonies, Quests," was 
held in Istanbul on 4-5 December 2010, was then held with the civil society 
organizations surveyed in the above research and report. 
- A Hafiza Merkezi website was created,g in order to inform a wider audience on 
transitional justice, confronting the past, and different work of different national and 
international institutions on these issues.h 
From March 2011 the second phase included activities: 
-In-depth workshops, translations for providing information on their website, public 
events to inform society on these issues, and a study visit to Argentina (11-15 April 
2011), to learn more about memorialization work in practice, as well as the experiences 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 “Towards a blueprint for reconciliation”, Hafiza Merkezi website. 
73 “Towards a blueprint for reconciliation”, Hafiza Merkezi website. 
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the country had had with transitional justice, presented to a larger audience through the 
publishing of a report.  
- Moreover, in September 2011, a presentation/discussion at DEPO Istanbul was held 
about their study trip to Argentina, in order to compare different experiences of dealing 
with post-conflict peacebuilding, and transitional justice issues for past atrocities during 
times of conflict. 
- Several meetings, all held in 2011, were the following: Civil Society Initiative for 
Truth Commissions (Istanbul, 23-24 July), Truth Commissions: Turkey in Light of 
World Experiences  (Istanbul, 15-16 October), Monuments, Museums, and Memorial 
Initiatives Workshop (Istanbul, 17-18 December)  
 
3. The “Memorialize Turkey” project, was created as a collaboration between the World 
Policy Institute (New York), the Fetzer Institute (Kalamazoo, Michigan) and Hafiza 
Merkezi.i 
- Workshops  were organize, an initial one in Istanbul, in December 2011 and in Mardin 
in February, 2013. The second workshop brought together individuals from varying 
political, ethnic and religious groups engaged in memorialization work. Alongside these 
participants were experts on memorialization from Germany, Israel and Bosnia. 74 
 
4. A “Regional Network on Historical Dialogue and Accountability in the MENA 
Region” is under development together with Columbia University's Institute for the 
Study of Human Rights. The network follows the model of the Alliance for Historical 
Dialogue and Accountability (AHDA) network based at Columbia University's Institute 
for the Study of Human Rights (ISHR). “AHDA is a convening body which aims to 
facilitate exchange among scholars, advocates, and organizations dedicated to historical 
dialogue and accountability.” 75 
 
- On October 25 and 26, 2013 the Columbia Global Centers office in Turkey (connected 
to Columbia University) hosts the “Istanbul Workshop on Regional Network for 
Reconciliation and Historical Dialogue”, with members from Hafiza Merkezi (Truth, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 “Memorialize Turkey”, Hafiza Merkezi website. 
 
75 “Memorialize Turkey”, Hafiza Merkezi website. 
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Memory and Justice Center) and the Institute for the Study of Human Rights at the 
School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Columbia University. In attendance 
are participants from Cyprus, Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel, and scholars from 
Columbia University in order to agree on a framework for the established network.76 
 
3.) What was the aim behind these projects/events? What did you want to achieve? 
Aims: 77 
- Uncovering human rights violations 
- Contributing to democratization 
- Dissemination of innovative methods to the public 
- Development of mechanisms for the structural transformation of the state. 
- Raising awareness of actors in civil society 
- Promotion of communication in civil society actors in the field of transitional justice 
 
The philosophy of the organization behind the work they do, and connected to the 
ongoing peace process in Turkey, is the following:78 
 -­‐ Promoting sustainable peace with justice. -­‐ The documentation of Human rights violations in the conflict. (Account them) -­‐ Their main aim is to establish a solid foundation of data now, in order for the past not 
to be forgotten, and to ensure that justice and reparations are made. -­‐ Moreover, the organization sees itself as acting towards “Empowerment, Capacity 
Building and Cooperation” - “Attacking the grassroots”, Empowering families of 
enforced disappearances, and setting in force restorative processes (for a type of 
catharsis for the conflict society). 
 
Aims for specific projects: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 “Istanbul workshop on regional”, Columbia Global Centres – Turkey website.  
77 “Enforced disappearances”, Hafiza Merkezi website.  
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-­‐ For the “Enforced Disappearances Database” project - It´s aim with this project was to 
examine the practice of enforced disappearances, which started in Turkey in the early 
1980s, turned into being used as a “war strategy” in the 1990s (continuing even 
today). Moreover, they wish to monitor legal proceedings, inform the public, and 
pressure relevant parties.  
 -­‐ For the “Towards A Blueprint for Reconciliation: Engaging the Civil Society and 
Capacity Building” Between February and December 2010, (and organized still within 
the structure of Anadolu Kültür) national and international civil society initiatives 
were compared to map future solutions and activities to contribute to the resolution of 
the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. “The aim of these projects was to gather experiences 
from post-conflict societies related to truth commissions, criminal justice, 
memorialization, and institutional reform and translate them to Turkish on the website 
to make them readily available to disseminate to the wider Turkish public.“ 79  
Moreover, networking meetings for civil society groups in the field aimed to facilitate 
and increase capacity for the active participation of civil society in the facilitation of 
peace and reconciliation, and to increase collaboration/networks. Another important 
point was the wish for increasing information on the topic of how civil actors around 
the world use various means and techniques of confronting the past by publishing and 
translating guide on transitional justice. 
 -­‐ The “Memorialize Turkey” project also took a comparative approach in order to seek 
for lessons learned in other conflict situations to apply these to Turkey, particularly in 
terms of looking at democratization, but also transitional justice and memorialization, 
and contested histories. 80 
 
- For the “Regional Network on Historical Dialogue and Accountability in the MENA 
Region”, it´s aim is, as is pursued by the ADHA Network at Columbia, to bring 
together “academics, representatives of civil society organizations, journalists, 
educators and artists as well as policy makers who all pursue historical dialogue in 
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conflict, post-conflict and post-dictatorial societies.” 81  Moreover, the aim of the 
network will be to examine and discuss the role of the history of conflict on society, 
and the importance of memory in this process.  
 
4.) Did these projects aim to affect the current peace process set in place by the 
government? Were your efforts heard at the higher level? 
- Reports written by Hafiza Merkezi have been presented to the CHP, AKP and to the 
(former) Minister of Justice, as well as to the Parliamentarian Solution Commission. It 
should be stressed that this was at the initiative of Hafiza Merkezi itself, and not 
opposite. 
- In general this organization does not work closely with the government, even though 
their reports, research, public events and projects could potentially be argued to stand to 
have a future influence to inform the ongoing peace process.  The organization has not 
conducted lobbying activities for their work. 
- In their view, it seems like civil society is working in parallel, and not with, the Track 
I political process. For instance, with their Judges/prosecutors project, they asked the 
former minister of justice for input, but received no response.  
- The outcome has been no follow up, politically with this project. They consider their 
role as pushing for the peace process to continue and for participation in it. However 
they view their isn’t much inclusion now, almost none. 
 
- Lastly, in their work targeting the violations of previous governments (in the  90s) 
some human rights perpetrators (i.e. mayors of cities with many disappeared) are still in 
office, and as they sometimes publish names this can be a sensitive issue in terms of 
governmental relations, and also affects how closely they can collaborate with them. 
 
5.) What were the results of these efforts/projects? (i.e. publications, change in public 
opinion, changes in society/communities etc.) 
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- Production of a Documentary “Buka Barane” (Screening throughout the country) 
- Reports on Transitional Justice/Missing Persons, for instance the latest “Unspoken 
Truth: Enforced Disappearances” (2013) 
- Regional network on historical dialogue and accountability 
- Memorialize website, showing cites of memory throughout the country.j 
- A standardized international database on enforced disappearances.k  
-They also worked with publishing parallel case studies to show examples of similar 
cases and how to deal with them. For instance, they translated ICTJ material on how to 
create a truth commission for the government, the process, and guides for civil society. 
 
Future planned/ongoing projects: 
- Starting a gender project – 99% of the disappeared are men, only women are left and 
their legal situation is precarious. They see it as important to look at women in the peace 
process, DDR, Guerillas for the future of the process. 
- Together with the established reconciliation network: attempting to establish a 
fellowship program with Columbia University and Global Centers, as well as an 
exchange on projects and a joint website to update on conflict in the region. 
 
Case 5) Wise Peoples Commission82 
 
 
1.) Could you give examples of a few projects/events that your organization/initiative 
planned to influence an increased understanding of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? (i.e. 
conferences, protests, workshops, other? 
A Commission, composed of 63 members, within which there are seven regional sub-
groups with nine members each, carried out its activities over a period of one month. On 
Thursday, April 4, 2013, its first meeting took place at the Turkish Prime 
Ministry’s Dolmabahçe Office.83 
 
A 63 Person Wise Peoples Commission, was set together, including well-known 
journalists, prominent leaders of nongovernmental organizations, celebrities (such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Interviews with members of  the Wise People´s Commission, Istanbul, December 4, 
2013,  and Istanbul, March 4, 2014. 
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movie stars and popular singers), writers, journalists, lawyers, unionists and 
businessmen, several academic experts, and generally reputable individuals.84 Among 
them were the following individuals  “…Turkey’s famous actress Hulya Kocyigit and 
actor Kadir Inanir. Orhan Gencebay, a legendary Turkish popular music singer who was 
identified as the founder of Arabesque music in Turkey in the 1970s… Leftist 
intellectuals Murat Belge and Baskin Oran … A controversial name could be Hasan 
Karakaya, the editor-in-chief of the radical Islamist daily Yeni Akit, who until recently 
was showing peace proponents as targets.“, 85   which produced a varied group. 
According to Women´s Initiative for Peace (BİKG) however, women were only 
represented by 14%.86 Diversity was important in the composition of the groups, for 
instance by religion, ethnicity and political affiliation, though some critics noted  an 
over-representation of individuals “close” to the government. 
 
Each province of Turkey was visited, with various different segments of society 
involved in outreach, including civil society, the media, students, local politicians and 
ordinary people. Especially the media was important in the advertisement and 
dissemination of the initiatives meetings and agenda. An initiative of the AKP, the 
opposition CHP was participating, while the MHP remained against but  mostly kept its 
criticism low-key, and there appeared to be a relative consensus on the process. 
 
2.) When and where did these take place, and how long did they last? 
 
The Wise Peoples Commission was announced established in April 2013. Initially 
convened for 1 month, the commission extended its work to take place over 2 months. 
The meetings took place in all 7 regions of Turkey. 
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7, 2013. Accessed March 3, 2014, http://www.al-
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85 Kadri Gürsel, “Erdoğan asks ´Wise people´to make case for peace”, Al-Monitor, 
April 15, 2013. Accessed March 3, 2014, http://www.al-
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The group was equally divided between the seven geographic regions of Turkey, with 
only the Aegean having eight members. Each regional sub-delegation had a chairperson, 
a vice chair and secretary, and these were pre-selected. However the Prime Minister 
said this was just to save time, and could be changed if needed or wanted, as a fixed 
structures was no envisioned. According to participants in the exercise there was 
relatively little direction or involvement from the government side, giving each group 
responsibility, and not directly enforcing a standardized procedure for every group.l All 
the members were pre-selected, and personally invited by the Ministry of Interior (The 
members would usually receive a phone call from either Beşir Altalay, Deputy Prime 
Minster, responsible for overseeing the peace process, or Yalcılak Doğan, advisor to the 
Prime Minister). There were a few meetings that informally took place both within and 
between the wise people´s group, but no coordination or much contact took place across 
or between the groups to compare experiences. The funding for the entire exercise was 
provided by the state. 
 
During the 1st meeting with the PM on April 4th, 2013 in Dolmabaçe palace87 (which 
lasted 5-6 hours) not much information was shared about the process itself, nor were the 
wise people given much direction as to how they should organize meetings, giving them 
relative room for autonomy. Each committee selected themselves who could participate 
in the meetings with locals. The meetings were described as taking place as 
“Toquevilleian town hall meetings” that took place including all sectors of society, 
including universities, political parties, and the business sector, to name a few. 
 
The groups travelled all over their regions, with the main idea being to listen. The 
groups would note down complaints and demands from the people. Complaints and 
documents were received, but usually on a personal initiative, not by the selected groups 
present in the formal meetings. Villages were also visited, and the initiative was meant 
to reach as many people form as many sectors as possible. The meetings took place with 
around 60 – 80 people, sometimes more, with groups such as doctors chamber, 
architects, NGOs, the business sector, there was a slight bias towards religious 
organizations, and a presence of some activist Kurds and PKK affiliates. When the (East 
group) travelled to Diyarbakir they met with representatives from the BDP, CHP, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 “Fuat Keyman has been appointed´”, Istanbul Policy Center. 
	   128	  
well as the AKP, and HAK-PAS (another smaller Kurdish Party), however the MHP 
didn’t want to meet them. They attempted to reach all political parties.  Sometimes there 
were clashes, and small protests at the commissions meetings. With people chanting 
slogans such as 'You are betraying nation' (in the case of the Aegean region for 
instance), however this was not widespread and did not pose a major threat. 
 
3.) What was the aim behind these projects/events? What did you want to achieve? 
-The aim of the exercise was to calm public fears and concerns related to the peace 
process, as well as to inform people as to the process and answer their questions. 88 
- The government announced a plan for the “Wise person” commission which can seen 
to be an adoption of, what senior PKK commander Karayılan had previously announced 
had been an idea of Öcalan to establish eight commissions to facilitate the peace 
process. “… a justice commission, a socio-economic commission, a National Pact 
[Misak-I Milli] commission, a women’s freedom commission, an ecology commission, 
a civil society commission, a security commission and a truth commission” 89 
- The prime minister was perceived to be confident in the developments of the peace 
process, so he adapted this idea making it his own. Making it larger, with a different 
function, the Wise Persons commission was established as a mechanism to penetrate 
and consult society, instead of confine the discussion only to the Track 1 negotiations.  
- Interviewees stressed that this exercise was also one of bridge-building between the 
Western and Eastern populations, and of “meeting” the Kurdish populations for the 
wider Turkish public (which is less applicable for the Easter group, of course). 
- The same point goes to the aim of wanting to “take the steam off” the Turkish 
nationalists, who were greatly opposed to the process (concentrated in Western regions). 
- The initiative was also meant to be demonstrated as a democratic exercise from the 
governments side, in including the wider population in the peace process. Also, it was 	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89 “The wise peoples commission subgroups begin nationwide rounds”, Sabah. n.d. 
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seen as playing a role in creating deliberation on a societal level, in order to foster 
dialogue and increase the transparency of the mainly closed and high level process. 
- It is argued that the move was part of the negotiation process between  Öcalan and the 
State itself, as in order to reach a ceasefire and disarmament and democratic reform, 
gaining societal support to accept the process was an integral part of their deliberations. 
- Ideally, it was also meant as a form of influencing the Track I talks too, and was 
interpreted that way by some participants and some sectors of the public consulted. 
- Lastly, it was envisioned as a way to get society involved, foster societal engagement 
and build social capital, for societal conflict resolution on the larger and holistic scale. 
- Critics of the process would say though that the wise people were put together to 
advocate the AKP´s specific view on the peace process, and just that however.m 
 
4.) Did these projects aim to affect the current peace process set in place by the 
government? Were your efforts heard at the higher level? 
There was a second meeting with all the regional groups in Dolmabace palace on May 
10, 2013, where Prime Minister Erdogan, as well as the Deputy Prime Ministers Beşir 
Atalay and Bekir Bozdağ, Interior Minister İdris Naim Şahin and Culture and Tourism 
Minister Ömer Çelik also attended. The meeting lasts for nearly seven hours, with no 
official statement made afterward. Wise people did speak to the press later ensuring that 
they had informed the Prime Minister about people´s view on the process.90 In July 
2013, a report was prepared and presented from each regional group to the Prime 
Minister at the end of the country-wide meetings. There were isolated protests taking 
place outside of Dolmabaçe during the final meeting, in July 2013, but these were not 
examples of noteworthy opposition. 
 
5.) What were the results of these efforts/projects? (i.e. publications, change in public 
opinion, changes in society/communities etc.) 
 
The final meeting the report was given to the Prime Minster, but were not published (as 
they reports were seen to been commissioned by the government, they were seen as the 
owners of the reports), and were not disseminated or publicized widely.  All the reports 
from the wise men were ultimately gathered into one website.n There were views that 	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also the reports produced were of varying quality, with for instance the South East and 
East group being increasingly published (on various websites), while some Western 
reports seemingly taking the exercise less seriously. There seemed to be a stalemate on 
the reports politically as to how to proceed. A book with photographs from the 
experience was also released (but it was more commemorative and was seen as not 
having much substance.) 
 
As to the general societal view, despite some small scuffles along the way (which were 
blown out of proportion by the media according to participants) the process went 
smoothly, especially in the nationalist Aegean and Black Sea region. The process was 
seen as a good test of how ready people were for this process. By critics, the exercise 
was seen as politically a way of gaining time in the negotiation process ahead of the 
2014 local and presidential elections.  In the end though, the aims of the process were 
identified as being met in terms of: 1. Societal engagement 2. Talking/deliberation 
(groundbreaking and novel on the issue, in Turkey) 3. Support and trust in the process 
was perceived by some to have increased overall. As to political criticism to the 
initiative, the CHP and MHP were initially against the process, however, they did not 
stand in the way of it.91 As for the BDP they organized a meeting where all the regional 
groups attended. 
 
In the aftermath of the initiative though the outcome of the process cannot be clearly 
seen, and it seems that after the exercise the government put the project on the back 
burner. The national increasingly polarized environment, with the Gezi protests, which 
ensued in the end phase of the commissions´ work, and the government’s overreaction 
to this, and the volatile regional and international scene, with the events of the Egyptian 
toppling of Morsi, for instance, overshadowed the government´s focus on the 
commissions work. Although the government was seen to back-track after the above-
mentioned scares, the exercise was seen to improve the social-psychological view of the 
conflict and the peace process on a whole.  Although the planning and execution of the 
commission was ultimately considered ad-hoc and unstructured by some, it was clearly 
visible. 
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Summing up, during the April 4th meeting, Prime Minister Erdoğan shared the results 
of polls, showing that “…in Turkey’s heavily Kurdish populated regions of  the 
southeast and east, support for the process appears to be 87% and 71%, respectively. In 
the strong conservative and nationalist Central Anatolia region support is said to be 
57%. From figures of Central Anatolia it is understood that the ruling party has captured 
some Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) strongholds and dented its popular base. 
Those who approve and do not approve are equal at /3% in the Black Sea region, while 
47% is in favor and 41% is against the process in the Mediterranean region… the 
Marmara region supports the "peace process’’ with 59%. In the country’s least 
conservative Aegean region in the west… 49% of the people appear to be against the 
‘’peace process.’’ In the Aegean region, support for the process is a little more than 
40%.” 92 Polls demonstrated that after the commissions activity, increasing numbers of 
support emerged for the peace process, according to members of a group, as well. 
 
With the virtual end of the constitution making process, there was a vacuum in the wise 
people commission as well. For instance, it was suggested that each region could have 
created a platform for the constitution, as a more durable mechanism. The work and 
outcomes of the commissions were deemed to have been a missed opportunity for the 
government in the advancement of the (now stalled) process. However, members also 
point out that the meetings grew large groups of people, and produced interest in the 
population for these issues. However, the fact that this is a long-term process, not 
fixable in 2 months work, was also acknowledged. The importance of a continued 
democratization process and of inclusion of rights and representation/inclusion for all 
minorities (and not just Kurds) was seemed to be a take-away from this exercise by the 
participants. Moreover, the deliberation process proved a concern and wish to discuss 
the constitution and democratization packages, in the wider social view of the process. 
The initiative also demonstrated that a new phase is taking place in Turkey, one of non-
violence, which hopefully will remain. For instance, in the media, the members of the 
commission were counting the days during the commissions work of no casualties 
publicly. 
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Case 6) Columbia University: Roundtable on Kurdish Peace process93 
 
1.) Could you give examples of a few projects/events that your organization/initiative 
planned to influence an increased understanding of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? (i.e. 
conferences, protests, workshops, other? 
The Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the 
Study of Human Rights and Columbia’s Global Center/Turkey convened a “Roundtable 
on the Kurdish Peace Process”, in December 2013 in order to discuss experts, 
academics and civil society representatives views and ideas on the current process, with 
the aim on building on previous meetings and to potentially build future alliances. 
 
Prior to this roundtable, an academic conference on “International Reconciliation 
Models” from various international examples (excluding Turkey) on truth and 
reconciliation, historical memory as a tool for conflict resolution, justice and amnesty 
options, and international experience with disarmament and demobilization took place. 
(All issues related to, and applicable to, the Kurdish case, though this case did not 
feature as one of study during the conference itself.) It was organized on May 8th 2010 
at the Istanbul Policy Center, Istanbul. A consortium of international scholars and 
practitioners converged to discuss these topics. The exercise was also designed as a 
dialogue between Turks and international scholars on these subjects. It was co-
sponsored by Sabanci University´s Conflict Resolution Program and Bosphorous 
University Peace Center, as well as American University´s Center for Global Peace, 
Columbia University´s Institute for the Study of Human Rights, and the Netherlands 
Institute for Higher Education. The government of Norway funded it. According to the 
organizer, David Phillips, the exercise was deliberately illustrative and not prescriptive. 
A publication of a report outlining the cases and topics covered, in both Turkish and 
English was produced. 94 A continued dialogue was envisioned for the international 
panel and Turkish civil society, opinion leaders and policy-makers on these topics.  
  
2.) When and where did these take place, and how long did they last? 	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94 Ed. David Phillips, “International Reconciliation Models”, Istanbul Policy Center -
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The Columbia Global Centers Office in Istanbul was the site for the “Roundtable on the 
Kurdish Peace Process”, on December 23rd, 2013, with the idea of the creation of a 
Civic Peace Platform in order to inform the ongoing peace process with ideas and 
knowledge from other Tracks. The workshop was convened on the initiative of David 
Phillips, Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia 
University´s Institute for the Study of Human Rights, in New York. Prof. At the 
workshop Turkish academic Dr. Doğu Ergil presented a Turkish perspective and David 
L. Phillips presented an American perspective on the Kurdish peace process, while 
Cengiz Candar served as interlocutor and moderator. Participants included scholars and 
other civil society representatives. 95 
 
The workshop noted that: “Participants debated whether the government’s approach 
qualifies as a “peace process.” They pointed out that political dialogue should be 
dynamic, transparent, and inclusive. While commending work of the “wise men,” they 
noted the absence of broad participation by civil society. They discussed the need for a 
qualified interlocutor representing Kurdish interests, and considered Öcalan’s role.” 96 
 
3.) What was the aim behind these projects/events? What did you want to achieve? 
The workshop was established at a time in the peace process where the resurgence of 
violence is probable, due to the recent year´s slowdown in the process and lack of 
progress. As the conflict is seen by the participants to be linked to a broader process of 
political and cultural rights, unfortunately after the September 30th “Democracy 
package” unveiling there has been little activity in relation to democratization initiatives 
or other moves related to the peace process.  Radical new shifts in thinking are needed. 
 
However, hopeful signs can be seen as well, meaning instances to push the process 
forward should be pursued. For instance, the mutually kept ceasefire, KRG President 
Barzani´s visit to Diyarbakir in an attempt to marginalize extremist factions of the PKK 
and the PYD, and Öcalan´s siding with Erdoğan after the corruption scandal are all 	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signs that point to a continuation of the process. Therefore a strategy for the increased 
involvement and consultation with academia and policy circles is needed in the future, 
for the continuation of the constitutional reform process and for democratization. 
 
4.) Did these projects aim to affect the current peace process set in place by the 
government? Were your efforts heard at the higher level? 
There was a perceived gap between the September 30th democracy package and the 
likelihood for increased political dialogue surrounding the peace process. The Wise 
people´s commission was therefore thought as a measure to fill this gap by generating 
some activity around peace dialogue. After the workshop of December 23rd, a small 
group of the roundtable participants met again to discuss the establishment of a  “Civic 
Peace Platform.” According to the memorandum from the workshop: “The Civic Peace 
Platform was envisioned as a mechanism to engage civil society in the peace process. It 
is also intended to show motion during a time when, due to Turkey’s election cycle, the 
Imrali peace process is slowing down and may stall. The project will engage a broad 
cross-section of civil society in an inclusive and transparent discussion about the terms 
of a peace agreement. “97 
 
Thereafter, a group of 15 of the wise people went to Ankara and actually proposed to 
make a peace platform as was envisioned in the platform. TESEV was envisioned as an 
organization which could facilitate this process. However the idea did not receive much 
interest or feedback from governmental circles in Ankara. 
 
5.) What were the results of these efforts/projects? (i.e. publications, change in public 
opinion, changes in society/communities etc.) 
 
There was no outcome, other then network building among the participants and airing 
of ideas, as the idea of a “civic peace platform” was not followed up on by track I. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 “Meeting Notes”, Memorandum from roundtable, January 1, 2014.  
	   135	  
Case 7) Constitutional Reconciliation Commission (CRC) and Economic Policy 
Research Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı – 
TEPAV) Constitution Platform: Constitutional Citizen´s Assembly Series 98  
1.) Could you give examples of a few projects/events that your organization has planned 
to influence an increased understanding of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? (i.e. 
conferences, protests, workshops, other?) 
The Constitution Reconciliation Commission (CRC) of the Turkish parliament was 
formed to provide Turkey with a new constitution, a key aspect in the peace process. 
The commission was criticized for its lack of activity, but discussed issues pertinent to 
the peace process related to constitutional reform such as the legal foundations of 
“Turkishness” and citizenship in Turkey. Other central issues related to both processes 
include language and minority rights, as well as the percentage for the election 
threshold of parties. Moreover, constitutional reform is central to Turkey´s 
democratization process, seen as parallel and going hand in hand with the peace 
process. The need for providing a legal foundation for the peace process, which is as of 
today still missing, will be an important future task for any constitutional reform. The 
commission is composed of the four parties in the government the AKP, and the 
opposition CHP, MHP and BDP, with equal representation of three representatives from 
each party. 99 The commission was set up on the 19th of October, 2011 and operates in 
the parliament. The commission conducted regular weekly meetings in parliament.100 
 
TEPAV´s Constitution Platform, consisted of syndicates, professional organizations and 
civil society organizations, organized the Constitution Platform Citizens’ Assembly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98  “Turkey Constitution Watch”, TESEV website.  Accessed March 24, 2014,  
http://www.turkeyconstitutionwatch.org/; Tulin Daloğlu, “Turkey´s Constitution 
Commission keeps working”, Al-Monitor, November 27, 2013. Accessed March 24, 
2014,  
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/turkeys-constitution-commission-
keeps-working.html; “The results of the Constitution Citizens´Assembly meetings to be 
submitted to Parliament”, TEPAV website. Accessed March 24, 2014, 
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meetings in Ankara, Konya, Edirne, Diyarbakir, Izmir, Ankara (with women only), 
Antalya, Samsun, Bursa, Trabzon, Gaziantep, Erzurum and Istanbul, working alongside 
the mandate of the CRC to assist them in their efforts towards constitutional reform.101 
Members included individuals from: TOBB, TZOB, Türk-İş, Memur-Sen, Türkiye 
Kamu-Sen, TUSKON, TÜRMOB, TÜRSAB, the Union of Turkish Public Notaries, 
TÜMSİAD, TÜRKONFED, TESK, Hak-İş, the Union of Turkish Bar Associations, 
MÜSİAD, TOFED, Association of the Retired, Youth for Habitat, the Turkish 
Federation of the Disabled, and TİSK. 
 
13 Citizens’ Assembly meetings were held throughout the country in order to capitalize 
on the work already done by the CRC in parliament. Citizens were invited to attend 
these messages via text message. The meetings took place with group of 10, with 
individuals that had never met before, and without the presence of a facilitator.  In these 
groups, participants discussed issues pertinent to the constitutional reform, and were 
asked around 50 questions, designed to foster discussion as well as a survey. 102 
 
2.) When and where did these take place, and how long did they last? 
 
The CRC commission in the parliament began its´ activity in October and November 
2011, but did not actually begin work until May 2012. Being mandated to conclude its´ 
work by the end of 2012, it had only completed 103 articles by this date, with 
agreement on 31. Speaker of parliament Cemil Çiçek (AKP) asked for an extension to 
the commissions work, which was granted until April 2013. 
 
The Constitution Platform of TEPAV came together in 2007, and Citizens’ Assembly 
meetings were carried out in Ankara, Konya, Edirne, Diyarbakir, Izmir, Ankara (with 
women only), Antalya, Samsun, Bursa, Trabzon, Gaziantep, Erzurum and Istanbul with 
a total participation of 6,500 people. 103  
 
3.) What was the aim behind these projects/events? What did you want to achieve? 	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The aim of the CRC parliament commission was to come up with a draft constitution 
for parliament, which needed to be supported by 367 of the total 550 members, while 
330 in support would bring the document to referendum. However, after commissions 
work lagging there was also the possibility for the AKP to individually write a draft.104  
The commission was envisioned as a central part of Turkey´s democratization process 
due to the current one being drafted under the military regime of the 1980 military coup 
in Turkey, endorsed by a referendum in 1982. Although having 30 amendments to it, 
the need for a more civilian and representative constitution was deemed necessary.105 
Aside from this however, each party has been viewed to be pushing for the demands of 
their particular party and constituencies: while the pro-Kurdish BDP party has pushed 
for issues relating to the peace process, the CHP worked, among other things, to free 
their jailed deputies (of which there also are from the BDP and MHP parties), while the 
MHP has fought greater changes to the 1980s military constitution.106 The wish of the 
AKP, and specifically the Prime Minister, to change the structure of government to a 
presidential system (to enable his potential election as President), by changing 
constitutional amendments was greatly contested.107 
 
4.) Did these projects aim to affect the current peace process set in place by the 
government? Were your efforts heard at the higher level? 
Related to the Kurdish issue, the AKP party was also attempting to make changes to 
state institutions such as the judiciary and army in order to facilitate the peace process. 
The constitutional amendments defining citizenship and nationhood are also seen as 	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20, 2013.  Accessed March 24, 2014, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/turkey-constitution-parliament-polarization-
democratization.html. 
 
107 “Amending Turkish constitution”, Al-Jazeera Center for Studies. 
 
	   138	  
contentious, yet central, issues to solving, and moving forward, the Kurdish peace 
process. Moreover, as a central piece to the AKP governments democratization efforts, 
which parallel and compliment the peace process, the commission plays a big role. 
The Constitution Platform submitted its report to Parliament Speaker Cemil Çiçek, to be 
handed over to the Parliamentary Constitution Commission with a ceremony held on the 
TOBB premises on Wednesday, 9 May 2012.108 Moreover, TOBB had earlier met with 
Minister of the Interior Beşir Atalay on August 12th, 2009 to talk about the Kurdish 
opening, and the governments´ views on it.109 
5.) What were the results of these efforts/projects? (i.e. publications, change in public 
opinion, changes in society/communities etc.) 
 
On November 18th, 2013, the speaker of the parliament and the CRC chairman, Cemil 
Çiçek, one of the deputy-chairmen from the AKP, publicly announced his will to resign 
due to the lack of progress made by the commission. However the commissions rules 
state that only the four participating parties are able to terminate the commissions work. 
The commission has (from the time of writing) been severely delayed in their work due 
to a lack of consensus between the parties, with a mandate originally stipulated for 12 
months, the work has taken more than the double of this, receiving harsh criticism from 
the Prime minister. The last six months of 2013 were especially charged in stalemate 
between the parties. Specifically, the opposition parties were opposed to the amendment 
bid by PM Erdoğan and his party to change the parliamentary system in Turkey into a 
presidential one.110  
 
The slow progress of the commission is seen to be produced by the lack of will, 
especially by opposition parties CHP and MHP to reform the constitution, as well as the 
disagreement and views over what changes to make, also by the AKP and BDP. While 
the commission has agreed on a number of articles, (60 articles, as of November, 	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2013)111 the central and most contentious articles to the constitution remain unresolved; 
the nationalistic preamble to the constitution defining “Turkishness” and citizenship, on 
education in mother tongue and the decentralization of power – all central issues to the 
ongoing peace process.112 With the local elections of 2014 the commissions work was 
stalled, with the need for renewed bargaining with the opposition or the AKP to present 
a draft to move the process forward. A report based on the meetings and voting 
procedures (excluding the Istanbul meeting) was compiled from the Citizen´s assembly 
meetings and delivered to parliament to be reviewed by the constitutional commission. 
 
Case 8) Human Rights Foundation - İnsan Haklari Derneği (IHD):  
The Saturday Mothers - Cumartesi Anneleri - Dayîkên Şemiyê (2009 – 2014) 
1.) Could you give examples of a few projects/events that your organization/initiative 
planned to influence an increased understanding of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? (i.e. 
conferences, protests, workshops, other? 
Beginning on May 27th 1995, the “Saturday mothers” have gathered on Istiklal Street in 
central Istanbul (in front of the Galatasaray high school, a common cite for protest in 
Istanbul´s central Taksim district) to protest the disappearances of their relatives. The 
Saturday mothers were forced to end their protests in 1998 due to governmental 
pressure, however they re-commenced their activity in January of 2009. 113 Seen as a 
landmark event that inspired these protests was the disappearance and death of famous 
poet and political figure Sabahattin Ali (62 years ago). However the movement only 
started in 1995, with mothers and relatives began meeting in front of Galatasaray high 
school in Istanbul with red carnations and posters with the pictures names and dates of 
birth and disappearance of their loved ones. Mostly the group will sit in silence, where 	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the stories of a couple of the stories of some disappeared sons or daughters or relatives, 
mostly during the military coup of the 1980´s, but also later on, are told by their 
relatives. 114 
As disappearances took place in Istanbul but also other cities, such as Diyarbakir and 
Sirnak, the Saturday mothers have also been meeting for years in other locations 
throughout the country, in their local communities, and always in public spaces where 
their demands can be clearly visible and heard. The group received inspiration from the 
Madres de Plaza de Mayo Association which held walking protests once a week in front 
of the Presidential palace in Buenos Aires Argentina (until 2006) to protest the 
disappearances of their children and relatives during Argentina´s military dictatorship. 
115 
2.) When and where did these take place, and how long did they last? 
The relatives of the disappeared had, as of December 2012, met for 404 weeks in 
Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, for 202 weeks in front of Diyarbakır’s Right to Life 
Monument, on Gülistan Boulevard in Batman for nearly 200 weeks, and in Cizre, in 
front of the Cizre High School for exactly 100 weeks, since 2009.116  
In the case of the more recent initiative in Cizre, a South-Eastern town, they 
commenced their activity after the opening of the Temizöz and others case in 
Diyarbakir, a legal proceeding to indict individuals (i.e. Cemal Temizöz and Kamil 
Atağ) responsible for murders and missing persons. A group of relatives and 
community members began to commute between Cizre and Diyarbakir to attend the 
court proceedings which cemented a regular group from that community. Hence the first 
sit-ins from Cizre were actually in front of the courthouse in Diyarbakır. Following the 
example of similar “sit-in” protests in Diyarbakir and Istanbul a regular protest 
movement was established also in Cizre. After a meeting in January 2011 with members 	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of the Progressive Lawyers Association (Çağdaş Hukukçular Derneği, or ÇHD), human 
rights advocates, and family members, the name of Saturday Mothers was also adopted 
by the group, agreeing to meet on Saturdays. The first meeting was held on 29 January 
at a park in Cizre Dörtyol. The movement is made up primarily of relatives of the 
disappeared, with a majority of women being represented as many of the men have been 
implicated in the ongoing KCK trials. 117 
 
3.) What was the aim behind these projects/events? What did you want to achieve? 
The Saturday Mothers movement main aims are establishing collective memory and 
memorialization; seeking justice for their relatives and children, with the identification 
of perpetrators; obtaining information and knowledge as to where to find the bodies; 
and the wish to protest state terror and receive acknowledgement of their suffering.118 It 
is reported that during meetings however, the mothers of missing persons stress that 
they “sought no revenge; only justice”. 119 More recently, the mothers have included the 
disappearances linked to the Ergenekon case, as well as the need for the systematic 
identification and mapping of actual and potential mass graves of missing persons. 
Moreover, the relatives want for the government to open the relevant police files from 
the disappearance periods, in order for them to receive information as if to 
investigations to their respective cases are ongoing or not. 120 Lastly, the Saturday 
Mothers movement asks for acknowledgement and information as to what actually 
happened in the years their relatives were disappeared, as for instance, an illegal 
intelligence unit called JİTEM, (whose existence has not been accepted by the Turkish 
Military as of today) is blamed for many of these disappearances, of which The Human 
Rights Association of Turkey (İHD) claims the victims number more than 17.500. 121  
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4.) Did these projects aim to affect the current peace process set in place by the 
government? Were your efforts heard at the higher level? 
In Febuary 2011 Prime Minister Erdoğan met with representatives of the Saturday 
Mothers for the first time, listening to their demands for justice for their relatives.122 
Moreover, in April 2011 The Parliamentarian Human Rights Commission held a 
meeting with representatives of the Saturday Mothers123 The movement has several 
demands (see previous point) which they want the government to comply with and 
which should, in their view, form part of the current peace process, and which they try to 
communicate through their protests and other public actions. 
 
For the newer Cizre gatherings, local politicians and party members, including BDP 
members of the Şırnak Municipal Council, the directors of the BDP, mayors, 
Association of Help with Families of Missing Persons (MEYA-DER), and the directors 
and members of ÇHD have supported the protests, after 99 weeks of protest the Şırnak 
Bar Association also expressed support for the initiative. 124 
 
5.) What were the results of these efforts/projects? (i.e. publications, change in public 
opinion, changes in society/communities etc.) 
 
Though the meeting with Prime Minister Erdoğan demonstrated (for the first time) for 
the mothers an engagement of the governing AKP to listen to their demands, they 
experienced that there was not much progress or outcome from their meeting, leaving 
the meeting to a symbolic gesture. 125  
 
Moreover, with reactions outside the country, after 1995, Amnesty International 
published international reports about the Saturday Mothers in Turkey, gaining them 	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international recognition with other members of anti-disappearance movements 
including Argentinean Madres de la Plaza Mayo, The Bosnian Mothers of Sebrenica 
and the Committee of Families of the Disappeared in Lebanon paying them visits. 126 
 
Case 9) Social Mobilization/Protest of the Kurdish Political and Social Movement 
 
9.a) Newroz Celebrations (2008 - 2014) 
1.) Could you give examples of a few projects/events that your organization/initiative 
planned to influence an increased understanding of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? (i.e. 
conferences, protests, workshops, other? 
Only in 1995 did Newroz celebrations become legal, and the feast has now been 
adopted officially, (some fear in an attempt to “co-opt” this traditionally Kurdish 
holiday). 127 Especially in the 90´s the event was marked by violence and clashes 
between the Kurdish protesters and Security forces, though violence, on a lesser scale, 
and clashes still have occurred in later celebrations into the 2000´s. In 1992, about 50 
people were killed by the security forces in clashes in various South-Eastern cities. 128 
“Newroz, celebrated on 21 March is the most important date in the 
secular Kurdish calendar. The “New Day” starts the new year and 
the beginning of spring, but it is also the day Kurds celebrate the 
mythological liberation from tyranny when the blacksmith Kawa 
saved his people from the tyrant Dehak. This is why it has always 
had political connotations for the Kurdish national movement and 
explains why all celebrations were banned after the 1980 military 
coup right up until the early 1990s, when the Newroz celebrations 
became more and more politicized.”129 
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Traditionally, participants in the Newroz celebrations dress in traditional dress, dance 
and sing and play Kurdish music, as a clear underlining of the importance of Kurdish 
identity markers, which had in previous years been banned. For instance, flags and 
items holding the colors of red, green and yellow are worn as they are considered the 
colors of the Kurdish “flag”. Moreover, political propaganda for the BDP (and 
predecessor Kurdish parties) as well as for the PKK and affiliated organizations, and 
portraits of Öcalan are present. A “Newroz” bonfire is generally lit with young men 
jumping over it, as part of the ritual of celebrations.  
2.) When and where did these take place, and how long did they last? 
The largest celebration is held each year in Diyarbakir, the unofficial “capital” of the 
Kurdish South-Eastern region (referred to as “Amed” by many Kurds),130 and also the 
biggest city. The massive celebrations/protests are there held in “Newroz Park”, a large 
lot at the outskirts of the city, usually taking place on the 21st of March each year.131 
The second largest Newroz gathering usually takes place in Istanbul each year. 
2008 
Influenced by the intensification in the armed conflict between the Turkish army and the 
PKK, where cross-border raids were conducted in Northern Iraq in February of 2008. 132 
Following this polarized environment, in March of the same year, the General Penal 
Board of the Court of Cassation outlined that individuals joining demonstrations where 
the PKK has called for public participation should be charged with  “membership” in 
the PKK, 133  severely undermining attempts at celebrating Newroz of that year.  
Reportedly, hundreds of Kurdish protesters clashed violently with police for four days 
in various South-Eastern cities, where at least two people (one was shot in Yuksekova, 
and another in Van) and dozens were injured. 134 There was a ban by the authorities to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 “Newroz 2008 in northern Kurdistan and Turkey”, KurdMedia, March 22, 2008. 
Accessed April 14, 2014, http://kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=14678. 
131 Güzeldere, “Kurdish Politics and Newroz 2011”. 
132 “Kurds killed in Turkey protests”, Infowars.com. 
 
133 “Turkey: Events of 2009”, Human Rights Watch: World Report 2010.  
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continue Newroz celebrations further then on the one designated day, Friday, whereas 
protestors wanted to continue their activity over the weekend. The demonstrations had 
been called by the then Pro-Kurdish party, the Kurdish Democratic Society Party 
(DTP), with large celebrations going against the ban and gathering in Western cities like 
Izmir and Istanbul (with large migrant populations of Kurds) on Sunday as well. 
2009 
The pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) organize Newroz throughout Turkey, 
attendees at the celebration in Diyarbakir were estimated to have reached 75,000 by the 
governor of Diyarbakir´s office, and 500,000 by the DTP.135 Prior to the local elections 
on March 29th the PKK vows to keep guerilla activity to minimum. The ruling AKP 
party remains a majority, though decline considerably in comparison with the 2007 
elections. 136  
 
2010 
 
As the DTP is banned the previous year, this marks the first year that Newroz is 
organized by the BDP party, though continuity in members is clearly maintained. The 
public events around the country celebrating the Newroz holidays (Kurdish New Year) 
of this year are generally peaceful, in comparison to earlier years. 137 This year´s 
Newroz takes place in the backdrop of the (until then still) publicly unknown Oslo talks. 
2011  
The Newroz celebrations of this year are moved to March 20th, as March 21st falls on a 
Monday in order to attract more people; the decision is announced on short notice by 	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the organization committee. 138  BDP politicians deliver speeches in Kurdish and 
Turkish, which would have been reason enough for arrest only a few years before. 139 
An estimated 500,000 crowd of people is estimated to have gathered in Diyarbakir 
alone. Diyarbakir Mayor Baydemir, BDP co-chairperson Kisanak and former party 
leader Ahmet Türk repeat the BDP´s (echoing the Kurdish movement and PKK´s 
demands) for mother-tongue education, the release of political prisoners, the lowering 
of the 10 percent threshold to enter parliament, and for decentralization. 140 The PKK 
has called for an ending of their unilateral ceasefire on March 1st of that year, but also 
vow to keep their ceasefire until after the June elections of that year, in an increasingly 
tense environment.141 Widespread violence and military escalation ensues after the 
elections. 
Following the Newroz celebrations, a spontaneous march with fewer participants is 
initiated to a central park in Diyarbakir where the BDP had set up a “Tent for a 
Democratic Solution”. In the park some of the protestors throw stones and are tear 
gassed by the police in clashes surrounding this unplanned march. 142 Three days later 
the BDP leaders announce launching of a new civil disobedience campaign dubbed the 
“peace tents” with in theory peaceful actions such as sit-ins in major squares in cities 
throughout South-Eastern and Western Turkey, in order to raise their awareness and 
voice demands for the June elections. Their demands include: the freedom of Öcalan, 
increased language rights, the lowering of the political party threshold to be represented 
in parliament, and democratic autonomy in the South-Eastern region of Turkey.143  
2012 
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The year´s Newroz celebrations in March are marked with clashes between 
demonstrators and police, 144  with many injured and hundreds arrested, with one 
protester being killed,  namely the head of the Istanbul branch office of the BDP, Haci 
Zengin.145. There was political disagreement as the BDP wants to organize the event on 
the 18th of March, a Sunday, while the government wants the event to take place on the 
usual day, the 21st, leading to an all out ban of the celebration that year, though crowds 
gathered regardless.146 This has been a symbolic and telling struggle in various of the 
previous years between the Kurdish movement and the Turkish State, with the former 
attempting to show its strength and the latter attempting to control it. 
2013 
March 2013 brings perceived steps forward endorsing the peace process, with a 
ceasefire being called in mid-March by Öcalan during the Newroz celebrations, which 
are conducted more peacefully then previously with the anticipation of his 
announcement.147 According to one estimate hundreds of thousands of people gather in 
Istanbul alone, in celebrations organized by the BDP and People's Democratic Congress 
(HDK), where BDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş and Istanbul deputy Sırrı Süreyya 
Önder spoke.148 By contrast, in Mersin, a South-Eastern city, there was a large presence 
of police forces and equipment, with ten thousand people participating, including BDP 
deputy Ertuğrul Kürkçü, BDP Akdeniz Mayor Fazıl Türk and a number of BDP 
officials and Peace Mothers. 149Around ten thousand people gather in İzmir, while novel 
celebrations take place in Adana as well.150 Hundreds of thousands are reported to 	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gather in Van,  people arriving from the surrounding areas such as Bitlis, Muş, Ağrı, 
Kars, Ardahan, Erzurum, Iğdır and Hakkari. Moreover, thousands gather in 
Thousands in Bingöl, Mardin, Dersim and Ceylanpınar.151 
2014 
On  March 21st, Newroz celebrations take place, with tensions ahead over the possible 
renewal of violence after the local elections at the end of March, with the PKK 
announcement of keeping the ceasefire till at least the March 30 local elections. Newroz 
takes place with relative calm, with a new letter from Öcalan urging the formalization of 
the ongoing peace talks. Following the elections violence does not resume however. 
3.) What was the aim behind these projects/events? What did you want to achieve? 
As explained above in the “Peace tent” case, Newroz is Kurdish New year and a 
symbolic event where according to legend Kurds gained their freedom from a despotic 
King. Newroz has coincided with several Kurdish rebellions and uprising throughout 
history. 
4.) Did these projects aim to affect the current peace process set in place by the 
government? Were your efforts heard at the higher level? 
As seen by Öcalan´s choice in the past for announcing ceasefires, and the most recent 
historic ceasefire called on Newroz 2013 to mark the start of the current peace process, 
Newroz holds a symbolic importance in the struggle for justice but also for peace for the 
Kurdish Nationalist movement, but also for Kurds in general. It is an important event 
also for the Kurdish political movement (primarily represented by the BDP, but as of 
more recently, also the HDP) as a show of strength, and to rally around their demands in 
their political agenda as well as in the peace process. Their main demands have not 
changed much since 2008 being the right to mother tongue education and the 
strengthening of cultural identity rights (of which Newroz is an important event to 
demonstrate these), increased rights and release for political prisoners and for Öcalan 
specifically, as well as the increase of democratization in Turkey, the lowering of the 	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election threshold for parties to be represented in parliament (i.e. through constitutional 
reform) and as of more recently, the need for a legal basis to the peace process. 
Although championed in other ways and through other events, these demands are 
expressly made clear and heard on Newroz, and have to a certain extent been registered 
and follow up on by the government over the years, the culmination of which is being 
discussed now in the peace process, of which results will have to be seen. 
5.) What were the results of these efforts/projects? (i.e. publications, change in public 
opinion, changes in society/communities etc.) 
 
Examples of resulting campaigns (usually called by the BDP and the wider Kurdish 
Nationalist movement) include: 
 
- 2011 – The “Peace Tent” Civil Disobedience campaign leading up the June elections.-  
- From March to June, 2013 the “Government Take a Step” (Hukumet Adim) civil 
disobedience campaign launched by the BDP to keep pressure towards this end.152 
- During Newroz 2013, the calling of the ceasefire by Öcalan with the commencement 
of a new (and the current) peace process with the AKP to resolve the Kurdish conflict. 
- Vocalization of demands from the Kurdish nationalist and political, as well as civil 
society and grassroots (i.e. including victims organizations) movement towards peace, 
through speeches, demonstrations, cultural and traditional rites and official declarations. 
 
9.b) “Peace Tent/Democratic Solution” Civil Disobedience Campaign153 
1.) Could you give examples of a few projects/events that your organization/initiative 
planned to influence an increased understanding of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? (i.e. 
conferences, protests, workshops, other? 
During the  “Kurdish Opening” of the AKP, and in the run-up to the 2011 Elections, a 
civil disobedience campaign was called by the BDP and affiliated grassroots and 
Kurdish nationalist movement organizations to put pressure on the government to 	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153 Participant observation and informal interviews at Aksaray peace tent, Istanbul, June 
2011. 
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provide advances in solving the conflict through providing increased political and 
cultural rights, and democratization reforms. Since March 2011 the conflict re-
intensified as military operations were re-commenced in the South-East, and the PKK 
broke its almost one-year-long unilateral ceasefire, escalating in the summer.o 
 
2.) When and where did these take place, and how long did they last? 
 
In response to this and the lack of addressing of the “Kurdish Question” of the 
government, p  and coinciding with that year's Newroz celebrations, the so called 
“Democratic Solution” or “Peace Tent” civil disobedience campaign was launched on 
March 18th, 2011 in Diyarbakir. This campaign took place throughout Turkey, both in 
the West, notably in Istanbul, and in the East, in large cities such as Diyarbakir and 
Batman, as well as smaller cities, and internationally, in several European capitals. This 
process lasted up until the June 12th, 2011 with the parliamentary elections in Turkey, in 
hope of getting the political demands of Kurds heard in the political arena. 
 
This initiative was organized as a joint effort of the Peace Mothers, the pro-Kurdish, 
Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) Union of communities in Kurdistan (KCK) and the 
Kurdistan National Congress (KNK) the village communes, Neighborhood Councils, 
City Council, mayors, municipal councils, as well as Kurdish Civil Society 
Organizations, and ordinary people. Together they were announcing the “four demands” 
outlined by the BDP in their election campaign: Education in the Kurdish language and 
freedom to use it in political arena; the end of military operations in the South-East; the 
release of all political prisoners, including the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, and the 
removal of the 10 % electoral threshold for parties to get elected into parliament (which 
adversely affects the BDP, and previous Kurdish parties). In addition to this was the 
demand that a new constitution including these demands be prepared after the elections. 
 
A short timeline of (representative) events taking place during the initiative include:154 
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-­‐ Monday, April 18th,: 12 Independent (pro-Kurdish and Kurdish, 7 were BDP backed) 
candidates were barred from participating in the June 12th Elections in Turkey due to 
previous “criminal convictions”, by the YSK (Supreme Election Board). -­‐ Thursday, April 21st: 7 independent candidates were reinstated to run after providing 
missing documentation. -­‐ 25 April, in Hakkari police detained 35 people, including an acting mayor, as part of 
an investigation into a group prosecutors accuse of ties to the PKK terrorists. -­‐ 152 suspects, including 12 mayors of several Southeast Anatolian cities, (all BDP), as 
well as many other local politicians are on trial accused of membership in the Kurdish 
Communities Union, or KCK (an alleged urban branch of PKK) Hundreds more are 
under arrest in connection with the investigation. (These trials are ongoing.) -­‐ March 23rd – A 20, 000 person sit-in strike in Batman. -­‐ March 23rd – Raiding and removal of Peace Tent in Batman; Molotov cocktails and 
terrorist documents. -­‐ March 21st –Sabahat Tuncel slaps a policemen during Newroz celebration in Silopi155 
(this incident sparks student clashes in Istanbul). -­‐ April 8th – Police intervene when a Peace tent is attempted pitched in a square in 
Diyarbakir. -­‐ Tuesday, April 19th - Protest march from Taksim Square to Aksaray – violent clashes 
and use of Molotov cocktails by demonstrators, and tear gas by the police. 
 
3.) What was the aim behind these projects/events? What did you want to achieve? 
The spring festivities of Newroz, celebrated on March 21st have in Kurdish history in 
Turkey, and elsewhere (i.e. Iran), often marked a joyous occasion of celebrating the end 
of winter with music, dancing and the traditional jumping over bonfires. However, as an 
indisputable expression of Kurdish cultural identity, it has also developed into a form of 
resistance, and often coincided with the launching of civil disobedience campaigns, 
protests, marches as well as violent clashes against the Turkish state.q 
 
According to a BDP politician present at the gathering in the June 2011 in Aksaray 
square in Istanbul: “(The tents) are organized by the BDP, but they are not for the 
elections. They are to make a stance, demanding rights, and a change.” The Diaspora 	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parliament in Europe, the Kurdistan National Congress’s report on the campaign 
outlines that: “The tents are an intervention to put a democratic solution of the Kurdish 
question on the agenda as well as acting as platforms for debate and discussion.”156 
 
The Diaspora parliament in Europe, the Kurdistan National Congress’s report on the 
campaign outlines that: “The tents are an intervention to put a democratic solution of 
the Kurdish question on the agenda as well as acting as platforms for debate and 
discussion.”1 
4.) Did these projects aim to affect the current peace process set in place by the 
government? Were your efforts as civil society heard at the higher level? 
Though the action didn´t have direct transfer to the government, its widespread and 
public nature makes it classify as a clear display of discontent towards the governments 
“Kurdish opening” policy, demonstrating the stance that not enough is being done, and 
an impatience to gain rights. Moreover, the influence that it had as part of the election 
campaign of the BDP means that the actions on the ground, and locally, could impact 
the higher levels through the Members of Parliament that were elected in June 2011. 
 
5.) What were the results of these efforts/projects? (i.e. publications, change in public 
opinion, changes in society/communities etc.) 
  
Clearly, this civil disobedience campaign, showed an increased urgency and will from 
Kurdish political organizations and civil society to impose their demands in the political 
(as opposed to the armed) arena and to influence the nascent democratization attempts 
and a future peace process. Showing an interesting example of the combination of 
social, political, but also cultural and identity-based demands and struggles in one 
campaign. The fact that these were too take place (in principal) in a peaceful manner, 
and nationwide show a widespread ability to of the Kurdish nationalist and political 
movement to make grievances and demands heard vocally and publicly, as just one 
example of various similar campaigns organized by these forces through the years. 
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As is shown in the above overview, the history of the Track I process (outlined in 
Chapter 4) can both differ and compliment the activities of the lower tracks II, III and 
1.5. Moreover, it is clear that these different activities of participation in the ongoing 
peace process (whether public or not), at a societal level, can take many different shapes 
and sizes, with endless creative character. Especially in circumstances where societal 
mobilization is constricted, the various forms of civil society and other sectors 
organization must seek multiple channels to make their voices heard, and more so in 
instances of a lack of more formal channels of Track I consultation with other tracks. 
An analysis of the selected case studies of actors of participation will now follow.  
 
Presenting and Analyzing the Data 
In order to evaluate and make sense of the data compiled regarding the selected cases of 
participation and inclusion, the selected cases will be codified according to the different 
models from the “Broadening Participation” project. Additionally, the reasons and 
justification of the clustering of models will be explained, as well as possible outlying 
cases and initiatives that were discovered in the conscious choice of taking the broader, 
peacebuilding view on participation in the wider peace process. The framework focuses 
on (among a number of other variables which are not included in the present study), if 
an initiative is “bottom-up”,  “top-down”, or both, as a useful additional way of 
explaining the organization and fit with the models. This consideration will be included 
in the justification of the models selected for each case, though the entire framework is 
not utilized here. Moreover, the models identified will be justified with the connection 
and influence they had on “transfer” to the Track I negotiation process; additional, 
smaller scale, peacebuilding activities will have a more indirect and general influence. 
 
As mentioned earlier, after the selection and description of the above-mentioned nine 
cases, three questions were asked to guide the analysis process. The first was – does the 
empirical evidence of participation/inclusion in the peace process in Turkey fit into the 
framework of the nine models? The second question then asked was; If not, why not? 
Thirdly, for the cases that did fit into the models, their classification was explained. The 
above mentioned models were then compared to the data from the selected cases in 
order to see if it was possible to identify models used for each actor. In all cases one 
main model or activity was identified, however additional activities were found for all 
cases. In this case, outliers and different types of inclusion and participation 
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mechanisms, which were not classifiable by the framework, were also identified. The 
analysis and justification according to the models, and peacebuilding activity performed 
by each actor, can be found in the following section, followed by a summarizing table. 
 
Case 1) Free Women’s Democratic Movement (Demokratik Özgür Kadın Hareketi, 
DÖKH): Women´s Initiative for Peace  (Barış İçin Kadın Girişimi, BİKG)157 
 
The model from the “Broadening Participation” framework (outlined in detail in 
Chapter 3) that fits most closely with the work of BİKG is Model 4 “Consultations” 
(informal, without official endorsement from Track 1). This model is defined as less 
far-reaching, and being conducted by either Track 1 representatives, the mediator  (if 
any), or by any of the conflict parties, with only selected groups/actors (as opposed to a 
larger, more representative simple of the population) in relation to a peace process. The 
event that they conducted which can be classified as a Model 4 consisted in the 
consultations that were done by the Wise Peoples Commission with the BİKG. 
 
The reason to classify BİKG as Model 4 was mainly because according to the data 
obtained on the activities and aims of the organization, it seems to take a multi-track 
approach to peacebuilding. This means that it actually works as bridge builder, but from 
the “bottom-up”, between the grassroots, conflict parties and the Track-1, governmental 
circles involved in the peace process. Its activities can be summed up as taking place 
primarily among one conflict party, the Kurdish social and political movement (as the 
initiative sprang out of the Free Women’s Democratic Movement, DÖKH), as well as 
targeting a specific group, women on all sides of the conflict. However, arguably, they 
also produce consultations and awareness in other circles of society, with their meetings 
and conferences aimed at influencing the peace process, and discussing the issues 
pertaining to it, and coming with new ideas and opinions to influence the process. 
Moreover, they group goes beyond the narrow conception of  “consultations”, and 
actually turn investigations and reports resulting in these, into actions and demands. 
 
Although BİKG can, in fact, also be seen as campaigning for becoming/being granted a  
title in the talks, the classification here must be done in accordance to what activity has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Personal correspondence, member of BİKG, August 14 and 15, 2013. 
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actually taken place, and not what actors aspire to become (although it is an interesting 
point to keep in mind). The Monitoring label has been seen in a variety of peace 
processes, where interestingly women’s groups, among other “minorities”, have gained 
this title in order to have their voices heard, which will otherwise be under-represented 
in the peace process. Though arguably, the talks in Turkey are not at the formalized 
stage where such observer groups would even be able to be present, as the process is 
closed, un-inclusive and unstructured (and its future undetermined) for now. However, a 
last point is that seen from this perspective, BİKG have in fact named themselves, and 
begun to act as a type of  “unofficial monitor”, as they have conducted monitoring of 
the withdrawal process of the retreating PKK fighters, for instance, though they clearly 
have not had the possibility to monitor actual talks.  
 
BİKG has also in fact (among a couple of other organizations, like Hafiza Merkezi) 
been vocal in arguing for the need for a  “Model 5: Inclusive post-agreement 
mechanisms” in the peace process in Turkey, of which no examples have been found in 
this study, since the peace process is at a much too early stage, without an agreement. 
 
Their previous experience with protest and civil disobedience can be clustered as a 
Model 9 (“Mass Mobilization”). In addition to the above mentioned activities BİKG 
also conducted an academic research and advocacy function, conducted lobbying at the 
Track 1.5 level, and propagated public dissemination of their findings to raise 
awareness and participation of the public into the substance of the conflict and its 
resolution, specifically concerned with the ongoing peace process. Artistic forms for 
participation and reconciliation, like the film festival, which they conducted cannot be 
disregarded as a form of participation.  
 
As we can see from these additional activities, most of the participation in this case was 
“bottom-up” driven by grassroots and civil society sectors, with some access to Track I 
(namely through the presentation to the “Wise Peoples Commission”). The activities of 
this actor preceded the most recent peace process heavily with Model 9 protest and 
mass mobilization, but shifted strategy to accompany the official peace process mainly 
through consultations (Model 4), to add demands to the peace process agenda (through 
non-official channels, as they were not consulted directly or part of the Track I), but 
also through additional and creative activities such as research, events and workshops. 
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Case 2) Ekopolitik: “Grand Dome of Turkey” - Turkiye´nin Büyük Çatısı  
 
The “Grand Dome of Turkey” dialogue project is considered according to the 
framework a “Model 6: High-level civil society initiative”. This mechanism of 
participation is a non-official Track II or Track 1.5 process, in the pre-negotiation phase 
to talks, or in parallel to a peace process. In this case, there was a combined Track II and 
Track 1.5 process characterizing this exercise, with the participation of retired officials 
and high ranking individuals, as characterized by former intelligence and military 
personnel, as well as ex- members of parliament and community leaders, as well as 
other representatives from society. It was Track II in terms of the actual meetings, but 
Track 1.5 in the briefings and communication channel which was open, and even made 
public, at times, between the organizers and facilitator of the “dome” and the Track I, 
mainly represented by President Gül and Interior Minister Atalay. Moreover, this 
dialogue and societal conflict resolution process was in fact taking place in parallel to 
the secret “Oslo Talks”, however, the public was at the time aware of this. 
 
The exercise was both a “bottom-up” exercise as it was initiated and organized by a 
think-tank and famous Social-Psychologist, Professor Vamik Volkan, and the exercise 
built on the discussions of the members to come up with ideas and suggestions for the 
resolution of the conflict, which were later passed on “upwards”.  
 
In addition to the main activity, namely the “dome”, people to people exchanges took 
place, through trips by members to the South-East, as well as lobbying at the higher 
political levels and meeting local authorities, bridging tracks. Additional public events, 
dialogues, conferences, lectures and public outreach in the media propagated the arenas 
and levels of participation that this initiative fostered. Additionally, trainings in social 
psychology and the Kurdish conflict, in form of lectures to students and the police 
academy, can be seen as another educational form of increasing participation of the 
public. All of these later activities could not be readily classified in the framework as 
they constituted more general peacebuilding initiatives in the wider peace process. 
 
Case 3) Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV): Democratization 
and Good Governance Programs 
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The main model identified for TESEV´s activities was “Model 4: Consultations”, and 
this in combination with their policy-oriented research project as many of their reports, 
specifically in this case on their series related to issues being discussed in the peace 
process, were developed in consultation with track I actors. For instance, their findings 
would be briefed to track I actors to inform the peace negotiations on issues pertaining 
to it, before the findings would be published, while the track I would in turn request 
subjects and issues for study of interest to the current process. Moreover, there was a 
high level of track I and political party (track 1.5) representation at the launching events 
and conferences discussing the reports connected to the peace process and constitution. 
 
Although the “broadening participation” project, does not look at the wider 
peacebuilding functions of civil society, but mainly on the models and mechanisms for 
participation, (the important precursor to this work however, Paffenholz (2010), 
identifies core functions of civil society in peace processes, which will not be employed 
in this research, however, as they constitute a different lens focusing on general 
“functions” and not on types of activities). The remaining activities undertaken by 
TESEV do fit the frame of a more general, peacebuilding, and societal reconciliation 
function, which could constitute an additional model, or alternatively, a broader view of 
inclusion/participation than is envisioned for the “broadening participation” project and 
framework.r This type of Track III, II and 1.5 activity constitutes academic, and people-
to-people meetings and dialogues, that though only unofficially and loosely connected 
to the peace process, may be assessed, in the broad view taken in this research, as 
having an impact. The question for the inclusion of such activities would be how far to 
“cast the net” in collecting instances of participation and inclusion of course. 
 
Additionally, one could argue that some of TESEV´s activities could even constitute a 
modified “Model 6: Track 1.5 Conflict Resolution Workshops” (high-level workshops, 
involving Track II, 1.5, with influential people involved), because of the focus of the 
think-tank on inviting and involving governmental officials in their activities. Clearly, it 
does not constitute a clear Model 6 however, as their activities have generally not been 
conflict resolution workshops where dialogues have taken place, but more research and 
academic based activities, that have involved dialogue on issues relating to the peace 
process, with the officials in the background, as spectators, and not actively involved.  
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Lastly, and more generally, it is not unthinkable that academic and think-tank pursuits, 
events and publications, could be considered alternative forms of participation in a 
peace process, especially when they aim to reach a broader audience with their research 
on issues pertaining to the peace process. For example, they can take the form of press 
conferences, or website publications. Moreover, when such groups aim to influence, 
inform and lobby the government officials, and potentially Track I, with these products, 
it increasingly starts to resemble some form of participation in the peace process, where 
the aim of the activities have a “higher purpose”, and where there are channels for 
transfer and an advising role to the Track 1 process.  
 
Case 4) Hafiza Merkezi – Truth, Justice and Memory Centre: Various Activities 
 
The case of the different activities of Hafiza Merkezi is considered as mainly a “Model 
X”. The selection of this case shows the aim of taking a broader view on participation, 
in order to classify and include the activities of Hafiza Merkezi as well. Their advocacy 
role is clearly stated in the aims for their projects, and can be seen through the various 
public and inclusive events they conducted, which have an important impact on the 
development of Track II discourse which develops around issues central to the peace 
process. Additionally, although working less closely with government and possible 
Track I then TESEV, Hafiza Merkezi did engage in transfer activities to share and 
disseminate their findings relating to the Kurdish conflict. In terms of monitoring issues 
pertaining to the conflict, as a human rights and memorialization organization their 
cataloguing and research into past atrocities, and visions for the future, as well as 
societal reconciliation, can be seen as a separate, but important parallel process to that 
of Track I.  The case could also be made for Hafiza Merkezi´s activities that if a model 
should be chosen, many of their larger conferences and workshops most closely fit into 
a modified version of the  “Model 6: Track 1.5 Conflict Resolution Workshops”, though 
the activities it has undertaken are most Track II and III, and rarely Track 1.5 (and 
hence its main activities of reconciliation will remain clustered as a Model X). 
 
Moreover, the focus of the activities of Hafiza Merkezi highlights another important 
form of inclusion, in addition to research and organizing events, namely the cultural and 
artistic dimension. If the scope is even further widened, in order to allow various forms 
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of participation and influence for the dissemination of the issues discussed in a “peace 
process”,s Hafiza Merkezi is a good example of track III and II people-to-people 
exchange activities as well, consisting of conflict resolution and transformation 
processes, and presentations of grievances done through creative means of expression. 
Their focus also on more psycho-psychological aspects of conflict, which clearly 
qualifies as a peacebuilding exercise as well, such as cites of memorialization and the 
need for future mechanisms for transitional justice in Turkey, are also important aspects 
of the peace process which they have been, and have a potential to, be participating in, 
but which also do not constitute any models according to the framework. 
 
Case 5) Wise Peoples Commission  
 
The Wise People´s Commission can be considered a “Model 7: Public participation”, 
which involves activities targeting the a broader portion of the population, by events 
such as public hearings, opinion polls, town hall meetings and signature campaigns. In 
the case of the Wise People´s Commission, the three first activities listed were all part 
of the exercise. Moreover, the Commission, though commissioned by the government 
side, was also endorsed by Öcalan, thus providing it with a wide mandate for 
conducting consultations and receiving input, as well as raising awareness, as to the 
peace process. This case is one of the most clear fits with the framework found. 
 
Moreover, this mechanism can also be classified as a “Model 3: Official/endorsed 
consultations”, as it was mandated by the government in order to learn the views of 
society on the current peace process, and in order to “pave the way” for the process. The 
views of society on issues related to the violent conflict and related to the peace process, 
including the intertwined constitutional reform process, were discussed, and gathered in 
a report that was handed over to the Prime Minister and presented to track I actors. 
Although it was perceived that words, and the findings of this process were not turned 
into action, the effect of this exercise on the process and the mindset of the track I 
negotiating team, may be measurable in the future when more is known about the inner 
workings of this currently secret peace process. 
 
Case 6) Columbia University: Roundtable on Kurdish Peace process  
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The “Roundtable on the Kurdish Peace Process” event lies as an example of  “Model 6: 
Track 1.5 Conflict Resolution Workshops”. I have chosen to cluster it as model 6 
though it was a one-time event (planned in a series of events that did not materialize). 
Since there was participation of former “wise people”, who had Access to Track I, for 
instance, as well as academics and civil society representatives, the workshop can be 
considered high level, with a varied participation sample.  
 
Established by a previous, purely academic meeting on “International Reconciliation 
Models”, the following roundtable meeting was more inclined towards the Track I, as it 
had envisioned to establish a “Civic Peace Platform”, to facilitate the participation of 
civil society in the ongoing peace process. This platform would be sustained with the 
participation of some of the “wise people” (influential individuals), government 
officials and with the possible facilitation of TESEV, a think-tank. However this never 
materialized with the lack of access and agreement from Track 1 for the project. 
However, here again we see an example of an academic Track II, and 1.5 (if we count 
the visit of the Wise people to propose the idea to Ankara to propose the establishment 
of a “Civic Peace Platform”), exercise aimed at influencing greater participation of 
different sectors into the ongoing peace process. 
 
Case 7) Constitutional Reconciliation Commission (CRC) and Economic Policy 
Research Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı – 
TEPAV) Constitution Platform: Constitutional Citizen´s Assembly  
 
The CRC/TEPAV Constitution Platform public assemblies can be considered as an 
example of  “Model 7: Public Participation”, as it included actors from various sectors 
allover the country. Moreover, the model had a clear transfer mechanism in delivering 
its report to the CRC and working with the commission in their findings and for the 
purpose of influencing this track I mechanism and process (constitutional reform). 
 
The CRC itself could be considered a “Model 5: Inclusive post-agreement mechanism”, 
if the modification of considering it a parallel-to-agreement seeking (instead of post-
agreement) was made. Model 5 seeks to encompass the “…participation of societal and 
political actors in implementation institutions and mechanisms”, and gives as examples 
of mechanisms such as commissions to implement a constitutional reform agenda, 
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including different actors, or commissions to implement peace agreements. In light of 
this, the CRC, with the participation of the four different parties in parliament, which 
represent very different constituencies, also in the range of conflict parties of the 
conflict, seems to fit the description well, with only a slight modification to the 
occurrence of the model. However, it will not be clustered as a model 5 in this instance, 
as this would necessitate a change to the timing of the model occurrence, which is not 
specified in the framework as of yet. 
 
In this sense, despite the lack of progress of the commission, one could even say that the 
Turkish agenda for the peace process is ambitious (others might say unrealistic) in 
planning for constitutional reform ahead even having reached a peace agreement. In this 
case of Turkey, the constitution is well established (although created under military 
tutelage), and must not be made from the scratch, therefore allowing its reform to take 
place parallel to, and as an intrinsic part of, the peace process. Clearly, since the articles 
in the constitution in need of reform are so directly linked to, and in fact in some cases 
the root cause of some of the issues in the conflict (i.e. definitions of citizenship and 
nationhood, the Penal code, and the Anti-Terror act), it does make sense to make the 
democratization, constitutional reform process, and peace talks run parallel. This is 
especially true in the current situation where the Kurdish counterpart, represented by 
Öcalan and the PKK, but in fact spanning the entire Kurdish population of Turkey, 
demands the guaranteeing of democratic and human rights for Kurds (and 
ethnic/religious minorities as whole in Turkey) as a central peace to the negotiations. 
 
One drawback with the current attempt at a Model 5 parallel to peace negotiations is 
that despite its focus on “reconciliation” in its work, among the political parties, and 
being inclusive in this form, it has till date not been very participatory. In terms of the 
inclusion of civil society and a larger sector of society in the form of suggestions of 
ideas and needs, or consultations for changes and amendments to be made, this has not 
taken place (though a constitutional referendum in 2010 showed favor towards reform). 
  
As will be seen in the various examples of “Model 9: Mass Action” discussed in this 
section, the participation and pressure from “below” in this sense seems to be pushed 
from other channels then the official ones, in general. Although the constitutional draft 
was envisioned to be approved by a referendum (which co-incidentally is another 
	   162	  
model, “Model 8: Public decision-making”), this does not lie in the near future, and 
lastly, the referendum of a constitutional draft was originally thought to be a second-
best option, if the draft is not able to receive enough support in the parliament first. This 
last point clearly demonstrates that the exercise of the CRC is mainly “top-down” 
focused in its philosophy, though it also springs from mobilization on the issue from 
below, for instance the “Yes, but not enough” movement of intellectuals and civil 
society that demonstrated an increased need for increased reform after that of 2010.  
 
Case 8) Human Rights Foundation - İnsan Haklari Derneği (IHD):  
Saturday Mothers - Cumartesi Anneler - Dayîkên Şemiyê (2009 – 2014) 
 
The Saturday Mothers could qualify as a mechanism of  “Model 9: Mass Action” for 
participation, however I have chosen to cluster it as “Model X”, due to the smaller scale 
of the initiative, as well as it being a civil disobedience initiative specifically, and not a 
form of “mass” protest. Though their activity has been ongoing long before any 
attempts at a peace process in Turkey commenced, and their activity was outlawed for a 
long period of time, the renewal of their civil disobedience activity coincided with a 
time of increasing political liberalization surrounding the Kurdish issue, as well as 
renewed attempts to solve the conflict politically, through the commencement of the 
“Kurdish Opening” reforms, as well as the (secret at the time) “Oslo Talks”, and then 
later on, the present more open process, which all paralleled their ongoing activity. The 
Mothers have played an important role mainly in calling for an end to violence and the 
reaching of a peaceful agreement to the conflict, but have also in their own way, called 
on the need for Track 1 and the State to focus on justice and accountability for past 
crimes in any ongoing peace process, in order to achieve meaningful peace in Turkey.  
 
In civil disobedience, the symbolic value of the actions of actors often speaks louder 
than the number of people (“mass”) that participate in a protest action. Thus, a possible 
modification to the “Model 9: Mass Action” could be made, to include symbolic, 
innovative events such as civil disobedience (another example, which was not selected 
as a case, is for instance the hunger strikes of Kurdish prisoners called by the Kurdish 
political movement which pressured the government to recommence talks in 2012).  
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Histories of resolving violent conflicts by political and peaceful means have various 
examples of strong symbolic activities of civil disobedience, in order to pressure 
governments towards change. Specifically in instances where international attention is 
directed towards such initiatives, pressure towards a government to resolve a certain 
situation can be strong. For instance, the “Mothers of Plaza de Mayo” in Argentina, 
from which the Saturday mothers gathered inspiration, became worldwide icons and 
symbols for the fight against the Argentina dictatorship, despite their relative modest 
numbers, due to their periodic public meetings and symbolic white headscarves. The 
Saturday mothers in Turkey have adopted similar symbolic attire, with many of the 
peace mothers wearing white headscarves for peace, and relatives often bringing large 
pictures of the ”disappeared”, along with red flowers to symbolize their loss. The public 
nature of such meetings, and the audience it draws should be considered as a form of 
demanding justice, but also as a call for the peaceful resolution of the ongoing conflict. 
The peace mothers are clearly an example of a “bottom-up” process as well. 
 
Case 9) Social Mobilization/Protest of the Kurdish Political and Social Movement 
(2008 – 2014) 
 
The following activities/groups which make up the Social Mobilization and Protest 
cases are all classified as “Model 9: Mass Action”. For simplicities sake the model will 
shortly be described again here, so as not to be repeated in detail again below. This 
model is exemplified in the framework as events including (but not limited to) 
campaigns, demonstration, street action, protests, and petitions. These should be 
organized with the aim of putting large scale pressure on the negotiating parties, 
according to the framework to: end violence, sign an agreement, bring about regime 
change, or add pertinent issues to the negotiation agenda.  
 
Moreover, though this will be discussed in more detail in the conclusion, this model is 
the one that occurs the most often in the case of the ongoing Peace process, but also 
arguably, in the history of Turkey. This is interesting in the debate surrounding the need 
for increased channels and mechanisms for participation, not only in the peace process, 
but in the general political process. In general, such protests movements will by 
definition be considered “bottom-up” processes, but there are some distinctions to be 
made according to case. Mass action usually relies on a rallying point, organizer or 
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instigator, and so although demands will be made from the grassroots, usually to the 
government/regime and/or Track 1, they will also be the subject to leaders or 
organizations coordinating or managing the goals and frameworks of such events. 
 
Case 9.a) Newroz Celebrations (2008 – 2014) 
 
The various Newroz celebrations taking place over the years since a peace process in 
Turkey has been present can be considered participation in form of “Model 9: Mass 
Action”. The event is a symbolic rallying point for the joint forces of the Kurdish 
nationalist (armed and non-armed), political, and societal/grassroots movements. 
Moreover, it is probably the largest showing of strength and of the demands for this 
conflict party in terms of issues in relation to the resolution of the conflict and 
expectations for a peace process. A wide array of campaigns have been launched in the 
event of Newroz, such as the “peace tent”, but also other civil disobedience campaigns, 
including increased language rights and improvement of prison conditions for political 
prisoners, and Öcalan in particular, or hunger strikes to pressure the government to 
make increased steps in the peace process. Additionally, the day has been the point of 
departure for launching specific initiatives such as petitions on specific issues, like the 
release of Öcalan from prison, as well as a general day of protests, marches, and cultural 
manifestation of identity, in itself seen as, at worst a “threat” by the government, and at 
best, a signal that this conflict will not go away by itself and necessitates recognition.  
 
The persistence of marking this event every year (despite it being legal or not, 
depending on the year) has been a major pressure point on the government due to the 
public nature of the gatherings, as well as the massive and widespread turnout. Speeches 
held by Kurdish politicians in Kurdish, in the years that this was still illegal, can be seen 
as a deliberate defiance and form of resistance to the status-quo on the situation for 
Kurds in Turkey of those years, only strengthened by the size of the audience that these 
events attracted. Moreover, the playing of Kurdish music, dancing and other cultural 
markers for Kurds have been integral to these mass meetings as a form of protest and 
resistance. 
 
 Lastly, in relation to this latter point, the letters written by Öcalan to be publicly read at 
Newroz are similarly more powerful when read at such a symbolic and well-known 
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event for Kurds, and have therefore also been able to be important signals and essential 
milestones for the peace process, for instance with the calling of the ceasefire in 2013. 
The transfer ability of making public statements in such a forum shows the strength and 
importance that lie in the organization of such events to communicate the public will. 
 
Case 9.b) “Peace Tent/Democratic Solution” Civil Disobedience Campaign (March 
2011)  
 
The “Peace Tent” civil disobedience campaign of the Kurdish political and wider social 
grassroots movement, in mobilization towards the June 2011 elections, is considered a 
“Model 9: Mass Action” This model is exemplified in the framework as including 
events that are similar to (but not limited to) campaigns, demonstration, street action, 
protests, rallies and petitions, for instance. These should be organized with the aim of 
putting large scale pressure on the negotiating parties, according to the framework to: 
end violence, sign an agreement, bring about regime change, or add pertinent issues to 
the negotiation agenda.  
 
In some form or another, the mobilizations that took place surrounding the Democratic 
Solution initiative can be considered to have been called to pressure the government 
towards all the four aims presented earlier. The movements demands (arguably for a 
future process, since publicly, the existence of the ongoing Oslo talks was not known) 
included the action of the government towards language rights, prisoner rights, electoral 
law and the end of violence in the South-East, and the signing of an agreement towards 
this end. Stretching the demands of this mobilization (and other mobilizations towards 
Kurdish rights, particularly those supporting the PKK and its affiliated social and 
political organs), regime change can be seen as an underlining demand, if not directly, 
in terms of the change of government, also in a deeper sense in the wish for a re-
structuring of the State in terms of the wish for the devolution of power regionally, and 
“democratic autonomy”, and increased cultural, political and social rights for Kurds. 
 
The peace tents can be seen as an initiative, which again similar to other Model 9´s 
which will be discussed further down, and general mass mobilization in the Kurdish 
political movement, which is called for or encouraged, usually by the Pro-Kurdish party 
existent at the time (in this case, the BDP), and at times from the PKK or affiliated 
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organizations (i.e. the KCK), who then have connections to, and support from, the 
grassroots and public. At the peace tent in Istanbul, in Aksaray square for instance, the 
BDP members underlined that this was a “grassroots” initiative, however the reality was 
that the party did call for the initiative (announced after the Newroz celebrations that 
year, in Diyarbakir), and the tents formed an important part of their election campaign. 
However, the communal and civil disobedience aspect of the events cannot be 
discounted as simply an “initiative from above”, as the events filtered down to the very 
local level, with widespread adherence, meaning that local and civil society engagement 
from “below” was also important, and vocal in the organization of these events. Lastly, 
the adherence and participation of such a large audience means the aims of the project  
were also largely agreed with and shared in the Kurdish population as demands that 
they wished to be heard and communicated to the government. 
Table 3 - Summary of main activity, model type, and additional activities, per case: 
 
 
 Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 “X” 
Actors and activities            
1) Free Women’s 
Democratic 
Movement  
           
Model 4: “Consultations” 
“Women´s Initiative for 
Peace” 
    X       
Overseeing the withdrawal 
of PKK guerilla. 
(Dersim/Tunceli) and 
consulting women. 
           
Academic research reports, 
and workshops            
Lobbying, Track I,1.5, (i.e. 
Presentation to Wise 
Peoples commission) 
           
Small protest (2009 -2013)            
Civil disobedience actions            
Artistic reconciliation 
initiative (Film festival)             
2) Ekopolitik  
            
Model 6: “Track 1.5 
conflict resolution 
workshop”: Grand Dome 
of Turkey 
      X     
People-to-people (Track 
III): (Hakkari, Mersin)             
Lobbying: High level 
briefings, meetings and 
interaction with local 
authorities 
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 Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 “X” 
Public events, dialogues 
and conferences, lectures 
with students and media  
           
CR training: with police 
academy (psycho-social)            
3) TESEV  
            
Model 4: “Consultations” 
TESEV Peace Process 
Research with Track I 
    X       
Academic: publications, 
workshops and conferences 
(under the 
“democratization” and 
“good governance” 
programs) 
           
Lobbying: Track I, I.5 ( i.e. 
informing politicians on 
research findings, 
collaborating on projects) 
           
Monitoring: Constitutional 
process project (website)            
Artistic: Documentary on 
IDP compensation            
Public events and press 
conferences            
People-to-people (Track 
III): exchange through the 
“Encounters” project 
(Diyarbakir – Trabzon) 
           
4) Hafiza Merkezi            
Model X: Transitional 
justice initiative           X 
Legal advocacy: (online 
database, following court 
cases with local law offices 
and the ECHR) 
           
Workshops, conferences, 
and events             
artistic 
exhibitions/documentaries            
Documentation: research, 
online database, reports.            
Artistic/Reconciliation 
Initiative: Documentaries, 
book project, exhibitions. 
           
Academic: i.e. Regional 
Network on Reconciliation 
and Historical Dialogue, 
research reports, 
conferences, workshops. 
           
5) Wise Peoples 
Commission            
Model 7: “Public 
Participation”: Nation-
wide consultations 
   X    X    
6) Columbia Uni.            
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 Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 “X” 
Model 6: “Track 1.5 
Conflict Resolution 
Workshop”: Roundtable 
on the Kurdish Peace 
process 
      X     
7) Constitutional 
Reconciliation 
Commission/TEPAV: 
Constitutional 
Platform 
           
“Model 7: Public 
Participation”        X   X 
8) Human Rights 
Foundation (IHD)            
Model 9: “Mass Actions” 
The Saturday Mothers           X  
Legal support/advocacy            
Documentation of human 
rights abuses, reports, and 
dissemination of 
information. 
           
Social mobilization and 
protest (on a smaller scale, 
not in the “mass”) 
           
9) Social 
Mobilization/Protest 
of the Kurdish 
Political and Social 
Movement 
           
Model 9: “Mass Actions”: 
(a.) Newroz celebration 
(2008 – 2014)t 
         X  
“Mass Actions”: 
(b.) Peace /Democratic 
Solution Tent - protests 
         X  
Smaller civil disobedience             
 
In sum we can see from the analysis and coding of the different case studies of actors 
that different models of participation, but also additional, outlying activities, emerge 
from the data obtained. Below, a table summarizing these findings is displayed, with the 
main activity (corresponding to a model from the framework in most cases) is listed in 
bold after the actors name, followed by additional activities, in italics, which have not 
been attempted classified according to the models in the framework as they were not 
applicable. Concluding remarks on the findings will be made in the next chapter. 
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  a	  Kaos GL’s 3rd International Feminist Forum was supported by SIDA, the Norwegian 
Embassy, Urgent Action Fund for Women’s Human Rights, Frontline Defenders, 
Mediterranean Women’s Fund and Ankara University KASAUM.   For more 
information please see event description: http://www.kaosgl.com/page.php?id=16085. 	  b	  “In October 2009, one month before the first meeting of Ekopolitik, 34 Kurds had left 
the PKK´s base in the Kandil mountains entering Turkey at a checkpoint on the Iraqi 
border, with the permission of Öcalan. They were dubbed the “Peace Group”, they were 
all allowed to go free without any trial. Beşis Atalay announced in a public statement 
that this was part of the “Kurdish Initiative” of the government, and that similar moves 
were to follow. The move and announcment produced a public outcry however, as the 
fighters were depicted in full uniform.” (Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p. 383.) 	  c	  Unlike other trainings led by Professor Volkan, none of the Ekopolitik core group 
members were trained in psychdynamic approaches to small- or large-group meetings. 
However, in 2010, Ayla Yazıcı, a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst based in Istanbul 
became part of the core group, acting as an advisor on psychological knowledge on 
these social issues to the Ekopolitik staff and the student volunteers. (Volkan, Enemies 
on the Couch, p. 381.) 	  d	  “There are identity problems in Turkey in which people ‘otherize’ each other,” Çelenk 
said. “With the help of Vamık Volkan, we gather people using a methodological 
technique, the conflict-resolution method, which aims to bring enemies together.”, 
“Ekopolitik sets up moderate meeting of Turkey´s extremists”, Hürriyet Daily News. 	  e	  “In spite of this unfortunate outcome (referring to the split in the organization) I knew 
that the work they had carried out during the previous couple of years had been 
extremely important for Turkey. It brought a public voice to the surface, one with which 
previously unspoken ideas could be discussed respectfully. It showed that citizens were 
tired of seemingly unending terror and military actions and that there was a realistic 
political way to find peaceful and satisfactory solutions that were acceptable to the 
general public.” (Volkan, Enemies on the Couch, p. 387.) 	  f	  TESEV´s constitutional monitoring website is the following: http://www.failibelli.org/ 	  g	  The Hafiza Merkezi website is: www.hakikatadalethafiza.org. 	  h 	  Related local and international institutions can be found at the link below: 
http://www.hakikatadalethafiza.org/calisma.aspx?PageId=179&LngId=5. 	  i	  “The initial project idea was suggested by Belinda Cooper of the World Policy 
Institute after attending Hafıza Merkezi’s first workshop on Memorialization in 
December 2011.”, (“Regional network of alliance”, Hafiza Merkezi website.) 
j	  The memorialize turkey project website: http://www.memorializeturkey.com/en/.	  	  k	  The database on enforced dissapearances is found at: www.zorlakaybetmelar.org. 	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  l	  “Before the delegation started its work, Erdogan had said that they will be working 
together with the Prime Ministry’s Undersecretariat for Public Order and Security, but 
this was eventually put aside.” (Gürsel, “Erdoğan asks ´Wise People´”.) 	  m	  “Who are these Wise People? The vast majority of them are figures who are known to 
be pro-government, some with Islamic identities or those who would think of criticizing 
the government as the very last resort But their common denominator is to believe in 
and advocate for a peace solution to the Kurdish question. Nevertheless, the delegation 
with former AKP deputies and parliamentary candidates is expected to promote the 
peace process formulated and implemented by Erdogan.” (Gürsel, “Erdoğan asks ´Wise 
People´”.) 	  n 	  The sub-groups report from the wise people´s commission are available at the 
following website (in Turkish): 
http://www.ukam.org/RaporlarDetay.aspx?id=20#.Uy3Sqi69Kc1	  	  o	  “…since early March, there have been organized military operations in Sirnak, 
Dersim, Mus, Bingol, Hakkari, Diyarbakir and Batman leading to the deaths of seven 
guerrillas.” In addition, the PKK announced the death of three Turkish soldiers in this 
time period. (“Newroz 2011: Democratic Peace Tents and Kurds”, KNK, p. 2) 	  p	  Except for the ongoing, secret Oslo Talks, which were not public at the time. 	  q	  “According to the traditional myth the people gained their freedom from a despotic 
king on Newroz. Also known as the start of the spring festival, Newroz symbolizes 
freedom for the people. Newroz has become a stage for full public rebellion for the 
Kurds through their struggle for freedom and rights over the past 20 years. So far, 
hundreds of Kurds have lost their lives during Newroz celebrations due to the severity 
of the state’s response.” (“Newroz 2011: Democratic Peace Tents and Kurds”, KNK, p. 
2) 	  r	  This could arguably also be noted that is possible as this study is examining one 
context and case study only, the Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey, while the 
“Broadening Participation” project is conducting a review of 60 peace processes and 
political transitions across the globe, and must therefore maintain a more limited view. 	  s	  The point should be made here that by “peace process”, the general societal, and also 
political, changes taking place instigated by a formal peace process are considered to be 
part of this process here. This is not limited to the Track I process only. I want to make 
this clarification as many civil society and other sectors would disagree that they are 
“supporting” or “part of” the official peace process, as they may either be against it, or 
doubt if the current effort is genuine, is in fact a peace process at all, or may be against 
its´ current format, and so will highlight that their efforts are “pointing in the same 
direction”, but are not set in place to facilitate the efforts of the government specifically. 	  t	  Newroz took place from 2008 – 2014 once each year, so will be counted 7 times.	  
	   171	  
Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 
According to the findings and analysis of the previous chapter (summarized in the final 
table), classifying the selected actors activities according to the “Broadening 
Participation” framework, Model 9 (“Mass Mobilization”) was overall the most 
common model, occurring nine times (as Newroz celebrations were counted for each 
year they were surveyed, 2008 - 2014). Apart from this Model 4 (“Consultations”) 6 
(“High level civil society initiative”) and 7 (“Public participation” involving the broader 
population via public hearings; opinion polls; town hall meetings or signature 
campaigns”) each occurred twice each. Model 3 (“Official consultative forums parallel 
to negotiations”) occurred only once, along with two cases of  Model X (for outliers). 
 
Table 4 - Model Occurrence in the Broadening Participation Framework 
Model Occurrence 
1) Direct representation at the negotiation table 0 
2) Observer status, direct presence during the negotiations 0 
3) Official consultative forums parallel to negotiations 1 
4) Consultations, less formal consultations without official 
endorsement 
2 
5) Inclusive post-agreement mechanisms, participation of societal 
and political actors in implementation institutions and mechanisms 
0 
6) High-level civil society initiatives, non-official track 2 or track 1 
½ facilitation initiatives in the pre-negotiation phase or parallel to 
official negotiations 
2 
7) Public participation, involving the broader population via public 
hearings; opinion polls; town hall meetings or signature campaigns 
2 
8) Public decision-making, referenda and other elective forms 
putting major political decisions to binding public vote 
0 
9) Mass action, campaigns, demonstration, street action, protests, 
and petitions 
9 
X) Anything that follows outside the above mentioned categories, 
with the possibility of constituting an additional model. 
2 
The aim of this research was to test the analytical strength of the Broadening 
Participation framework, in order to classify instances of inclusion in a peace process. 
The aim was to be able to look beyond the framework and identify additional activities, 
which may add richness and detail to the description of these mechanisms. In order to 
make conclusions on the applicability of the models that did occur in this case (the 
models that did not occur will not be discussed in detail), and possible modifications, 
each occurring model will be discussed individually according to the data obtained in 
the following section on theoretical implications. This section will then be followed by 
a final discussion on policy related findings and outcomes of this research. 
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Theoretical Implications 
According to the analysis of the previous chapter, Model 4 (“Consultations”) was a 
useful model, perhaps allowing to its rather wide interpretation, its full description 
being simply “less formal consultations without official endorsement”. In general, this 
did not put any restrictions as to the format. For instance the Women for Peace Initiative 
were consulted by the Wise peoples commission. However, their preparatory work for 
this consultation was done through additional activities, such as two conferences 
dialoguing with a cross-section of women, in order to influence the peace process, as 
well as through research, and subsequent site visits parallel to conducting a monitoring 
of the withdrawal process. Moreover, the flexibility of the consultations not needing to 
be officially endorsed was helpful for this classification as a Model 4, as the Women for 
Peace were not officially represented in the negotiations, and had no official role. 
Moreover, consultations could take different forms, as long as they had the same aim, to 
influence and consult with Track I, as for instance TESEV conducted research and 
briefings with top tier ministers in order to inform, academically, the peace process. 
 
Although Model 5 (“Inclusive post-agreement mechanisms”) did not occur, it will be 
shortly discussed as the CRC could have been classified as this model. This model´s 
description could clearly be less restrictive on the stage of the peace process (and not 
only negotiations) that it aims to identify. As has already been outlined, a slight 
modification could be made for the purpose of this study to this model in this respect, 
re-naming Model 5 “Inclusive parallel mechanism” as opposed to “post-agreement”. 
The full description of the model outlines: “participation of societal and political actors 
in implementation institutions and mechanisms”. However, an inclusive institutional 
mechanism, like the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, can clearly take place 
in parallel, as part of an ongoing peace process, not necessarily needing to wait for an 
agreement, especially in circumstances where democratization and peace are related. 
Alternatively, the CRC as a “parallel inclusive mechanism” could potentially be 
considered a “Model X” where such high level, and institutional mechanisms of 
inclusion take place in parallel to negotiations, and not in the post-agreement phase. 
 
The experience with the various Model 6´s (“High-level civil society initiatives”) 
identified was that although it was clustered a few times, there were several 
participation exercises that were “borderline” to this model (and which, for security´s 
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sake, were clustered as simply Model “X”). The full description of this model 
encompassed: “non-official track 2 or track 1 ½ facilitation initiatives in the pre-
negotiation phase or parallel to official negotiations”. Firstly, there was not much space 
for more peacebuilding, Track III, i.e. people-to-people exercises (which may be 
organized or facilitated by Track II or 1.5 at times) such as those conducted by think-
tanks and NGO´s (such as TESEV and Hafiza Merkezi) to be included in this model. 
Hence, perhaps a more generous multi-track approach could be allowed Model 6. 
Moreover, the wide array of academic workshops and conferences, which were in many 
cases attended by Track I or 1.5, posed difficult to cluster. The format and types of 
events that encompassed Model 6 simply were difficult to ascertain, meaning that 
perhaps more examples or clues might be helpful in this models future description.  
 
Activities which could have potentially been classified as Model 9 (“Mass 
Mobilization”), including smaller protests and mobilizations, generally weren´t because 
of the restriction on size (by “mass”) in order to constitute a model. Smaller, but 
sustained or frequent, protests were in this case also no classified according to this 
reading of Model 9, as not being  inclusive of smaller and more informal activities and 
mobilization. Moreover, the description of Model 9 (“Mass mobilization”) as 
encompassing “Mass action, campaigns, demonstration, street action, protests, and 
petitions” was constricting in classifying cases of civil disobedience actions in general  
(which encompassed the sustained activities of, for instance, the Saturday Mothers). In 
terms of more symbolic and creative forms of resistance and protest, the flexibility of 
Model 9 (“Mass Mobilization”) remained unclear, and could be increased, at least to 
involve the term “civil disobedience”, which is widely used in conflict contexts, and in 
the Turkish case especially, as it is widely employed by the Kurdish social and political 
movement which employ tactics such as hunger-strikes and “sit-ins” regularly. 
 
Lastly, all the other types of outlying activities, which remained un-clustered according 
to the Broadening Participation framework, consisted of a wide array of activities, 
mostly aimed at peacebuilding at the societal level, but also some aimed at higher-level, 
and inter-track activity and communication were left un-clustered. For instance, 
activities pertaining to the fields of the arts and culture (all of Hafiza Merkezi/Depo 
activities), societal reconciliation and healing (Grand Dome of Turkey psycho-social 
trainings), memorialization and transitional justice (Hafiza Merkezi), as well as 
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documentation and legal advocacy (IHD and Hafiza Merkezi) did not seem to fit within 
any of the models. This despite their clear connection to wanting to add pertinent issues 
to the conversations on the Kurdish conflict, ranging from the societal level (Track III), 
to the Track II and 1.5 level, and up to the Track I (depending on the aims of the 
individual actors and projects, which differed). The lobbying and cross-track facilitation 
that took place (by TESEV and Women´s Initiative for Peace, for instance) shows the 
inter-related developments that take place between the different tracks, when it comes to 
i.e. conferences and research, that may also take other forms then Model 4 
“Consultations”. Clearly, the activities un-clustered in the table were those of a more 
broad peacebuilding and conflict transformation nature, which weren´t discounted as 
participation mechanisms in the broader peace process, in the view taken by this 
research. Despite lacking a clear “transfer” mechanism to Track I in the views of the 
“Broadening Participation” framework, this thesis argues that the transfer could 
potentially be extended, and measured in other ways, in a broader sense, as exercising 
influence from the societal and organizational level, up to the higher tracks. 
 
In sum, the results of this picture demonstrate that the “Broadening Participation” 
framework attempts to look at both direct and indirect, and “high” and “low” level 
initiatives of participation in peace negotiations (and political transitions), (as 
exemplified by the inclusion of Model 9 at all as a model). However, the framework is 
still relatively heavy on the track I, elite driven participation side, with less focus given 
to the wider activities of track 1.5, II and III peacebuilding initiatives that are more 
“bottom-up” in a wider peace process. From the data compiled on the different actors 
varied activities towards participation in the Kurdish peace processes, whether direct 
(through seeking contact and interaction with Track I), or through more indirect means 
(by pursuing agendas more geared towards peacebuilding, supporting the peace process, 
but at a greater “distance”), was uncovered. The complexity and varied nature of this 
participation poses a challenge. When attempting to organize and cluster this 
information, certain lacks of the framework of the nine models were discovered.  
 
The “Broadening Participation” study underlines that the models are tentative and may 
be subject to change (after the results from the ongoing study are obtained), and in no 
way claims to be an exhaustive list (as evidenced by the inclusion of a “Model X” to 
capture additional models that may be identified). Therefore, it is a framework open to 
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suggestions and changes. As a case study employing such a new and flexible 
framework, the usefulness of the models was seen, however, certain nuances seemed to 
be missing from these categories. As can be seen in the summarizing table in the 
previous chapter, the lack of more models (apart from model 9) addressing more 
specific forms of participation in civil society and society at large is still missing. For 
instance, some of the categories of functions of civil society, identified in Paffenholz´s 
2010 study on civil society and their peacebuilding functions, demonstrates the 
possibility that peacebuilding and “lower level” initiatives can be classified, not just as 
functions, but also as forms of inclusion and participation in an ongoing peace process, 
as this thesis demonstrates. Hence this research concludes with the thought that perhaps 
Paffenholz´s earlier work could be a starting point to inform the later “Broadening 
Participation” framework, and similar exercises seeking to identify mechanisms of 
inclusion and participation, in the direction of being less elite and Track I centered, and 
taking the wider view on participation.a This seems counter-intuitive as the aim of the 
project is namely to broaden participation, however, with the many activities left 
unclassified, clearly the models are still to exclusive and selective in terms of 
classifying what participation “is” and “is not”.  
 
Additionally, the instances of creative, arts-based, psycho-psychological, reconciliation 
initiatives at Tracks II and III in society, as well as different symbolic forms of protest 
as civil disobedience for example, forms of participation, often considered “soft” forms 
of conflict resolution, should be allocated a space in the framework, and consider 
participation in its own right. As this research demonstrates, there was a rich base of 
such activities taking place beforehand, as well as in parallel to the ongoing peace 
process. Moreover, this form of activity has a long history and is a sustained form of 
participation which will most likely not falter, according to the actors themselves, 
should the formal Track I negotiations fail. Therefore, though perhaps not so visible to 
the high level peace process realm, participation in different shapes and sizes must be 
considered in order to get a firm grasp of what “participation” really entails, and to 
examine the richness and possibilities it holds. 
 
Policy implications 
Examples of participation mechanisms can be witnessed from the different designs of 
international cases of peace processes. These can range from and include Truth 
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Commissions (such as in South Africa), Consultative Civil Society Bodies (Such as in 
El Salvadorian), the writing of a Peace Process Report (Guatemala), or Civil Society 
“Round Tables” (as in Colombia), to “Wise People” committees, consisting of civilian 
intellectuals, who inform public opinion on the peace process (as was the case in the 
current process in Turkey). Such different forms of participation take place at different 
levels of societal dialogue during conflict and can include a variety of societal actors, 
which can perform a range of different functions and roles. 
 
Turkey´s democratization efforts can be seen to go hand in hand, and to essentially be 
intertwined with, the peace process in terms of increasing the legal rights of Kurds, in 
cultural, social and political terms, but also more widely in fostering a climate of respect 
for minorities more generally in Turkey. This process has especially spurred by Turkeys 
EU harmonization process since the early the 2000’s, showing important steps towards 
moving from a frozen conflict towards the commencement of a peaceful resolution, 
which will be a longer process than simply the agreement on a peace process through 
negotiations.  
 
This ongoing democratization process, as well as Turkey´s recent social turmoil related 
to the “Gezi Protests” of summer 2013 and leading up to the March 2014 local elections 
and August presidential elections, shows not only important transitions from armed 
conflict to peace ongoing in Turkey, but also wider political and social transformations 
nationally. These changes are also taking place in the context of regional upheaval, with 
the so-called “Arab spring” revolutions and the violent social and political conflicts, and 
ongoing transitions or political stalemates, that have enveloped the entire region. If we 
expand the picture even further, the world is increasingly seeing unprecedented 
instances of citizens and social movements participation towards change or protest in 
light of event such as the global economic crisis, climate change, or demands for 
increased democratic rights and freedoms. 
 
These national, regional and international inter-linked processes are increasingly 
creating a demand for more transparency, and space for participation by citizens in a 
country with traditionally hierarchical and closed political structure, such as Turkey. As 
peace processes have been deemed to be political opportunities for inclusion and the 
establishment of future political norms and democratizing efforts, the notion of 
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inclusion and participation in the peace process itself, and in wider peacebuilding 
attempts, are important indicators not only as to the sustainability of a peace process, 
but also in terms of the securement of its future implementation and sustainability. 
These reflections are important for Turkey, but apply for other conflict situations too. 
 
This thesis refocuses not only on “civil society”, but also other forms of organizations 
and initiatives that are actively participating in the activities of fact finding, 
reconciliation and peacebuilding, or in some other way supporting, or attempting to 
influence in some way the peace process, in tune with its related themes, aims and 
activities. Clearly, there is a need to examine this ongoing case from new angles. The 
lessons learned from the previous rounds of talks in Turkey´s Kurdish conflict, and in 
the current processes, could possibly be of immediate concern and implementation for 
ongoing efforts at a policy, academic and practical level to resolving the conflict. The 
knowledge and experience that the “lower” tracks (track 1.5, II and III) possess in 
participating for a peace process in Turkey could clearly be capitalized on further by 
Track I, and could demonstrate a learning exercise for peace processes elsewhere. 
Especially in this context where the majority of the work for peace and reconciliation 
has been implemented and pioneered by lower tracks, the study of their participation is 
vital, in relation to this case study, but also for other similar cases elsewhere. 
 
Only through the understanding and familiarization with studying “lower tracks” and 
“bottom-up” processes in times of political transitions, or transitions to peace, can we 
begin to shift our attention away from the elite-driven processes that certainly influence, 
but seldom can on its own, sustain a peace or political agreement. The concept of 
participation lies central, both in terms of the legitimacy and acceptance of an 
agreement, as well as its later implementation and maintenance, to the “success” of a 
negotiated settlement. It is clear that a shift as to what we see as “important” or 
“influential” in a peace process must be turned on its head, if we are really to study such 
a socially and politically transformative process as resolving conflicts for good. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  The forms in which these two theoretical approaches could be merged is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.	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